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Abstract
This thesis includes a collection of three distinct essays that study empirically the determ-
inants of health and human capital and build a foundation for policy interventions.
Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between giving birth through unplanned caesarean
section and mothers’ mental health after childbirth. Previous studies have mostly explored
the impact of this procedure on hospital expenditure and newborns, ignoring its effect on
the new mothers’ health. This chapter extends the literature by showing that having an
unplanned caesarean section increases the risk of postnatal depression. The effect is even
larger when accounting for the endogeneity of delivery method.
Chapter 3 uses a sample including all patients who received a coronary bypass during the
period 2000-2010 within the English National Health Service to shed light on the effect
of long waiting times for elective surgeries on patients’ health. Waiting times have been
extensively used as a non-price rationing mechanism in countries with universal health care
systems. However, it is unclear whether rationing by waiting harms individuals’ health.
We find no evidence of waiting times increasing the risk of in-hospital mortality and an
adverse but weak effect on 28-day emergency readmission following discharge.
With Chapter 4, the focus is shifted from healthcare systems to families, looking at
the determinants of parental investments in children. We explore how parents’ time
investment, namely the amount of time they spend in formative activities with their
children, responds to variations in their offspring’s health, cognitive and socio-emotional
abilities. Results indicate that mothers react differently to changes in different dimensions
of the child’s human capital; more specifically, they compensate for reductions in children’s
socio-emotional abilities. We also observe heterogeneous behaviours, which depend on
mothers’ level of education and working status.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis covers themes on the determinants of individuals’ human capital, with a
particular emphasis on health. Many factors combine together to affect the health of
individuals and communities. They include the social, economic and physical environment
and the person’s individual characteristics and behaviours (Evans and Stoddart, 1990;
Zweifel et al., 2009). In general they can be classified into two categories: those on which
individuals can exert a direct control (such as smoking, unhealthy dietary behaviours) and
those that do not depend directly on their choices, such as healthcare services or family
support. The latter factors are of arguable importance in shaping individuals’ health. Lack
of access to care or access to poor quality services can worsen individuals’ health in an
irreversible way. On the other hand, family support (both financial and emotional) is
particularly important during childhood, when children’s health and development strongly
depend on parents’ ability to take care of them (Currie and Almond, 2011).
In this thesis, I analyse these two determinants of individuals’ health – healthcare services
and family support – from different perspectives. Chapters 2 and 3 build on the theoretical
framework of the health production models (Grossman, 1972), defining health as a capital
stock that depends on a combination of medical and non-medical inputs. They explore the
impact of emergency caesarean deliveries on new mothers’ mental health (Chapter 2) and
the relationship between waiting times for elective surgeries and patients’ health (Chapter
3). Chapter 4 estimates a parental allocation model (see Becker and Tomes, 1986; Behrman
et al., 1982) and investigates the role of parents in their children’s development by showing
how their time investment in children depends on their offspring’s human capital. To study
these questions and to inform policy on how to improve individuals’ well being, this thesis
uses a variety of micro-econometric techniques to account for individual heterogeneity and
endogeneity in an attempt to identify causal relationships. In the following, the motivation
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for the empirical analyses implemented in each essay is briefly discussed and the structure
of the entire thesis is outlined.
Chapter 2 investigates the health cost for new mothers to give birth through emergency
caesarean section. The utilization of this surgical procedure has spread remarkably in
recent years in different countries, regardless of the type of healthcare system (and relative
incentives for physicians) and women’s health needs (Bragg et al., 2010; Gibbons et al.,
2010). The World Health Organization (WHO) has also called attention to this phenomenon,
arguing that caesarean section may be associated with short- and long-term risk, which can
last many years beyond the current delivery (WHO Executive Summary 2015). Chapter
2 contributes to the literature on this topic by identifying the causal effect of emergency
caesarean deliveries on mothers’ mental health. In particular, it shows that mothers
who give birth through this procedure are more likely to experience postnatal depression.
Mental health issues in general, and postnatal depression in particular, have been found to
largely impact the mother’s life, being associated with a deterioration of mother’s physical
well being, her relationship with the partner and her ability to take care of the child. As a
result, emergency caesarean deliveries are expected to harm not only mothers, but also
their families.
The identification of the risk of postnatal depression associated with emergency caesarean
delivery is obtained by employing an extensive set of information on mothers’ health and
socio-economic status, as well as on their pregnancy and fertility history from the first
wave of the UK Millennium Cohort Study. Because mothers who have an emergency
caesarean section might be systematically different from mothers who give birth naturally,
in terms of their own health and of the health of their children in a way unobservable to
the researcher, I correct for the potential consequent endogeneity bias by instrumenting the
delivery method with a binary variable indicating a breech position of the baby in the womb
before the delivery. The presence of unobserved hospital characteristics affecting both the
risk of postnatal depression and the probability of having an emergency caesarean delivery
is controlled with hospital fixed effects. Results demonstrate that having an emergency
caesarean delivery increases the risk of postnatal depression, and the effect is larger when
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
Chapter 3 explores the role of healthcare systems in affecting individuals’ health. If
patients face difficulties in accessing healthcare services, they may have prolonged pain
and, depending on the nature and severity of their condition, suffer permanent damages to
their health. One of the factors limiting access to healthcare is waiting times for elective
treatments, a non-price rationing mechanism adopted in countries with public healthcare
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systems and low patient cost sharing to limit the demand of healthcare (Smith and Sutton,
2013). While waiting times are justified by the need to limit the potential infinite demand
of healthcare and the principle that access to healthcare services should be granted on the
basis of health needs regardless of patients’ socio-economic status, they also raise concerns
about their potential negative effect on patients’ health. Indeed, if a patient waits for a
long period, by the time he or she receives the treatment, his/her health condition may
have worsened and the gain from the treatment thus reduced.
This chapter provides evidence of the effect of long waiting times on the probability of
in-hospital mortality and emergency readmission following the surgery for patients in
need of a coronary bypass. This procedure is a common elective heart revascularization
surgery, with about thousands patients treated in England every year. It carries a high
risk of short-term mortality (about 1 per cent of the patients die while in the hospital for
the surgery) and complications (e.g. infection, arrhythmias, heart failure), which lead to
hospital readmission (4 per cent of the patients).1 Contrary to the previous literature,
which relies on relatively small samples of patients admitted to a limited number of health
centres, this study uses administrative data on all the inpatient admissions in the English
NHS hospitals (the Hospital Episode Statistics, HES) over eleven years (2000/01-2010/11).
In this period a number of policy initiatives have been introduced to reduce waiting times,
leading to a sharp decrease in the average wait for many elective surgeries, not only for
coronary bypass (Siciliani et al., 2014). We exploit such variation in waiting times over
the years and across providers to estimate hospital fixed effects models combined with
instrumental variable methods that control for patients’ severity and hospital unobserved
factors, which jointly affect the wait and patients’ health (e.g. protocols, standard of care).
Waiting times show no effect on in-hospital mortality risk and are only weakly associated
with an increase in patients’ probability to be readmitted as an emergency. These results
are consistent across model specifications and seem to support the use of waiting times as
a form of rationing.
Chapter 4 focuses on other health promoters, parents. Recent studies demonstrate that
parental investments during childhood have important effects on the physical health and
on the cognitive and socio-emotional skills of children (Aizer and Cunha, 2012; Carneiro
and Heckman, 2003), which in turn are strong predictors of long-term outcomes such
as educational attainments, adult health behaviours and wages (Heckman et al., 2006).
However, it is still unclear what drives parental investments in children and, in particular,
whether they respond to children’s needs. Chapter 4 sheds light on this aspect by studying
1Calculations based on our study, using the Hospital Episode Statistics.
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whether parents change their time investments in children to compensate for or reinforce
children’s low human capital. An important innovation of this study is the definition of
parental time investment as the quality time mothers and fathers spend with their children
in formative activities; this is computed using details from time-use diaries available in the
Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC). Using this measure, we are able to
overcome potential issues of recall errors and social desirability, which typically undermine
self-reported measures of family investments.
This study further contributes to the literature by analysing simultaneously how parental
time investments respond to three different dimensions of child human capital: physical
health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills. Allowing for the possibility that parental
investment varies with changes in child’s health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills, we
aim at reconciling varied findings from previous studies.
The response of parental time investment to changes in their offspring’s human capital
is estimated by adopting a child fixed effect model combined with instrumental variable
methods to account for the issues of unobserved variables and reverse causality. Both
mothers and fathers are found to compensate for a reduction in child’s socio-emotional
skills, but while mothers invest equally between sons and daughters, fathers seem to react
only to changes in sons’ skills. Working mothers compensate less than non-working mothers,
suggesting the importance of flexible work arrangements in order to allow mothers more
time to spend time with their child. Finally, we find differences in the investment behaviours
according to mothers’ educational level. While mothers with a university degree react to
low cognitive abilities, mothers without such degree compensate for low socio-emotional
skills.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarising the key findings of each of the three main
chapters and providing suggestions for future research.
4
Chapter 2
Mother’s health after childbirth:
does delivery method matter?
5
2.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades a dramatic growth in the caesarean section (CS) rate has
been recorded in many developed countries. In England, for example, the overall rate
was about nine per cent in the 1980s, while nowadays more than one-fourth of women
gives birth through caesarean delivery (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2009;
Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2012), implying that the incidence of this
surgical procedure has almost tripled over the last 30 years. Similar patterns have been
experienced by other countries (Declercq et al., 2006; Macfarlane et al., 2015), raising
questions regarding the economic implications of alternative delivery methods.
Concerns about the increase of caesarean sections are justified by the higher economic and
health costs associated with this procedure compared to a normal delivery. Indeed, while
it is undeniable that caesarean deliveries have life-saving effects for mothers and children,
especially for those that have concurrent health conditions (Gholitabar et al., 2011), it is
also recognised that this procedure is very expensive. Looking at the burden to the National
Health Service in England, Petrou et al. (2002) estimated that the healthcare costs in the
first two months after childbirth are equal to £1,698 and £3,200 for natural and caesarean
deliveries respectively.1 Gruber and Owings (1996) focused on the medical reimbursement
system in the U.S. and estimated that a caesarean delivery costs 66 per cent more than a
natural delivery.2 While accounting for financial costs, these studies tend to ignore indirect
and intangible costs, such as the additional risk for mothers’ health. As highlighted in the
economic evaluation literature,3 failing to account for these factors may lead to inaccurate
evaluations of this procedure and, as a consequence, to the implementation of inappropriate
health policies.
Understanding the impact of having a caesarean delivery on mothers’ health also has
important implications for child development. Indeed, previous studies have shown a strong
link between the mother’s and the child’s health (e.g. Propper et al., 2007; Kiernan and
Huerta, 2008; Minkovitz et al., 2005; Coneus and Spiess, 2012). In particular, maternal
mental illness has been identified as an important determinant of the risk of poor mental
health and behaviour in children. In reviewing previous research, Goodman and Gotlib
(1999) found that children are adversely affected by their mother’s depression and this is
true for children ranging in age from infancy to adolescence. Perry (2008) provided an
1Price estimates in 1999–2000.
2When comparing the cost of caesareans with respect to natural deliveries is important to consider that,
depending on complications during the birth, a natural birth might not be much cheaper than a caesarean
delivery (Gruber and Owings, 1996).
3See Drummond (2005) for reference.
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explanation for such findings, showing how a significant improvement in children’s health
is observed when depressed mothers are treated. Also the World Health Organization
(WHO) has called attention to this issue, indicating a strong association between maternal
depression and high rates of infections, hospital admissions and reduced completion of
recommended schedules of immunization for children.
This paper aims to analyse the impact of caesarean sections on mothers’ mental health
after childbirth. Medical studies investigating this issue argue that caesarean deliveries are
expected to carry higher risks for mothers’ mental health compared to natural deliveries.
Indeed, women who have a caesarean delivery are more likely to suffer from physical pain
after childbirth and have longer and more difficult postnatal recovery, both conditions that
also affect their psychological wellbeing. Additionally, caesarean deliveries may have a
direct effect on mothers’ mental health due to separation of mothers and their babies in
the instants after the delivery.
However, previous literature investigating this issue has not yet reached a unanimous
consensus on whether having a caesarean delivery increases the risk of postnatal depression.
This may depend on the limitations that characterise some of these studies, such as the
small sample usually restricted to a particular geographic location or population cohort,
which does not allow to generalise the results to the entire population. Failure to distinguish
between elective (i.e. planned) and emergency caesareans might also represent an issue,
given that people tend to adjust better to traumatic events when they can predict or
prepare for them (Clement, 2001). Additionally, the variability in the source of information
on mother’s mental health (medical visits, self-completion questionnaires) and in the length
of postnatal period during which mothers develop depression (from a few weeks to one
year after childbirth) can contribute to explain such variability.4
This paper builds on the previous research by addressing some of these issues. I investigate
the effect of caesarean deliveries on the risk of postnatal depression by employing a
nationally-representative sample of British children (and mothers) obtained from the first
wave of the UK Millennium Cohort Study. I use a medium-term measure of postnatal
depression, measured by a dummy taking value equal to one if the mother reports to have
experienced a period of sadness lasting at least two weeks in the first nine months after
childbirth.
The focus of this paper is on the effect of unplanned caesarean deliveries; therefore,
caesareans planned in advanced are excluded from the analysis. This choice is justified by
4Waldenström (2004) shows that mothers’ feelings about the delivery experience change over time.
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two reasons. The first reason is related to the fact that elective and unplanned caesareans
can have very different consequences for the mental health of the mother. While both
types of caesareans are expected to have negative psychological consequences, the effect
is likely to be larger for women who give birth through an unplanned caesarean. Indeed,
unplanned caesarean deliveries are unexpected, usually mentally and physically stressful,
and associated with a loss of control and unmatched expectations. On the contrary, planned
caesareans are scheduled in advance, which allows the possibility for women to adjust
their expectations for this event. The second motivation concerns a limitation of the data
employed in the analysis. The UK Millennium Cohort Study does not collect information
on the reasons why a caesarean delivery has been planned, which can be related to mothers’
or foetus’ health needs, as well as can follow the mother’s request. Distinguishing between
the two cases is important because a different psychological impact of this procedure is
expected depending on the reason why it has been implemented.
The empirical model explaining the risk of postnatal depression is specified following the
standard health production models as theorized by Grossman (1972) and firstly estimated
by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). I adapt such framework by defining a maternal
mental health production function that includes medical, as well as socio-economic, factors
associated with the risk of postnatal depression. In a first instance, this is estimated using
linear probability models obtained from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and a probit model,
the latter to account for the binary nature of the outcome variable.
One major problem complicating the estimation of the causal effect of unplanned caesarean
sections on mother’s mental health is the potential endogeneity of the delivery method, due
to unobservable variables at mother or hospital level which jointly affect the probability of
unplanned caesareans and postnatal depression. For example, epidural anaesthesia has
been found to increase the risk of an unplanned delivery, but it is also associated with
a reduction of pain during labour, which turns into a lower psychological impact from
this event. Among hospital unobservable characteristics, hospital internal organisation
and availability of resources (e.g. medical staff and material goods) could both affect
the delivery method as well as the standard of care. Indeed, in a hospital with a low
nurse-to-patient ratio, women may receive less attention both during the labour and after
the delivery. This translates into (a) an increased risk of complications during the delivery,
which augments the probability of an unplanned caesarean and (b) less psychological
support after the delivery. On the other hand, scarce availability of operating rooms or
surgeons may be cause to avoid a (unplanned) caesarean delivery, even if preferable.
Endogeneity due to unobservable hospital factors is accounted for by estimating hospital
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fixed effects models, while I adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach to further
control for endogeneity due to the omission of mother-level variables. As a main identifying
instrument, I exploit information on baby’s position in the womb before delivery and in
particular whether or not the baby was in a breech position. I also use details on whether
the mother has suffered from pre-eclampsia during pregnancy, a hypertensive disorder, as an
additional instrument. The validity of these instruments is confirmed by an overidentified
test. The binary nature of the key variables of interest (delivery method and postnatal
depression) poses an additional econometric challenge to modelling the endogeneity of the
delivery method. I therefore estimate a bivariate probit model in addition to standard
linear IV models and compare the estimates as a way of validating the results.
Results show a negative impact of unplanned caesarean deliveries on mothers’ mental
health. Without accounting for endogeneity, I find that a woman who gives birth through
this procedure is 3.2 percentage points more likely to experience postnatal depression. The
sign and statistical significance of this effect is confirmed by IV estimates, even if in this
case marginal effects are larger (14.8-21.0 percentage points). This suggests that failing to
account for selection of delivery method leads to an underestimation of the true negative
impact of this procedure on maternal mental health.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature and discusses
the contribution of this paper. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the theoretical framework and
the methodology. Data are described in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 shows the main results and
discusses the validity of the instruments employed in the analysis. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
The worldwide increase in the utilisation of caesarean sections has attracted the attention
of researchers to this phenomenon. Economists and health scientists have extensively
investigated the medical and economic reasons explaining this trend, together with its
economic consequences for healthcare systems. Until now, however, there exist few papers
that have focused on the psychological impact of caesarean deliveries.
Evidence from previous studies examining the relationship between mode of delivery and
maternal mental health after childbirth is mixed, which makes it difficult to draw useful
conclusions from a policy perspective. Patel et al. (2005) compared rates of postnatal
depression for women who had an elective caesarean and women who had a planned natural
delivery, as well as between women who had an unplanned caesarean and those who gave
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birth naturally. Measuring postnatal depression eight weeks after childbirth and exploiting
data from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parent And Children, they found no difference
in the incidence of this disease among these groups of women. However, while this study
relied on good-quality data, it failed to account properly for systematic differences in
these groups of women. Postnatal depression rates are, indeed, adjusted only for those
factors that univariate analysis has shown to be associated with a higher risk of postnatal
depression.
Without distinguishing between planned and unplanned deliveries, Fisher et al. (1997)
found that caesarean sections increase the risk of postnatal depression. This result was
obtained from a prospective study of 272 voluntary women. However, because voluntary
women are a selected group, this sample was not random and results cannot be generalised
to the entire population.
Koo et al. (2003) used a retrospective comparative cohort study of 250 Malaysian women
interviewed at least six weeks after childbirth. They found that, with respect to women
having a non-emergency delivery, those who gave birth through caesarean section had
about twice the risk of developing postnatal depression.
The meta-analysis by Carter et al. (2006) examined the association between caesarean
section and postnatal depression, measured between 10 days and one year after delivery. The
authors mentioned methodological weaknesses and the possibility that having a caesarean
is a weak risk factor for postnatal depression as potential explanations for the absence of
clear evidence, suggesting that only high-quality studies may be able to identify such effect.
In their review of risk factors for postnatal depression, Robertson et al. (2004) classified
caesarean section as a weak determinant. They drew this conclusion using previous research
from Warner et al. (1996), Forman et al. (2000) and Johnstone et al. (2001) who did not
find any significant link, and that of Boyce and Todd (1992) and Hannah et al. (2002) who,
instead, found a highly significant association between this delivery method and postnatal
depression after three months and six weeks, respectively.
Overall, the validity of these studies relies on the assumption that the treatment (i.e.
giving birth through unplanned caesarean delivery) is randomly assigned. In other words,
they implicitly assume that women who had an unplanned caesarean do not differ from
those who gave birth naturally except through observable characteristics for which we can
control.5 However, because of data limitations, it is difficult to control for all factors that
5This is equivalent to what Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) call unconfoundedness assumption, which
assumes that adjusting for differences in observed pretreatment variables removes biases from comparisons
between treated (mothers who give birth through unplanned caesarean deliveries) and control units (mothers
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jointly affect the probability of having an unplanned caesarean and experiencing postnatal
depression.
In this paper, I account for the endogeneity of delivery method by implementing an
instrumental variable approach combined with hospital fixed effects (see Section 2.4 for
details).
2.3 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework used to motivate the relationship between medical, non-medical
inputs and health outcomes is the Grossman’s human capital model (Grossman, 1972). In
his seminal work, Grossman adapts the household production model proposed by Becker
(1965) to describe how individuals allocate their resources to produce health. Health is
considered a commodity capable of being produced and it is the result of individuals’
attempts to maximise their utility under a budget constraint. Individuals are assumed
to derive utility from their health and the consumption of market goods, some of which
may have a direct effect on their health condition. The production of health is defined by
a health production function where the consumption of medical care and other market
goods, as well as individuals’ behaviours, determine individuals’ health. As a result, health
inputs act as investments that influence the individual’s stock of health.
Since the publication of the Grossman model, this framework has been adopted to explore
empirically the demand for health inputs, mainly medical care (Goldman and Grossman,
1978; Leibowitz and Friedman, 1979), and to estimate health production functions in an
attempt to quantify the impact of health investments on individuals’ health. For example,
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) examined the effect of health inputs on birth weight,
adopting an instrumental variable approach that accounts for unobservable heterogeneity.
While it is recognised that the instruments they employed had little explanatory power,
this study represents an important contribution to this stream of literature. Adopting a
similar empirical strategy, Mullahy and Portney (1990) estimated the impact of smoking
on adults’ respiratory health. In a more recent study, Conway and Kutinova (2006) focused
on the mother’s health and analysed the effect of prenatal care on maternal health after
childbirth. Their theoretical framework presents some similarities with the one used in this
paper, having prenatal care, like delivery method, an effect on both mothers’ and children’
health.6 Therefore, to isolate the effect of unplanned caesarean deliveries on the mothers’
who have a natural delivery).
6While I recognise the effect of unplanned caesarean delivery on child’s health may be important, in this
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health, controlling for the child’s health is particularly important.
By adapting such a framework, I define the following reduced-form health production
function for mother’s mental health (measured in terms of postnatal depression):
PNDm = H(CSm, SESm, PREGNANCYm, HEALTHMm , HEALTHBm) (2.1)
The outcome variable is PNDm, a binary indicator denoting whether mother m has suffered
from postnatal depression in the first nine months after childbirth. CSm represents the
causal variable of interest and indicates whether the woman gave birth through an unplanned
caesarean delivery (the reference category is giving birth through a natural delivery). SESm
is a vector including all socio-economic variables that may be related to mother’s mental
health, such as age, marital status, income and ethnicity. PREGNANCYm includes
information on whether the pregnancy was planned, whether the mother had previous
deliveries and antenatal care. Measures of mother’s physical health, HEALTHMm , which
refer to different points of time, are included to control for pre-existing health conditions.
Finally, HEALTHBm, represents child’s health at birth.
The health production function (Equation 2.1) is assumed to be additive separable and
linear in its inputs:
PNDm =β0 + β1CSm + β2SESm + β3PREGNANCYm + β4HEALTHMm
+ β5HEALTHBm + m
(2.2)
where m represents mother-specific idiosyncratic error, clustered at the hospital level.
In the following section, I describe the econometric strategies implemented to obtain
consistent estimates of the coefficient of interest, β1, which quantifies the effect of unplanned
caesareans on the risk to develop postnatal depression.
2.4 Econometric strategies
Equation 2.2 is initially estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), treating the delivery
method (CS) as exogenous. This specification can be viewed as a descriptive regression
which sheds light on whether the effect of unplanned caesarean delivery persists after other
paper I do not focus directly on this topic since extensive work has already been done in this area (e.g.
Jensen and Wüst, 2015). Rather, my goal here is to provide the missing piece in estimating the overall
impact of unplanned caesarean delivery by evaluating its effect on mother’s mental health.
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observed factors are controlled for. Also, it provides a benchmark against which to compare
the results from fixed effects and IV models described below that account for potential
endogeneity bias.
From a theoretical point of view the linear probability model is not the appropriate
specification, given the binary nature of the outcome variable. Main problems associated
with the use of a linear approximation of the health production function rather than a
more appropriated latent variable model concern (i) predicted probabilities that are less
than zero or greater than one, (ii) a constant marginal effect of each explanatory variable
and (iii) violation of the Gauss-Markov assumption of homoskedasticity. To account for
these issues, I estimate Equation 2.2 also adopting a probit model specification.
2.4.1 Hospital Fixed Effects
I control for unobserved variables at the hospital level that may jointly affect the probability
of giving birth through unplanned caesarean and the risk of postnatal depression by
estimating Equation 2.2 using a hospital fixed effect model:
PNDmj =β0 + β1CSmj + β2SESmj + β3PREGNANCYmj + β4HEALTHMmj
+ β5HEALTHBmj + µj + ξmj
(2.3)
where PNDmj indicates whether mother m who gave birth in hospital j has suffered from
postnatal depression in the first nine months after child’s birth. This equation differs
from Equation 2.2 because the error term is split into two components, an idiosyncratic
mother-level component, ξmj , and an unobserved heterogeneity component at the hospital
level, µj . Using this model specification cancels out the unobserved heterogeneity at
hospital level and provides unbiased estimates, provided that there is no other source of
endogeneity.
2.4.2 Instrumental Variables
In addition to the hospital fixed effects specification, I employ an instrumental variable
approach (IV) to account for the residual endogeneity due to the omission of mother-level
variables. This approach exploits exogenous variation in the position of the baby in the
womb at the time of delivery and whether mother suffered from pre-eclampsia during
pregnancy to obtain valid estimates of the causal effect of unplanned caesarean delivery on
the mother’s mental health.
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The main instrument employed in the analysis is POSITION , a binary variable indicating
whether the baby presents feet or shoulder first, head at the back or other abnormal
positions at birth (a situation called breech position). Full breech position at term means
that the baby has not turned head down in the womb by week 37 of the pregnancy. Among
babies at term, breech position is present in three to four per cent of all births (Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2006).
Baby’s position in the womb at birth satisfies the relevance and validity condition, being
strongly associated with the probability of giving birth through unplanned caesarean
section and showing no direct association with maternal mental health.
Hartnack et al. (2011) argue that breech babies can be considered as a good random
subgroup of all babies since there is no clear evidence of maternal or baby’s characteristics
that can predict the probability of breech position. This hypothesis is also supported by
Jensen and Wüst (2015) who analyse the health consequences of caesareans for babies
in breech presentation at birth. In contrast, a few medical studies have found that there
exists (weak) evidence of an association between the probability of having a baby in a
breech position and some predictors of postnatal depression (e.g. maternal age, parity,
antenatal care, smoking behaviour, child’s birth weight). 7 Nevertheless, because these
variables are already included in Equation 2.2, I can safely argue that breech position is a
valid instrument and therefore can be used in the IV model estimation. In Section 2.6 I
provide formal evidence of the validity of the instrument computing an over-identification
test after estimating linear IV models.
POSITION also shows a strong association with the endogenous variable, CS. The
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines encourage resorting to a
caesarean delivery if a breech position occurs at the end of the gestational period to reduce
the risk of perinatal mortality and neonatal morbidity (Gholitabar et al., 2011). Similar
guidelines have been issued in other countries, especially after the publication of the results
from the Term Breech Trial, the largest random control trial evaluating the adequate
mode of delivery for breech babies that has shown the superiority of caesarean delivery
with respect to a natural delivery (Hannah et al., 2002). As a result, a large proportion
of breech babies are born through caesarean delivery in the United Kingdom every year
(Bragg et al., 2010), and similar rates are observed in other countries, e.g. U.S. (Lee et al.,
7Investigating this aspect using the data employed in this study I find similar evidence. In particular I
observe systematic differences in maternal characteristics (age, socio-economic status), use of antenatal
care and baby’s health at birth between mothers with babies in a breech position and those with babies in
a normal position. However, when I regress baby’s position on a set of covariates (including unplanned CS),
I find that apart from the mode of delivery, only parity, baby’s health conditions at birth and belonging to
an ethnic minority are significantly associated with the instrumental variable.
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2008), Sweden (Alexandersson et al., 2005), Denmark (Jensen and Wüst, 2015) and the
Netherlands (Rietberg et al., 2005).
In addition to POSITION , I consider another instrumental variable, ECLAMPSIA,
which indicates whether the mother has experienced pre-eclampsia during pregnancy or
at the time of the delivery. This health condition is characterised mainly by high blood
pressure (hypertension), which usually occurs after the 34th week of gestation. Since
women with pre-eclampsia are at higher risk of stroke and heart attack, and because
natural delivery is a very stressful event with a strong impact on the woman’s body,
physicians tend to opt for a caesarean delivery to avoid such risk.
As in the case of breech position, women cannot directly affect their probability of experien-
cing this condition. However, the medical literature has identified some factors that increase
the incidence of this condition, such as parity, obesity and multiple deliveries.8 Moreover,
women with existing long-term medical problems, such as diabetes, kidney diseases or high
blood pressure, are at higher risk of pre-eclampsia.9 Finally, since pre-eclampsia symptoms
are usually picked up during routine antenatal visits, there may be a correlation between
antenatal care and this health condition. Again, I control for all these predictors in the
analysis; therefore, I argue that the variation left in ECLAMPSIA is exogenous.
2.4.2.1 Linear IV model
I initially implement an instrumental variable approach by adopting a two-stage least
squares estimation using POSITION as an instrument. The first stage is given by the
following equation:
CSm =α0 + α1POSITIONm + α2SESm + α3PREGNANCYm+
α4HEALTH
M
m + α5HEALTHBm + m
(2.4)
Then I re-estimate the model adding ECLAMPSIA to the vector of instruments to obtain
an over-identified model, which allows testing the validity of the instrument using the
Sargan test. To show whether the unobserved heterogeneity at the hospital level is an
issue, I present results obtained adding and excluding hospital fixed effects to this model.
8As discussed in Section 2.5, I exclude from the sample mothers with multiple deliveries.
9While I can easily control for the first set of covariates, this is not completely possible for the others.
Indeed, the Millennium Cohort Study reports whether women have ever been affected by these long-term
illnesses during their lives, but no information is available on the onset of such conditions. Therefore, if one
of these control variables takes value equal to one, it means that the woman suffers (or has suffered) from
such health condition, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that it happened during the pregnancy.
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2.4.2.2 Bivariate model
The main advantages of using linear IV methods concern the possibility to test the validity
and relevance of the instruments and to interpret the coefficients in terms of marginal
effects. However, as in the OLS case, this specification ignores the binary nature of the
health outcome and the endogenous variable. To account for this issue, in addition to
linear IV models, I also estimate a bivariate probit model (Heckman, 1978), following the
approach suggested by Nichols (2011). The bivariate probit model is defined for two binary
responses, postnatal depression (PND) and unplanned caesarean section (CS):
CS∗m =1(γ1SESm + γ2PREGNANCYm + γ3HEALTHMm + γ4HEALTHBm
+ φ1POSITIONm + νm > 0)
(2.5)
PNDm =1(λ1CSm + δ1SESm + δ2PREGNANCYm + δ3HEALTHMm +
+ δ4HEALTHBm + ζm > 0)
(2.6)
where 1(•) is the indicator function which takes value of one if its argument is true and
zero otherwise. Errors νm and ζm are assumed to be jointly normal with unit variance, but
unknown correlation, ρ. If ρ 6= 0, then νm and PNDm are correlated and single-equation
models produce inconsistent estimates. Although theoretically the identification of bivariate
probit models does not require exclusion restrictions, empirical identification and testing
can be quite difficult without the use of instrumental variables (Monfardini and Radice,
2008). Therefore, in Section 2.6 I present results based on the same exclusion restrictions
used in the linear models. Comparing results across different models, it is important to
bear in mind that in the case of bivariate probit, not only exclusion restrictions, but also
functional form assumptions, concur to the identification of the parameters of the model.
2.5 Data
The data come from the UK Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), a multidisciplinary lon-
gitudinal data set on a cohort of children born between September 2000 and January
2002.10 This dataset covers several topics, such as parenting, childcare, child behaviour
and cognitive development, child’s and parental health, pregnancy and delivery, parents’
10Data are collected between September 2000 and August 2001 in England and Wales, November 2000
and January 2002 in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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employment and education, income and poverty. Information is derived from parents’
interviews in five sweeps, when children are 9-11 months, 3, 5, 7 and 11 years old. For the
purpose of this study, I use only the first sweep, which contains detailed information on
circumstances of pregnancy and birth, as well as socio-economic background and health
conditions of the family where children were born.11
2.5.1 Sample selection
The initial sample was characterised by 18,818 children, born from 18,552 women. I excluded
women who had a multiple delivery (two or more babies) because (i) they are more likely to
have health complications after childbearing and (ii) their babies are systematically different
in terms of (lower) birth weight, gestational age at birth and other birth characteristics
in comparison to single-pregnancy babies. I also dropped observations with missing or
incomplete information on delivery method, postnatal mental health, mother’s other health
conditions that occurred before and during the pregnancy, socio-economic status and baby’s
health. In addition, since I use information on place of delivery and particularly on hospital
identifiers, I excluded deliveries if they occurred at home or in unknown hospitals. I also
dropped observations if information on the identifying instruments I require to implement
the IV strategy (i.e. baby’s position before delivery and pre-eclampsia during pregnancy)
is not available. This lead to a final sample composed of 13,994 women.
2.5.2 Main variables
The outcome variable is maternal mental health, measured using a binary variable that takes
a value equal to one if the mother reports to have experienced a period of sadness lasting
two weeks or more after childbirth, and zero otherwise. As mentioned above, previous
literature focusing on mother’s postnatal depression shows a high degree of heterogeneity
in the definition of this condition. In particular, while there is a general agreement in the
medical community on the symptoms that identify postnatal depression (e.g. low mood,
loss of enjoyment and pleasure, anxiety), the length of the period after delivery12 and the
the time of onset13 that should be taken into account are less clear.
11Full details of the study are available at University of London, Institute of Education, Centre for
Longitudinal study.
12For example, the NICE and the Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network (SIGN) define postnatal
depression as any non-psychotic depressive illnesses occurring during the first postnatal year.
13In some women, postpartum blues - a transient condition that mothers could experience shortly after
childbirth (Stewart et al., 2003) - simply continue and become more severe. In others, a period of well-being
after delivery is followed by a gradual onset of depression.
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In this paper, I follow the definition of postnatal depression suggested by Mcintosh (1993),
who considers postnatal depression as the experience of depressed mood for a period of
at least two weeks at some stage during the first nine months after delivery. Compared
to other measures, this can be considered a medium- to long-term indicator of maternal
postnatal depression. MCS does not provide details on the severity of this condition,
therefore mothers reporting symptoms of postpartum depression may be affected by this
condition differently.
In the MCS, the mode of delivery is initially coded in ten categories (including missing and
refused responses). I reclassify this measure into three mutually exclusive groups: natural,
elective caesarean and unplanned caesarean delivery. Natural deliveries are defined as
those that can be classified as medical procedures, according to the Healthcare Resource
Groups (HRG) system (therefore, this category also includes instrumented deliveries),
while caesarean sections are distinguished as elective and unplanned, the latter usually
associated with an unexpected complication at the time of delivery. Following Essex et al.
(2013), for those women who reported more than one mode of delivery, I combine responses
by coding the most invasive as the primary delivery method.14 Since the analysis focuses
on the effect of unplanned caesarean deliveries compared to natural births, I drop from the
sample elective caesareans and I define a binary variable, CS, taking a value equal to one
if the woman had an unplanned caesarean delivery and zero in case of a normal delivery.
2.5.3 Other variables
There exists a vast assortment of factors that may be associated with the probability of
experiencing postnatal depression and giving birth through unplanned caesarean delivery.
I classify them in the following categories: (i) socio-economic factors, (ii) previous maternal
health, (iii) pregnancy-related attitude and (iv) baby’s health.
Among the socio-economic factors, mother’s age is one of the most important. Teenagers are,
on average, more likely to experience postnatal depression (Deal and Holt, 1998; Robertson
et al., 2004). Additionally there is evidence of a U-shape relationship between maternal
age and unplanned CS (Brown, 1996; Patel et al., 2005). To account for this, I include
in the model a linear and quadratic terms of mother’s age. Dummies defining mother’s
ethnicity are included to account for the heterogeneous composition of the UK population.
Also, ethnic minorities are less likely to be affected by anxiety and/or depression, probably
because of their propensity to under-report health problems (Fiscella et al., 2002; Harris
14In other words, I consider unplanned caesarean sections as the most invasive procedure, while natural
births as the less invasive.
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et al., 2005). I distinguish between White British (baseline category), Black British, Indian,
Pakistani-Bangladeshi and a residual group, which includes, among others, Asian mothers.
Household income, measured here with a modified OECD scale for equivalization, has been
identified by the economic literature as a strong predictor of psychological wellbeing. It
is also found to be positively associated with unplanned caesarean sections, even after
controlling for standard covariates (Gresenz et al., 2001; Segre et al., 2007). I measure
mother’s education with a set of dummies that indicate her highest national vocational
qualification (defined in five levels, plus the baseline category for those without qualification
and one that includes women with overseas qualification only).
Marital status is used as a proxy for perceived social support. A married woman is expected
to have psychological support from her husband in taking care of the child, which, in turn,
reduces her likelihood of becoming depressed (Stewart et al., 2003).
As covariates related to the pregnancy, I include indicators that measure if the pregnancy
was planned and details on antenatal care during the pregnancy (in particular, whether
she attended antenatal classes and had antenatal visits). A measure of parity (i.e. whether
the cohort member is the first child of the woman) is also included.15
Physical and mental health before pregnancy are strong predictors of postnatal depression.
Unfortunately, the MCS is a child-focused dataset; therefore, it does not include any
direct information on maternal health before the child was born. To proxy her physical
health before pregnancy, I use information about mother’s smoking behaviours (number
of cigarettes smoked per day) and her body mass index (including both a linear and a
quadratic term). Admissions to hospitals and whether she had a paid job during pregnancy
are included to control for mother’s health during childbearing. Furthermore, I include
dummies to measure whether she suffers/has suffered in the past from diabetes, gestational
hypertension or kidney diseases.
According to the literature (e.g. McLennan et al., 2001), mothers of unhealthy children are
negatively affected by their babies’ health and, as a consequence, they are more likely to
report a depression status. I account for this association by including birth weight and
gestational age at birth as measures of baby’s health.
15This information is not directly available in the dataset. I derive it using the algorithm developed by
Dr. Fiona Mensah, who combined different information from MCS (see Kiernan and Mensah, 2009).
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2.5.4 Instrumental variables
As discussed in Section 2.4, I employ an instrumental variable approach to account for the
potential unobserved heterogeneity. The instruments are two binary variables, POSITION
and ECLAMPSIA. The former, POSITION , takes the value of one if the baby was
in a breech position or in another abnormal position requiring a surgical intervention.
Pre-eclampsia, hereafter called ECLAMPSIA, measures whether the mother has suffered
from this hypertension disorder during the pregnancy and/or at the time of delivery.
2.5.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 34.32
per cent of the women in the sample have experienced a period of sadness lasting at least
two weeks after delivery (PND=1). This percentage is above the documented prevalence
rate for postnatal depression in the UK, estimated to be around 10-15 per cent. However,
this difference could be ascribed to variability in the definition of postnatal depression
and in the length of the postnatal period considered. Additionally, previous literature has
shown that higher rates of incidence are observed when employing non-clinical definition
of depression (e.g. self-reported measures as the one employed in this study), compared to
the case in which standard instruments for the detection of depression are used.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.1 show means and standard deviations by delivery method for
all the covariates and the outcome measure. Comparing the incidence rate of postnatal
depression across women who gave birth through an unplanned CS and those who had
a natural delivery, I find that the rate is higher for the former group of mothers and the
difference is statistically different from zero (Pearson chi-squared = 7.95, p-value = 0.005).
When looking at other predictors, I find a significant difference in the level of health
during pregnancy, being mothers who gave birth by unplanned caesarean delivery more
likely to experience poor health (in terms of hospitalisation during pregnancy, diabetes,
hypertension and kidney disease). Additionally, 64.46 per cent of the women who had an
unplanned CS had no previous pregnancies, while only 40.89 per cent of those who had
a natural delivery have no other children. This may suggest that a mechanism through
which unplanned CS negatively affects women’s mental health is the lack of information
(or wrong expectations) they may have about this experience.
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the full sample and by delivery method
Full sample CS = 1 CS = 0
Variables Definition Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
PND = 1 if mother experienced postnatal depression (dummy) 0.3432 (0.4748) 0.3715 (0.4833) 0.3387 (0.4733)
Age mother’s age at baby’s birth (years) 28.12 (5.90) 29.22 (5.89) 27.95 (5.89)
Ethnic group
White = 1 if White British (dummy) 0.8651 (0.3416) 0.8554 (0.3517) 0.8667 (0.3399)
Black = 1 if Black British (dummy) 0.0287 (0.1668) 0.0466 (0.2109) 0.0258 (0.1585)
Pakistani or Bangladeshi = 1 if Pakistani or Bangladeshi (dummy) 0.0552 (0.2283) 0.0404 (0.1969) 0.0575 (0.2329)
Indian = 1 if Indian (dummy) 0.0245 (0.1546) 0.0264 (0.1604) 0.0242 (0.1537)
Other = 1 if other race (dummy) 0.0265 (0.1607) 0.0311 (0.1736) 0.0258 (0.1585)
Married = 1 if married (dummy) 0.5842 (0.4929) 0.6119 (0.4874) 0.5797 (0.4936)
Income equivalised annual household income (thousands of pounds) 15.3841 (10.2536) 17.4387 (11.0412) 15.0554 (10.0836)
Mother’s qualification
No qualification = 1 if no NVQ (dummy) 0.1452 (0.3523) 0.1145 (0.3185) 0.1501 (0.3572)
NVQ level 1 = 1 if highest NVQ level is 1 (dummy) 0.0845 (0.2782) 0.0751 (0.2637) 0.0861 (0.2804)
NVQ level 2 = 1 if highest NVQ level is 2 (dummy) 0.2998 (0.4582) 0.2803 (0.4493) 0.3030 (0.4596)
NVQ level 3 = 1 if highest NVQ level is 3 (dummy) 0.1504 (0.3575) 0.1503 (0.3574) 0.1504 (0.3575)
NVQ level 4 = 1 if highest NVQ level is 4 (dummy) 0 .2633 (0.4404) 0.3161 (0.4651) 0.2548 (0.4358)
NVQ level 5 = 1 if highest NVQ level is 5 (dummy) 0.0313 (0.1741) 0.0389 (0.1933) 0.0301 (0.1708)
Overseas qualification = 1 if overseas NVQ qualification only (dummy) 0.0254 (0.1575) 0.0249 (0.1558) 0.0255 (0.15776)
Children no. children in the household (excluding cohort member) 0.8886 (1.046) 0.5269 (0.8516) 0.9465 (1.0629)
continued . . .
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Full sample CS = 1 CS = 0
Variables Definition Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Cigarettes no. cigarettes smoked per day before pregnancy 4.60 (7.66) 4.43 (7.62) 4.63 (7.67)
Before-pregnancy BMI mother’s Body Mass Index before pregnancy 23.56 (4.38) 24.53 (4.93) 23.40 (4.27)
Parity = 1 if first pregnancy (dummy) 0.4414 (0.4966) 0.6446 (0.4788) 0.4089 (0.4917)
Planned = 1 if planned pregnancy (dummy) 0.5445 (0.4980) 0.5829 (0.4932) 0.5384 (0.4985)
Antenatal Care = 1 if antenatal care & antenatal classes (dummy) 0.3587 (0.4796) 0.4902 (0.5000) 0.3376 (0.4729)
Mother’s hospitalization = 1 if mother admitted to hospital during pregnancy (dummy) 0.1814 (0.3854) 0.2622 (0.4399) 0.1685 (0.3743)
Employed Pregnancy = 1 if mother employed during pregnancy (dummy) 0.6516 (0.4765) 0.7456 (0.4356) 0.6366 (0.4810)
Diabetes = 1 if mother ever suffered from diabetes (dummy) 0.01858 (0.135) 0.0347 (0.1831) 0.0160 (0.1255)
Hypertension = 1 if mother ever suffered from hypertension (dummy) 0.0042 (0.0648) 0.0114 (0.1062) 0.0031 (0.0553)
Kidney Disease = 1 if mother ever suffered from kidney disease (dummy) 0.0089 (0.094) 0.0114 (0.1062) 0.0085 (0.0920)
Birth Weight Baby’s birth weight (kilos) 3.36 (0.58) 3.25 (0.80) 3.38 (0.5279)
Gestational Age Baby’s gestational age at birth (days) 277.86 (14.02) 273.37 (20.69) 278.58 (12.48)
Position = 1 if baby in abnormal position (dummy) 0.0525 (0.2229) 0.1808 (0.3850) 0.0319 (0.1758)
Eclampsia = 1 if mother suffered from pre-eclampsia (dummy) 0.0715 (0.2576) 0.1451 (0.3523) 0.0597 (0.2369)
Observations 13,994 1,930 12,064
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source: UK Millennium Cohort Study.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Results from linear probability and fixed effect models
In this section, I report results obtained treating the delivery mode (CS) as exogenous.
Table 2.2 presents OLS estimates obtained by adding gradually different sets of covariates
in the regression equation. The first column shows results when delivery method and
socio-economic variables are included. The specification described in the second column
comprises also maternal health conditions and pregnancy-related variables. Finally, I add
measures of baby’s health to account for the negative impact of poor baby’s health on
maternal mental health (column 3).
In all the specifications, I find a positive and statistically significant association between
unplanned caesarean delivery and postnatal depression. When including measures of
maternal health and pregnancy experience, the magnitude of the coefficient decreases
(0.049 and 0.043 in the first and second specification respectively), suggesting that part
of the CS effect is due to the poorer level of health of mothers who gave birth through
this procedure. Adding baby’s health variables further decreases the magnitude and the
significance of the coefficient associated with CS. Particularly, when controlling for the
full set of regressors, I find that having an unplanned caesarean delivery increases the
likelihood of postnatal depression by 3.2 percentage points and this effect is significant at
the 5 per cent level.
When focusing on the coefficients associated with the covariates included in the model, I
find that they behave as expected. For example, being married (or in a relationship) has an
effect that more than compensates for the impact on mental health due to an unplanned
caesarean: married women have a 4.1 percentage points lower chance of being affected
by postnatal depression than unmarried women. Income also shows a strong negative
association with the probability of experiencing postnatal depression (negative coefficient
equal to 0.003). This result is consistent with the ’family stress model’, as defined by
Conger et al. (2000), which states how economic hardship and pressure negatively impact
parents’ mental health.
In column 1, we also find evidence of a clear educational gradient, with more educated
mothers being less likely to experience postnatal depression. However, such effect is no
longer statistically significant in the other specifications.
Among the health and pregnancy variables, OLS results show that smoking before pregnancy
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is positively associated with the probability of developing postnatal depression; in particular,
smoking 10 cigarettes per day increases such probability by six percentage points. Poor
physical health, measured by hospitalization during pregnancy and whether kidney diseases
have affected the mother, strongly predicts postnatal depression, coherent with the literature
that shows a strong association between physical and mental health (Canadian Mental
Health Association, 2008). In the same line, I find that working during the pregnancy
is negatively associated with the probability of developing depression after childbirth
(negative coefficient equal to 0.031).
On the contrary, diabetes and hypertension are found to not be significantly associated
with postnatal depression. This result goes in the opposite direction with respect to
what is highlighted by the descriptive statistics, suggesting that once accounting for other
concurrent health issues, these conditions are no longer relevant in explaining mother’s
mental health.
Results also show that having planned the pregnancy in advance is associated with a
decrease in the probability of postnatal depression by 3.4 percentage points. Additionally,
antenatal care and mental illness after childbirth are positively associated: women who
did not benefit from antenatal care are less likely to experience postnatal depression, with
respect to women who attend both antenatal classes and visits. This evidence seems to
suggest that women who require antenatal care are also those in need of psychological
support. Finally, as expected, poor baby’s health predicts maternal postnatal depression.
Particularly, baby’s low gestational age increases mother’s risk of depression after childbirth.
Table 2.2 shows also that some of the variables expected to be highly correlated with
maternal mental health are not relevant. For example, maternal age, which previous
literature has identified as one of the most important predictors of postnatal depression, is
not significantly associated with the risk of postnatal depression. The strong association
with other (significant) measures (e.g. marital status and parity) represents a reasonable
explanation for this finding.
In Table 2.A, I report results obtained from a probit model that account for the binary
measure of the dependent variables.16 Estimates from this specification are very similar to
those from OLS estimates, suggesting that results from linear probability models are not
affected by functional form assumptions.
16Marginal effects are computed using Stata command margins.
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Table 2.2. Linear Probability Models and Fixed Effect Models
LPM LPM LPM FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emergency CS 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.032** 0.031**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Mother’s age 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Black -0.003 0.015 0.012 0.002
[0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038]
Pakistani & Bangladeshi -0.021 0.004 -0.002 -0.026
[0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.027]
Indian 0.028 0.047** 0.036 0.071***
[0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.027]
Other ethnicity -0.032 -0.016 -0.018 -0.012
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024]
Married -0.068*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]
Income -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
NVQ level 1 0.005 0.025 0.026 0.031*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
NVQ level 2 -0.016 0.011 0.012 0.014
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
NVQ level 3 -0.036* -0.000 0.002 0.003
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017]
NVQ level 4 -0.040** 0.001 0.004 0.005
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019]
NVQ level 5 -0.055* -0.010 -0.008 -0.004
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028]
Overseas qualification -0.006 0.010 0.013 0.011
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Before-pregnancy cigarettes 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Before-pregnancy BMI -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Before-pregnancy BMI2 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Parity -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.039***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Planned pregnancy -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.035***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Antenatal Care 0.019* 0.024** 0.025**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Mother’s hospitalization 0.098*** 0.090*** 0.088***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Employed pregnancy -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030***
continued . . .
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LPM LPM LPM FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Diabetes pregnancy -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
[0.030] [0.029] [0.030]
Hypertension 0.028 0.011 0.008
[0.064] [0.064] [0.064]
Kidney diseases 0.075* 0.070* 0.064
[0.041] [0.041] [0.040]
Birth weight -0.062 -0.049
[0.056] [0.057]
Birth weight2 0.006 0.004
[0.008] [0.008]
Gestational age -0.015*** -0.015***
[0.005] [0.005]
Gestational age2 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000]
Constant 0.460*** 0.418*** 2.631*** 2.533***
[0.083] [0.106] [0.621] [0.639]
Observations 13,994 13,994 13,994 13,994
Notes. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustered at hospital level in brackets. Linear Probability Models (LPM) estimated using OLS.
FE: Hospital Fixed Effects included in the model. Data source: UK Millennium Cohort Study,
wave 1.
2.6.2 Results when accounting for the endogeneity of the delivery method
Results shown so far can still be biased if there are omitted variables at the mother or
hospital level. In this section, I discuss results from hospital fixed effect models, linear
IV models (with and without hospital fixed effects) and a bivariate probit model that
account for heterogeneity and allow to identify the causal effect of unplanned caesareans
on mother’s mental health.
Column 4 of Table 2.2 shows that when hospital fixed effects are included in the model
results do not change significantly, suggesting that unobservable hospital characteristics
affecting both the delivery method and the risk of developing postnatal depression are not
an issue.
Results from linear IV models exploiting exogenous variation in the baby’s position in the
womb at birth and in mother’s health condition (whether she suffered from pre-eclampsia)
are reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
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The first stages of linear IV models (Table 2.3) obtained using only POSITION as
an exclusion restriction, show that the partial correlation between baby’s position and
unplanned CS is equal to 0.313, and it is strongly significant (p-value = 0.000), providing
a first proof of the instrument relevance (column 1). It is interesting to notice that
other variables are significantly associated with the delivery method. In particular, black
women have a higher probability of experiencing a surgical delivery (7.7 percentage points)
compared to white women. Having previous pregnancy experiences, instead, reduces the
likelihood of having an unplanned caesarean delivery, even when controlling for health
status. unplanned caesarean delivery is also positively associated with the number of
cigarettes women smoked before pregnancy and mother’s age. Having been hospitalised
during pregnancy, as well as having suffered from diabetes, also increases the risk of
an unplanned delivery. A U-shape relationship between birth weight and probability of
unplanned caesarean is also found, suggesting that low-birth-weight babies or giant babies
are more likely to born via this procedure. On the contrary, gestational age seems having
no effect, probably because it was captured by the baby’s birth weight. Similar findings are
obtained when adding ECLAMPSIA to the set of instruments, regardless of the inclusion
of hospital fixed effects in the model.
Table 2.3. Linear Instrumental Variable Models: First Stages
Dependent Variable: Emergency Caesarean Section
Instrumental Variable Instrumental Variables
POSITION POSITION, ECLAMPSIA
w/o FE with FE w/o FE with FE
POSITION 0.313*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.317***
[0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017]
ECLAMPSIA – – 0.077*** 0.079***
– – [0.016] [0.016]
Mother’s age 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.010**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Black 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.079*** 0.072***
[0.018] [0.022] [0.018] [0.022]
Pakistani & Bangladeshi 0.010 0.000 0.012 0.002
[0.011] [0.016] [0.011] [0.016]
Indian 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.024
[0.015] [0.017] [0.015] [0.017]
Other ethnicity 0.028 0.021 0.030 0.022
[0.020] [0.023] [0.020] [0.023]
Married 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
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Dependent Variable: Emergency Caesarean Section
Instrumental Variable Instrumental Variables
POSITION POSITION, ECLAMPSIA
w/o FE with FE w/o FE with FE
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
NVQ level 1 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.012
[0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012]
NVQ level 2 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
NVQ level 3 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012
[0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]
NVQ level 4 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
NVQ level 5 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.013
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Overseas qualification 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Before-pregnancy cigarettes 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Before-pregnancy BMI 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Before-pregnancy BMI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Parity 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.122***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Planned 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Antenatal Care 0.013** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Mother’s hospitalization 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.022** 0.019**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Employed pregnancy 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Diabetes pregnancy 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.069***
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Hypertension 0.107** 0.109** 0.068 0.069
[0.049] [0.049] [0.050] [0.051]
Kidney diseases -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004
[0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030]
Birth weight -0.605*** -0.605*** -0.591*** -0.591***
[0.069] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067]
Birth weight2 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.088***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Gestational age 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Gestational age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
continued . . .
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Dependent Variable: Emergency Caesarean Section
Instrumental Variable Instrumental Variables
POSITION POSITION, ECLAMPSIA
w/o FE with FE w/o FE with FE
Constant 0.118 – 0.226 –
[0.852] – [0.843] –
Observations 13,994 13,961 13,994 13,961
Notes. *** p<0.01, **0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors in brackets. Data source: UK Millennium
Cohort Study, wave 1.
Column 1 in Table 2.4 reports the second-stage results obtained using POSITION as
the only instrument. In this specification, the coefficient associated with unplanned CS
increases notably with respect to OLS estimates, being now equal to 20.7 percentage points.
This effect is not negligible, given the underlying risk of postnatal depression of 34 per
cent.
When including hospital fixed effects (column 2), the unplanned CS coefficient decreases
to 17.1 percentage points. Such coefficient, still dramatically higher than OLS estimates,
is smaller than the one obtained in the IV model without hospital fixed effects, but not
statistically different.
Column 3 and 4 of Table 2.4 include results from linear IV models obtained using both
instruments. Depending on whether hospital fixed effects are included in the regression
model, having an unplanned caesarean increases the probability of postnatal depression by
21.0 and 17.3 percentage points, respectively, in accordance with results obtained using
POSITION as the only instrument (columns 1 and 2).17
Overall, the fact that the estimates of the coefficient associated with the mode of delivery
in the OLS model are smaller than those found in linear IV models indicates that either the
linear IV method produces upward biased results or that women who had an unplanned
CS are actually negatively selected on the basis of unmeasured factors that correlate with
their mental health. Evidence on the validity of the IV approach (see Subsection 2.6.2.1)
rules out the first hypothesis, leading to the conclusion that OLS estimates are downward
biased due to an omitted variable problem.
17All the IV models include baby’s birth weight and gestational age as controls. These variables may be
endogenous, if, for example, women with low birth weight babies and women at risk of giving birth before
their due date are more likely to receive intensive care before the birth of their child and are also more likely
to end up with an unplanned caesarean. For this reason, I estimate the models excluding such controls.
Results do not change significantly. However, because breech position at birth (the main instrumental
variable) may be correlated with baby’s health at birth, I prefer to include in the models these controls.
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Table 2.4. Linear Instrumental Variables Models: Second Stages
Instrumental Variable: Instrumental Variables:
POSITION POSITION, ECLAMPSIA
Linear IV w/o Linear IV with Linear IV w/o Linear IV with
fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emergency CS 0.207*** 0.171*** 0.210*** 0.173***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.048] [0.048]
Mother’s age -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Black -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008
[0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.037]
Pakistani & Bangladeshi -0.003 -0.026 -0.003 -0.026
[0.023] [0.027] [0.023] [0.027]
Indian 0.034 0.068** 0.034 0.068**
[0.024] [0.027] [0.024] [0.027]
Other ethnicity -0.023 -0.015 -0.023 -0.015
[0.026] [0.024] [0.026] [0.024]
Married -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.043***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011]
Income -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
NVQ level 1 0.025 0.030 0.025 0.030
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
NVQ level 2 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.015
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
NVQ level 3 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
[0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017]
NVQ level 4 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
NVQ level 5 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
[0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028]
Overseas qualification 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.011
[0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027]
Before-pregnancy cigarettes 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Before-pregnancy BMI -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Before-pregnancy BMI2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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Instrumental Variable: Instrumental Variables:
POSITION POSITION, ECLAMPSIA
Linear IV w/o Linear IV with Linear IV w/o Linear IV with
fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parity -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.059***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Planned -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.035***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Antenatal Care 0.021** 0.023** 0.021** 0.023**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Mother’s hospitalization 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Employed pregnancy -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Diabetes pregnancy -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Hypertension -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009
[0.066] [0.066] [0.066] [0.065]
Kidney diseases 0.069* 0.064 0.069* 0.064
[0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.041]
Birth weight 0.043 0.035 0.045 0.036
[0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061]
Birth weight2 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Gestational age -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Gestational age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant 2.554*** – 2.552*** –
[0.654] – [0.655] –
Observations 13,994 13,961 13,994 13,961
Notes. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustered at hospital level in brackets. Data source: UK Millennium Cohort Study, wave 1.
As discussed in Section 2.4, linear IV models may not be an appropriate model specification
because of the binary nature of CS and PND. I take into account this issue by estimating
a bivariate probit model and comparing results from this model with those obtained using
the linear IV specification. Because the coefficients of the bivariate probit model are
not directly comparable with those in the liner IV models, I estimate average marginal
effects (AMEs) from bivariate probit (reported in Table 2.5). When only breech position is
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excluded from the outcome equation, I find that having an unplanned delivery increases
the probability of postnatal depression by 14.5 percentage points. Adding pre-eclampsia
to the vector of exclusion restrictions does not significantly change the results (average
marginal effect equal to 14.8 percentage points).
When interpreting the estimates in the two models, it is important to keep in mind the
different source of identification that the two models exploit. Linear IV models rely on
the exclusion restriction(s), therefore the coefficient obtained using this strategy identifies
the average treatment effect for a defined ’subpopulation’ group of women who had an
unplanned caesarean delivery, namely those who give birth through this method because
of the position in the womb of their baby at birth. Using the terminology of Angrist
and Pischke (2008), IV methodology allows to estimate the local average treatment effect
(LATE). This effect is still interested, but caution needs to be taken when generalising
these results to the entire population of women who give birth through this procedure.
The bivariate probit model depends, in addition to the exclusion restrictions, also on
the functional form assumptions. The fact that in this case the magnitude of linear IV
estimates and AME from the bivariate probit are quite similar suggests that the stricter
assumption of joint normality of error terms in the bivariate probit is consistent with the
data. More generally, these findings could be interpreted as evidence of the robustness of
results, that do not depend on parametric assumptions.
Table 2.5. Marginal effects of emergency caesarean section on the risk of
postnatal depression using linear IV models and bivariate probit
Instrumental Variable: Instrumental Variables:
POSITION POSITION and ECLAMPSIA
Linear IV Bivariate Linear IV Bivariate
model Probit model Probit
Estimated Coefficients 0.207 0.395 0.210 0.4111
(0.049) (0.127) (0.048) (0.123)
Marginal effects a 0.207 0.145 0.210 0.148
(0.049) (0.048b) (0.048) (0.048b)
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Data source: UK Millennium Cohort Study, wave 1.
a Average marginal effects estimated with margins Stata command.
b Delta-method standard errors.
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2.6.2.1 Tests on the validity and relevance of the instruments
The reliability of the results obtained using instrumental variable models depends on the
quality of the excluded instruments and the choice of the model specification. In this
section, I provide some evidence in favour of the validity and relevance of the instruments
(see Table 2.6).
The correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressor is measured using
the F-statistic(s) for the joint significance of the excluding restrictions. These statistics
are always greater than 10,18 suggesting that the instruments are strongly relevant. This
is also confirmed by the results from the under-identification test performed using the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk LM statistic which is robust to deviations from the hypothesis of
i.i.d. errors (see the second row of Table 2.6). P-values are always below the standard levels,
leading to the conclusion that the matrix is full-column rank and the model identified. As
an additional check, I test whether IV estimates are affected by weak identification, which
arises when the excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous
regressor. Comparing the robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic with the Stock Yogo
critical values, I find that in all the specifications, the statistic is well above critical values.
Therefore, I conclude that the baby’s position and pre-eclampsia could be considered strong
predictors of the delivery method.
Formal evidence on the validity of the instruments is obtained performing the over-
identification test in the linear IV model estimated using both the instruments (i.e. using
also ECLAMPSIA as an additional instrument). The Hansen’s statistic from the Sargan-
Hansen test19 is equal to 0.069, with a p-value of 0.7923 (0.022 and p-value equal to
0.8834) when hospitals fixed effects are included (omitted). Therefore, I conclude that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and hence they are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation.
Finally, I test the endogeneity of delivery method. Using the difference of two Sargan-
Hansen statistics (one for the equation where the delivery method is treated as endogenous,
and one for the equation where CS is considered exogenous), I find p-values close to zero;
therefore, I reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (see Table 2.6).
18Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest 10 as a rule of thumb. Under such value, the relevance of the instrument(s)
is not guaranteed.
19Stata reports the Hansen’s J statistic when we account for heteroskedasticity and clustering.
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Table 2.6. Post-estimation tests on exclusion restrictions and endogeneity
Instrumental Variable: Instrumental Variables:
Tests POSITION POSITION and ECLAMPSIA
(w/o FE) (with FE) (w/o FE) (with FE)
F-stat of excluded instruments 317.36 (0.000) 330.63 (0.000) 174.67 (0.000) 181.61 (0.0000)
Underidentification testa 66.126 (0.0000) 67.600 (0.0000) 69.926 (0.0000) 71.264 (0.0000)
Weak identification 317.36 >16.38 b 330.63 >16.38 174.67 >19.93 181.61 >19.93
Endogeneity test of CS c 12.509 (0.0004) 8.258 (0.0041) 13.242 (0.0003) 8.606 (0.0033)
Notes. FE: Hospital Fixed Effects. p-values provided in parentheses. Data source: UK
Millennium Cohort Study, wave 1.
a Under the null hypothesis of underidentification of the model, the statistic is distributed as a
chi-squared with N degrees of freedom.
b Stock-Yogo critical values in case of one or two exclusion restrictions, allowing for a 10% of
IV maximum distortion with respect to OLS.
c Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, the statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with 1
degree of freedom.
2.7 Conclusions
This study represents a first attempt to close an important gap in the health economics
literature regarding the health consequences of the utilization of caesarean sections. In
particular, it investigates the effect of unplanned caesarean sections on mothers’ mental
health, looking at whether this surgical procedure is associated with an increase in the
mothers’ risk of postnatal depression in the first nine months after childbirth.
Results show that unplanned caesarean deliveries carry significant psychological risks, with
women who give birth via this procedure being more vulnerable to post-traumatic distress
and depression (by 21.0 and 14.8 percentage points when estimated using linear IV models
and bivariate probit, respectively). These findings are important for at least three reasons.
First, caesarean deliveries have spread remarkably in recent years, becoming one of the
most frequent surgical procedure, with 165,000 deliveries performed every year in England
(among these, about 25,000 are unplanned caesareans). Second, depression can be a very
severe condition limiting mothers’ everyday life and their ability to take care of their
children. Because mothers are usually the main childcare givers, poor mother’s mental
health is likely to also negatively affect baby’s health and development. Additionally,
postnatal depression is likely to become a chronic health condition, associated with high
costs for families as well as for society (e.g. inability to work, see Schultz et al., 2013).
From a policy perspective, this study highlights the importance of also accounting for the
psychological costs of unplanned caesarean deliveries when evaluating the costs and benefits
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of this procedure. Additionally, they suggest that governments should put effort into
reducing the utilisation of unplanned caesarean sections when alternative delivery methods
are available. When an unplanned caesarean delivery cannot be avoided, healthcare
providers should offer services, such as professionally-based home visits and peer-based
telephone support, to prevent the development of postnatal depression.
A potential limit of the proposed analysis relates to the use of a self-reported health
measure to identify mothers’ mental health status after childbirth. The general concern
about this type of health outcomes is that they can measure individuals’ health with error,
being affected by unintentional (e.g. recall bias) and intentional bias (stigma associated
with mental disorders may lead mothers to under-report mental illnesses). Nonetheless,
more ’objective’ measures, such as postnatal depression diagnosed by doctors, are also not
free of error. For example the probability of being diagnosed with depression depends on
the frequency of GP contact. If the woman tends to not attend GP visits, there exists the
risk of underestimating the incidence of this condition.
Another limitation of this study, which opens the door to future research in this area,
relates to the data used to shed light on this phenomenon. A longitudinal administrative
dataset with detailed information on mothers’ previous pregnancy experiences and their
health conditions before and after the pregnancy would allow to identify the causal effect
of unplanned caesareans using alternative econometric approaches and fewer assumptions.
In addition, it would allow the comparison of results from this study with those obtained
using objective measures of mother’s health.
Reaching these goals would require a link of hospital records on maternity events, such
as the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) from England, to other data sources containing
information on primary care visits, being depression usually diagnosed by general practi-
tioners (at least in a first instance), and census data providing details on mothers’ income,
education, working condition and other socio-economic variables. However, such linkages
are not currently available, at least for English data.
Another aspect left for the future is the extension of this study to elective caesarean
deliveries. As discussed in the paper, from a theoretical point of view, we may expect
elective caesarean deliveries to have a smaller impact compared to unplanned caesareans,
being planned in advance and giving mothers the opportunity to adjust their expectations.
However, they can still have a negative impact on their body, and as a consequence, make
difficult their post-partum recovery. Looking also to elective caesareans would provide
a more complete picture of this phenomenon and contribute to the implementation of
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effective health policies.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 2.A. Linear Probability Model and Probit Model
LPM Probit
(1) (2)
Emergency CS 0.032** 0.032***
[0.012] [0.012]
Mother’s age 0.000 0.001
[0.006] [0.006]
Mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Black 0.012 0.011
[0.037] [0.035]
Pakistani & Bangladeshi -0.002 -0.001
[0.023] [0.022]
Indian 0.036 0.037
[0.023] [0.023]
Other ethnicity -0.018 -0.019
[0.026] [0.026]
Married -0.041*** -0.040***
[0.011] [0.010]
Income -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000]
NVQ level 1 0.026 0.026
[0.019] [0.018]
NVQ level 2 0.012 0.012
[0.017] [0.016]
NVQ level 3 0.002 0.002
[0.018] [0.017]
NVQ level 4 0.004 0.003
[0.020] [0.019]
NVQ level 5 -0.008 -0.012
[0.029] [0.031]
Overseas qualification 0.013 0.014
[0.028] [0.027]
Before-pregnancy cigarettes 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001]
Before-pregnancy BMI -0.001 -0.000
[0.006] [0.005]
Before-pregnancy BMI2 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Parity -0.038*** -0.037***
[0.011] [0.011]
Planned pregnancy -0.034*** -0.034***
[0.008] [0.008]
Antenatal Care 0.024** 0.023**
[0.010] [0.010]
continued . . .
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. . . continued
LPM Probit
(1) (2)
Mother’s hospitalization 0.090*** 0.086***
[0.010] [0.009]
Employed pregnancy -0.031*** -0.029***
[0.010] [0.010]
Diabetes pregnancy -0.002 -0.003
[0.029] [0.029]
Hypertension 0.011 0.011
[0.064] [0.061]
Kidney diseases 0.070* 0.067*
[0.041] [0.038]
Birth weight -0.062 -0.057
[0.056] [0.055]
Birth weight2 0.006 0.005
[0.008] [0.008]
Gestational age -0.015*** -0.014***
[0.005] [0.005]
Gestational age2 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000]
Constant 2.631*** –
[0.083] –
Observations 13,994 13,994
Notes. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustered at hospital level in brackets. Linear Probability Models (LPM) estimated using OLS.
Column (2) includes average marginal effects from probit model, computed with Stata command
margins. Data source: UK Millennium Cohort Study, wave 1.
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Chapter 3
Do waiting times affect health
outcomes? Evidence from
Coronary Bypass
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3.1 Introduction
Long waiting times for elective (non-emergency) services are a prominent health policy
issue in several OECD countries. They tend to be prevalent in countries that combine
public health insurance with low patient cost-sharing and constraints on capacity.1 It has
been argued that they act as a non-price rationing mechanism, which brings together the
demand for and the supply of public health services (Siciliani et al., 2014; Lindsay and
Feigenbaum, 1984; Iversen, 1997; Martin and Smith, 1999; Hoel and Sæther, 2003). Long
waiting times may induce some patients to receive treatment in the private sector more
swiftly and at a positive price, or to sacrifice the treatment, therefore reducing the demand
for public treatment. Similarly, if waiting times are long in the public sector, individuals
may prospectively buy private health insurance and opt for the private sector when ill. On
the supply side, when waiting times are high, providers may work harder if motivated by
altruistic concerns or if subject to performance targets (Cullis et al., 2000; Iversen and
Siciliani, 2011).
A key concern with rationing by waiting is that waiting times may worsen health outcomes.
By the time the patient receives the treatment, his or her health condition may have
deteriorated so that the health treatment becomes less effective and the potential health
gains are reduced. If this is the case, policy makers should either consider alternative
rationing mechanisms, or introduce policies that further encourage effective prioritisation
of patients.
This study informs the debate on the relative merits of different types of rationing in
healthcare systems by investigating whether patients with longer waiting times have poorer
health outcomes. We measure health outcomes in terms of probability of (a) in-hospital
mortality once admitted to the hospital for surgery, and (b) being admitted as an emergency
for any cause in the 28 days following the discharge from the hospital after the surgery.
We focus on elective patients in need of a coronary bypass (CABG) in the English National
Health Service (NHS). CABG is a common procedure for patients with serious heart
conditions with thousands of patients being treated every year. Focusing on CABG is
advantageous because (a) health outcomes can be unambiguously interpreted, as the risk
of mortality and readmission is not negligible (more than 1 per cent and about 4 per cent
respectively) and (b) CABG is nearly exclusively provided in the public sector, with the
1Countries where waiting times are a significant health policy issue include Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom.
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private sector performing only 2% of all heart surgeries, including CABG (Ludman, 2012).
Therefore selection effects due to the private sector are likely to be negligible.
We employ a large sample, which includes all patients who received a coronary bypass
during the period 2000-2010 within the English NHS. During this period, waiting times
dramatically reduced from an average of 220 days to 50 days (Figure 3.1). Such reductions,
unique to the United Kingdom, are the result of several policies that combined more
resources for the healthcare system with stringent maximum waiting-times targets (Smith
and Sutton, 2013).2 As discussed below, we argue that such policies have generated changes
in waiting times that vary over time and across hospitals, providing a unique opportunity
to assess whether long waiting times are associated with worse health outcomes.
Figure 3.1. Mean waiting times for CABG patients in the English NHS
Note: Data source: Hospital Episode Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
Our analysis relies on three main empirical strategies. First, for each financial year, we
estimate patient-level linear probability models, including hospital fixed effects to control
for variations in hospitals’ resources and protocols that may act as confounders. A key issue
for identification relates to waiting-times prioritisation (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2008a): more
severe patients are likely to wait less and to be at higher risk of in-hospital mortality. We
address this issue introducing a wide range of controls. Nonetheless, we cannot exclude that
there may remain unobserved dimensions of severity correlated with both waiting times
2Such targets are unconditional, e.g. no patient should wait more than x weeks regardless of the
treatment and conditions. Only recently some targets have been added for specific type of care, e.g. cancer
treatments.
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and health outcomes. This limitation is addressed with our second and third approaches.
Our second strategy exploits the significant variations of waiting times over the years
and across providers. We build a long panel with repeated observations at the hospital
level over 11 years. We test whether hospitals that experienced sharper reductions in
waiting times resulted in better health outcomes by employing fixed-effects panel data
models, which control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the hospital level.
In addition, we account for time-varying unobserved factors by adopting an instrumental
variable approach.
Our third strategy consists of the estimation of patient-level models exploiting the whole
panel. In such models, waiting times are again potentially endogenous due to unobserved
severity affecting both health outcomes and waiting times. We therefore instrument
patient-specific waiting times with the waiting time at the hospital level for CABG and
waiting times at the hospital level for Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty
(PTCA),3 a less invasive procedure. Waiting times for PTCA should be correlated with
waiting times for CABG, but not with CABG health outcomes, once we control for hospital
characteristics.
Our results from panel-data models suggest no association of CABG waiting times with
in-hospital mortality. Instead long CABG waiting times are associated with an increase in
emergency readmission rates (although this effect has weak statistical significance). This
is also generally the case when we employ individual-level regressions. The results are
therefore robust to different econometric approaches.
3.2 Related literature
Relatively little evidence exists on whether waiting times affect post-surgery health outcomes
of elective patients. Most studies are from the medical literature and focus on CABG
patients. They tend to be small-scale retrospective studies with a limited number of patients
from selected providers. Légaré et al. (2005) and Carrier et al. (1993) find that CABG
waiting times in Canada do not predict the probability of dying during hospitalization or
other adverse outcomes (e.g. length of stay in intensive care units and total length of stay).
Sari et al. (2007) compare health outcomes for those who had CABG within 7 days (94
patients) and those who waited more than seven days (82 patients) and find no difference
in terms of in-hospital mortality, morbidity and major adverse cardiac events. Sampalis
3PTCA is also commonly referred to as coronary angioplasty or simply angioplasty.
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et al. (2001) find no association between CABG waiting times and the probability of dying
after surgery, but evidence of a reduction of physical functioning, vitality and other health
indicators for long waiters (more than 97 days). Rexius et al. (2005) conclude that there
is no evidence that prolonged CABG waiting times increase postoperative mortality risk
using data from two Swedish hospitals. In our study we follow the medical literature
in measuring health outcomes as in-hospital mortality and probability of a post-surgery
emergency admission. However, we employ a much larger sample, which includes the whole
population of CABG patients over 11 years in England.
Sobolev and Fradet (2008) provide an extensive review of the literature for CABG patients.
They suggest that long waits may worsen symptoms and lead to worse clinical outcomes.
Waits may also increase the probability of pre-operative death (while waiting) and of
unplanned emergency admission (see also Rexius et al., 2004; Sobolev et al., 2006; Sobolev
et al., 2012; Sobolev and Kuramoto, 2010). However, the main difference in these studies
with respect to ours is the focus on the experience of patients while waiting, as opposed to
the health of patients once they have been admitted for surgery, with the latter being our
focus.
There is analogous literature that investigates the impact of waiting times for patients
in need of hip or knee replacement (Hajat et al., 2002; Fielden et al., 2005; Hirvonen
et al., 2007; Tuominen et al., 2007). These studies suggest that long waiting times are
not associated with higher mortality and this may be explained by the very low mortality
risk for patients undertaking this surgery. Some analyses find, however, small or moderate
effects of long waiting times on patients’ quality of life. A systematic review by Hoogeboom
et al. (2009) including 15 studies concludes that there is strong evidence that pain does not
worsen during a six-month wait (see Hirvonen, 2007 for an earlier review). Self-reported
functioning also does not deteriorate for patients awaiting a hip replacement, while the
evidence is conflicting for knee replacement. An important limitation of these studies is the
sample size, which tends to be relatively modest since health outcomes are not collected
from regular administrative datasets.4
In the economics literature, Hamilton et al. (1996) analyse the impact of waiting times
following a hip fracture on the probability of death and further hospitalisation in Canada,
finding no effect. Hamilton and Bramley-Harker (1999) find a similar result for England.
Hamilton et al. (2000) compare waiting times and outcomes in the U.S. and Canada;
although waiting times are significantly longer in Canada, they do not affect mortality
4A recent exception is Nikolova et al. (2013), which makes use of PROMs data for elective hip replacement
in England.
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rates. These studies differ from ours since they deal with very short (less than a week)
waiting times following hip fracture, as opposed to much longer waiting times for CABG
surgeries (weeks or months). In addition, our focus is on elective care, where waiting times
are notoriously long.
3.3 Institutional background
Waiting times for healthcare have been a persistent phenomenon in the British National
Health Service since its inception in 1948. The NHS inherited a waiting list of over 400,000
patients waiting for hospital inpatient treatment in 1948 (Iacone et al., 2012). Ever since
1948, waiting times have been the subject of intense political debate.
The NHS provides universal access to healthcare. It is funded by taxation and free to
patients at point of use. Geographically-defined local purchasers receive budgets from
central government to fund the healthcare for their populations. Family doctors act as
gatekeepers to specialist care and patients need to have a referral from them to access a
specialist.
Most hospital care is provided by public hospitals, which are separate from the local
purchasing body. Hospitals are subject to tight financial and regulatory control, and receive
a fixed price for each patient treated based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs). The
HRG system, also known as Payment by Results, was initially introduced in 2003 for a
subset of procedures and then gradually expanded to all other types of admissions (Farrar
et al., 2009). It is similar to the DRG payment system within Medicare in the US.
Hospitals meeting certain financial and clinical requirement have Foundation status, which
gives them more discretion in using surpluses. From 2003, private sector providers have
been able to enter the NHS market, though they currently treat a small proportion (2
per cent) of NHS elective patients (mainly hip and knee replacements and cataracts). A
number of hospitals’ mergers occurred before 2003, but the number of hospitals has been
reasonably stable since then.
The NHS Plan published in 2000 recognised that the health system has been underfunded
for many years, relative to other European countries, and appeared to have relatively higher
waiting times. As a result, in 2001 the government instituted an aggressive national policy
(known as ’targets and terror regime’) to reduce waiting times for elective treatment (Smith
and Sutton, 2013). While maximum waiting time guarantees have been implemented in
the NHS for at least 20 years, it was only with this reform that severe sanctions were
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introduced for hospitals not satisfying such targets, contributing to substantive reductions
in waiting times (Propper et al., 2008). In particular, waiting times for inpatient care were
published regularly and used as basis for sanctions and rewards, with the main sanction
being the dismissal of hospital managers in case of poor performance and the reward mainly
consisting in greater autonomy for hospitals, in particular the freedom to keep certain
surplus.
This policy was designed to reduce waiting times for elective care progressively over the
years. The target of a maximum wait was initially set at 18-months by the end of March
2001, until a maximum of six months was established in 2005. This trend is clear in Figure
1, which shows a slow reduction of waiting time for CABG patients rather than a ‘jump’
in the average wait.
In the English NHS, patients who need to see a specialist are usually referred by a General
Practitioner (GP) to a hospital. Patients with symptoms of coronary artery disease (e.g.
chest pain) are referred to a cardiologist. Direct access to hospital specialists is only possible
through the Accident and Emergency department for emergency patients. At the time of
the referral, patients have the right to choose which hospital to go for their outpatient
appointment and the consultant-led team who will be in charge of the patient in the first
appointment at the hospital. During the outpatient visit, the cardiologist assesses the
health conditions and chooses the appropriate treatment. She may perform a non-surgical
procedure to unblock the artery. If this fails the patient is referred for a CABG, usually
performed by a cardiac surgeon, and placed on the waiting list (Gaynor et al., 2012).
This is the time we start to calculate the wait. During the wait, a pre-assessment clinic
appointment is arranged to prepare the patient for surgery and give her the opportunity
to ask questions. The surgeon reviews patient’s medical history and does a physical check.
The wait ends when the patient enters the hospital for the treatment. We are not aware of
a formal urgency categorization to prioritise patients on the list, neither of corresponding
recommended maximum waiting times for different groups, though that does not imply
that doctors prioritise patients informally on the list.
3.4 Methods
We employ three main specifications, whose advantages and drawbacks are outlined below.
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3.4.1 Patient level analysis - cross-section
For each financial year, we estimate the following patient-level specification using a linear
probability model (LPM):
mij = α+ β1log(wij) + β2sij + µj + ij (3.1)
where mij is a binary variable equal to one if patient i died (or was readmitted as an
emergency following surgery) in hospital j, wij is waiting time, sij is a vector of measures
of patients’ severity and other controls and ij is the idiosyncratic error term. µj is a
hospital fixed effect, which controls for time-invariant unobservables at the hospital level
(e.g. differences in resources, protocols, quality of care, teaching status, etc).5
Our key interest is in estimating β1. Failing to control for severity may lead to (downward)
biased estimates because (a) mortality (or emergency readmission) risk depends on patients’
pre-operative severity and (b) more severe patients are prioritised and tend to wait less.
To account for this, we include a large set of covariates (see below). Therefore, the
identification strategy relies on any residual unobserved severity being negligible.
We run the specification in Equation 3.1 for each individual year. Waiting times have
significantly changed over time (more than halved, see Figure 3.1) and the impact of
long waiting times on patients’ health may also have changed. Comparing the coefficients
obtained using data from different years allows to identify the evolution of the relationship
between waiting times and health outcomes over the period 2000-2010.
The models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and allow for clustered
standard errors at hospital level. The advantages of LPMs are that they allow us to
interpret the estimated coefficients as marginal effects and to obtain unbiased estimates if
the conditional expectation is linear. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) recognise, the LPM
approximates the conditional expectation function (CEF), whether the latter is linear or
non-linear. However, we are aware of the concerns that the binary nature of the dependent
variable could arise6 and we also estimate fixed-effects logit regressions as a robustness
check (results reported in Tables 3.A and 3.B in the Appendix).7
5For data restriction reasons, we cannot use hospital identifiers to link HES data to other data sources
including information on hospital characteristics and performance (e.g. beds availability, staff, etc.). As
a result, we cannot identify which are the hospitals that accomplished earlier or those which had larger
reductions in waiting times.
6The use of a linear probability model could produce predicted probabilities that are less than zero or
greater than one. It implies a constant marginal effect of each explanatory variable and it violates the
Gauss-Markov assumption of homoskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2010).
7We estimate a classical conditional fixed-effects logit estimator (Chamberlain, 1980) when we use
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3.4.2 Hospital level analysis – panel data
Our second specification employs data aggregated at the hospital level:
mjt = α+ β1log(wjt) + β2sjt + µt + µj + jt (3.2)
where mjt is the mortality (or readmission) rate in hospital j in year t, wjt is (mean)
waiting time, sjt is a vector of variables which includes patients’ severity and other controls
and jt is the error term. µt includes year dummies to allow for a time trend, which
captures - among other things - changes in technologies, national guidelines or protocols
of care.8 µj is a hospital fixed effect controlling for time-invariant unobservables at the
hospital level.
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the coefficient of interest, β1, this approach exploits
large variation in waiting times over time and across hospitals. We argue that such changes
in waiting times can be considered exogenous, since they were driven by general policy
initiatives rather than specific ones on coronary bypass procedures or aimed at specific
hospitals. Additionally, by estimating a fixed effect model, we are able to control for time
invariant confounding factors, such as hospital organization, that potentially could impact
both waiting times and health outcomes.
Even if we control for time-invariant unobservables at the hospital level, there may be
other concurring events (e.g. time-varying factors) that lead to an omitted-variable bias.
For example, the reduction of waiting times through penalties and targets may also affect
the referral criteria of patients added to the waiting list, introducing a selection bias. We
control for this possibility by instrumenting CABG waiting times with waiting times for
PTCA. The idea is that waiting times for PTCA should be correlated with waiting times
for CABG, but not with CABG mortality rates or emergency readmission rates (in the
Robustness Checks section we test for possible substitution effect between CABG and
PTCA).
Overall, this approach exploits variation in waiting times over time and across hospitals. β1
can be interpreted as the effect of waiting times on mortality (or emergency readmission)
mortality as outcome. For emergency readmissions instead we employ an unconditional fixed-effects logit
estimator, due to the lack of variability of the outcome in some of the hospital clusters. Although the
unconditional logit fixed-effect may potentially provide biased estimates of the parameters of interest, this
issue happens only with small number of clusters (less than 16) and small numbers in each cluster (less
than 50 individuals), as shown in a simulation study by Katz (2001). This does not apply here, as we have
at least 20 hospital-clusters in each year, and on average more than 300 patients in each hospital per year.
8As an alternative specification, we have substituted year dummies with a linear time trend. Results are
unchanged.
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due to variation within hospital.9 The main advantage of this approach is that it exploits
information at hospital level, therefore the estimates are less likely to be affected by omitted
variable bias caused by the impossibility to fully control for patient-specific severity. On
the other hand, because all variables are aggregated at hospital level, results may suffer
from aggregation bias (also known as ’ecological fallacy’). For this reason, we also employ
the third specification using patient-level data collected over the entire panel.
3.4.3 Patient level analysis – panel data
We extend our analysis by running the following patient-level specification:
mijt = α+ β1log(wijt) + β2sijt + µt + µj + ijt (3.3)
This model is analogous to the one defined in Equation 3.1 but it exploits variations across
hospitals and years (being estimated using the entire panel). As a result, the coefficient
associated to waiting times measures the average effect of waiting times on health outcomes
over the entire period. As in Equation 3.1, estimates from Equation 3.3 could be subject
to omitted-variable bias, if in each year patients with higher severity wait less and have a
higher risk of mortality (or emergency readmission).
To address this form of endogeneity, we control for patients’ severity using an extensive
set of controls (the same employed in Equation 3.1) and we instrument the patient-level
waiting times, wijt, with the mean waiting times in each hospital and in each year for both
CABG and PTCA (i.e. we use wjt,CABG and wjt,PTCA as instruments). Since aggregated
CABG waiting times are constructed by definition using individual waiting times, it is
reasonable to assume a strong positive correlation between (hospital-level) aggregated
waiting times and the individual (patient-level) waiting times. Moreover, there is no reason
to believe that aggregated waiting times are correlated with in-hospital mortality (or
emergency readmission) once we control for patients’ severity and hospital (unobserved)
characteristics. A similar reasoning could be applied to (hospital-level) aggregated PTCA
waiting times, that are expected to be correlated with patients’ health status only through
patients’ waiting time for CABG surgery, after controlling for patients’ and hospitals’
characteristics.
9We are not interested in the effect of waiting times on health outcomes across hospitals since this is
likely to be confounded by unobservables: for example, hospitals with high quality could in principle be
characterized by both long waiting times (due to high demand) and better health outcomes.
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3.5 Data
The analysis uses the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES).10 This is an administrative dataset
that contains records of all inpatient admissions, outpatient appointments and Access
& Emergency attendances at English NHS hospitals. We use data for 11 financial years
(April-to-March) between 2000-01 and 2010-11.
Our sample includes all patients (elective inpatient admissions) who had a CABG surgery
(OPCS-4 codes K40-K46). We exclude 30,486 patients for whom CABG was combined
with PTCA and/or a heart valve procedure. These procedures, PTCA in particular, can
be substitutes or complements to CABG and contribute to mortality risk. We make the
sample more homogeneous by excluding them.
We also drop: duplicates, incomplete spells, episodes that do not allow to link information
across spells or missing information on our covariates; patients below 35 years; patients
waiting more than two years; and hospitals performing less than 20 procedures each year.
The final sample includes 133,258 patients.
For each patient we construct (a) a dummy equal to one if the patient dies in hospital
between 0-29 days (inclusive) from admission for the first eligible procedure in the spell in
the respective financial year, and zero otherwise; (b) a dummy equal to one if the patient is
re-admitted as an emergency within 28 days following CABG surgery, and zero otherwise.
These are our key dependent variables measured at the individual and hospital level.
We define waiting time (our key regressor) as the difference between the time the patient is
added to the list, following the specialist assessment, and the time the patient is admitted
to the hospital for surgery (commonly known as inpatient waiting time). 11
Our control variables include patients’ age, gender, number of diagnoses at time of admission
and number of past emergency admissions to NHS hospitals the year preceding the surgery.
We also employ a proxy of patient’s socio-economic status12 built on the income domain
of the Indexes of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2004, 2007 and 2010: the proportion of
10Hospital Episode Statistics are Copyright 2015, re-used with the permission of The Health Social Care
Information Centre. All rights reserved.
11An alternative measure of waiting times used in the literature consists in the referral-to-treatment
waiting time, i.e. the time elapsed from the GP referral to the date the patients admitted to the hospital
for the procedure. This measure - as well as the one employed in our study - does not take into account the
time from a patient experiences problems to when he/she sees a GP. This can potentially raise issues, if
individuals with different characteristics (e.g. socio-economic status) wait more/less time before seeing a
GP, and such unobservables also affect the probability of dying or being readmitted as an emergency. In
our case, we control for patients’ socio-economic status using the income domain of the Index of Multiple
Depreivation (IMD). See Dixon and Siciliani (2009) for a more discussion on waiting time measures.
12Some existing evidence suggests that income deprivation is correlated with waiting times (Cooper et al.,
2009; Laudicella et al., 2012; Johar et al., 2013.
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population living in low-income households in the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) of
patient’s residence (Noble et al., 2004). The distribution of this indicator is split into five
quintiles.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics. On average, waiting time for CABG is 107 days.
Waiting times have changed dramatically over the years, as shown in Figure 3.1. In 2000,
a CABG patient waited, on average, more than seven months before having a surgery,
but only two months in 2010. The decline was more substantive in 2000-2005 and then
remained relatively stable.
In addition to a large overall variation, waiting times for CABG surgery have varied
significantly within each hospital over the years. Such variation is important since fixed-
effects models rely on this source of variability. A graphical representation is provided in
Figure 3.2 which shows the mean waiting time distribution across hospitals over 11 years.
There is large variability in waits both between (standard deviation is 46.74) and within
hospitals (standard deviation is 107.33).
Figure 3.2. Mean waiting time for CABG patients by hospital
Note: Data source: Hospital Episode Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
In-hospital mortality and emergency readmission rates have been stable at around 1 per
cent and 4 per cent, respectively. The average age is 65 years and 82 per cent are men. 8
per cent of patients have no comorbidities; more than half of patients have at least five
concurrent diagnoses. On average, patients had 0.27 emergency hospitalizations in the year
preceding surgery.
50
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics. CABG elective patients: 2000/01-2010/11
Variables Mean Standard Deviation
Individual Level Variables (sample size =133,258)
Patient died in hospital 0.01165 0.1073
Patient had an emergency readmissions 0.0407 0.1975
within 28 days from discharge
Waiting time (days) 107.06 110.85
Age
35-44 years old 0.0197 0.1389
45-54 years old 0.119 0.3238
55-64 years old 0.3185 0.4659
65-74 years old 0.3977 0.4894
75-84 years old 0.1423 0.3494
85-94 years old 0.0028 0.0526
Male patient 0.8223 0.3823
Number of diagnoses at admission
one diagnosis 0.0804 0.2718
two diagnoses 0.2718 0.2681
three diagnoses 0.1168 0.3212
four diagnoses 0.1422 0.3492
five diagnoses 0.1479 0.355
six diagnoses 0.1384 0.3453
seven diagnoses 0.1256 0.3314
more than seven diagnoses 0.17084 0.3764
Number of past emergency admissions 0.2698 0.6351
Income Deprivation Score (quintiles)
least income deprived quintile 0.2223 0.4158
2nd income deprived quintile 0.1825 0.3863
3rd income deprived quintile 0.1974 0.398
4th income deprived quintile 0.2056 0.4042
most income deprived quintile 0.1923 0.3941
Provider Level Variables (sample size = 325)
Waiting time (days) 97.75 62.77
Average patients’ age 64.94 1.22
Average number of diagnoses per patient 5.32 1.93
Proportion of male patients 0.823 0.0319
Number of past emergency admissions 0.2684 0.0688
Death Indicator for all CABG patients 0.0118 0.0078
Proportion of patients with emergency readmissions 0.0405 0.013
Notes. Data source: Hospital Episode Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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3.6 Results
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the results for the patient-level analysis, as specified in Equation
3.1. All models include hospital fixed effects. Column (1) has no control variables, while
columns 2-5 introduce additional controls for age and gender (column 2), number of
diagnoses (column 3), number of emergency admissions in the previous year (column 4)
and income deprivation (column 5).
Our key results when focusing on in-hospital mortality show that for all years (except
for 2003) there is no association between waiting times and in-hospital mortality.13 For
2003, we find instead that longer waiting times are associated with a reduction in mortality.
A 100 per cent increase in waiting times (doubling the wait) reduces the probability of
mortality by 0.22 percentage points (with an underlying risk of mortality of 1 per cent).
This counter-intuitive result may be due to waiting times acting as a residual indicator
of urgency, even after extensive controls on patients’ severity. We also note that in 2003
waiting times were still on average high (100 days), therefore prioritisation was more likely
to be pronounced.
When health outcomes are measured as probability of emergency readmission following
the surgery (Table 3.3), we find a positive association (except for 2002, 2004 and 2010
when negative), but generally not statistically significant. The only exception is 2006 with
a positive and statistically significant coefficient: an increase in waiting times by 100%
increases the risk of an emergency readmission by 0.3 percentage points.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 do not report coefficients on the control variables. These are provided
in Tables 3.C and 3.D in the Appendix (see Section 3.9). The sign of the coefficients of
the controls are as expected. The risk of in-hospital mortality and readmission generally
increases with age, number of diagnoses and past utilization.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide the results for the analysis at the hospital level (using unbalanced
and balanced sample). This specification exploits exogenous variations in waiting times over
time. Hospital fixed effects are included in all models.14 In Table 3.4 we find that waiting
times are not associated with in-hospital mortality rate. The control variables are generally
13This holds if we consider statistical significance at 5 per cent level. We also find a (negative) significant
coefficient at 10 per cent level in 2002.
14As a robustness check, all model specifications are estimated using random effects (RE). When the
Hausman test could be implemented (i.e. when the RE models do not degenerate to a pooled OLS model),
it suggests that FE should be preferred. In the few cases where RE models degenerate to pooled OLS,
we find that FE and RE estimates are qualitatively similar (same sign and significance of waiting time
coefficient).
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Table 3.2. Patient Level Analysis
Dependent variable: in-hospital mortality for elective CABG patients
Year Sample Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2000 13,646 -0.0002987 -0.000357 -0.0004566 -0.0000750 -0.0000842
[-0.34] [-0.41] [-0.54] [-0.09] [-0.10]
2001 13,837 -0.0007831 -0.0008513 -0.0011012* -0.0006719 -0.0006988
[-1.14] [-1.25] [-1.72] [-1.03] [-1.09]
2002 14,196 -0.0015049 -0.0016002 -0.0017758* -0.0017338* -0.0017907*
[-1.52] [-1.64] [-1.83] [-1.85] [-1.88]
2003 13,654 -0.0015245* -0.0017477** -0.0022661*** -0.0022377*** -0.0021645**
[-1.90] [-2.22] [-2.80] [-2.78] [-2.74]
2004 13,593 -0.0004476 -0.0006273 -0.0008699 -0.0006771 -0.0006729
[-0.44] [-0.62] [-0.85] [-0.63] [-0.63]
2005 11,614 0.0004950 0.000184 -0.0001328 -0.0001210 -0.0001880
[0.48] [0.18] [-0.13] [-0.11] [-0.17]
2006 11,151 0.0002042 -0.0002910 -0.0005764 -0.0004427 -0.0005610
[0.14] [-0.20] [-0.39] [-0.30] [-0.38]
2007 11,844 0.0013930 0.0010540 0.0007195 0.0008005 0.0009006
[1.37] [1.03] [0.75] [0.85] [0.94]
2008 11,429 -0.0015440 -0.0017945 -0.0022054 -0.0021524 -0.0022134
[-1.14] [-1.32] [-1.60] [-1.59] [-1.60]
2009 9,655 0.0000941 -0.0000619 -0.0003729 -0.0002916 -0.0002942
[0.06] [-0.04] [-0.24] [-0.19] [-0.19]
2010 8,639 -0.0011555 -0.0014763 -0.0016190 -0.0015133 -0.0015461
[-0.68] [-0.86] [-0.93] [-0.86] [-0.88]
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Linear probability models
with clustered robust standard errors at hospital level. All specifications include hospital fixed
effects. Column (1) includes no control variables. Column (2) includes patient’s age at admission
and gender. Column (3) adds the number of diagnoses at admission. Column (4) adds the
number of emergency hospitalizations in the previous 365 days (for any cause). Column (5)
includes, in addition to all the previously mentioned controls, income quintiles. Data source:
Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.3. Patient Level Analysis
Dependent variable: emergency readmission for elective CABG patients
Year Sample Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2000 13,646 0.0005680 0.0005662 0.0005205 0.0002577 0.0002793
[0.42] [0.42] [0.39] [0.19] [0.21]
2001 13,837 0.0020397 0.0019435 0.0018830 0.0018626 0.0017976
[1.24] [1.19] [1.14] [1.16] [1.12]
2002 14,196 -0.0004020 -0.0003640 -0.0004273 -0.0010149 -0.0010683
[-0.29] [-0.26] [-0.31] [-0.74] [-0.78]
2003 13,654 0.0030209* 0.0028725* 0.0025588 0.0024356 0.0024484
[2.01] [1.91] [1.69] [1.55] [1.55]
2004 13,593 -0.0008238 -0.0008296 -0.0010266 -0.0009803 -0.0009810
[-0.51] [-0.51] [-0.62] [-0.60] [-0.60]
2005 11,614 0.0014051 0.0013068 0.0011203 0.0011518 0.0009158
[0.70] [0.65] [0.56] [0.58] [0.46]
2006 11,151 0.0038495** 0.0039140** 0.0038244** 0.0035219** 0.0032491*
[2.32] [2.33] [2.28] [2.16] [1.92]
2007 11,844 0.0000530 -0.0001295 -0.0003445 -0.0003579 -0.0004096
[0.02] [-0.05] [-0.15] [-0.15] [-0.17]
2008 11,429 0.0008658 0.0007150 0.0005486 0.0006677 0.0005642
[0.42] [0.35] [0.26] [0.32] [0.27]
2009 9,655 0.0020787 0.0019454 0.0016447 0.0012281 0.0009717
[0.81] [0.76] [0.64] [0.48] [0.37]
2010 8,639 -0.0002173 -0.0004907 -0.0006415 -0.0007072 -0.0008229
[-0.07] [-0.16] [-0.21] [-0.23] [-0.28]
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Linear probability models
with clustered robust standard errors at hospital level. All specifications include hospital fixed
effects. Column (1) includes no control variables. Column (2) includes patient’s age at admission
and gender. Column (3) adds the number of diagnoses at admission. Column (4) adds the
number of emergency hospitalizations in the previous 365 days (for any cause). Column (5)
includes, in addition to all the previously mentioned controls, income quintiles. Data source:
Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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insignificant, which is not surprising given that patients’ case-mix is unlikely to vary
significantly over time for a given provider. Table 3.5 instead suggests a positive association
between waiting times and the probability of an emergency readmission, although the
coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level only, when additional controls are included.
An increase in waiting times by 100 per cent increases readmission rates by 0.47 percentage.
Given a baseline risk of readmission of 4.07 per cent, doubling waiting times increases the
risk of readmission from 4.07 per cent to 4.54 per cent. The effect of waiting times appears,
therefore, relatively modest.
Table 3.4. Hospital Level Analysis
Dependent variable: in-hospital mortality rate for elective CABG patients
Unbalanced Sample Balanced Sample
(1) (2) (1) (2)
log(waiting times) -0.0008503 -0.0009039 0.0016345 0.0013302
[-0.42] [-0.52] [1.09] [0.88]
male patients -0.0105294 -0.0247305
[-0.80] [-1.10]
patients’ age 0.0025860* 0.0020602
[1.74] [1.03]
n of diagnoses -0000048 0.0001335
[-0.01] [0.21]
income deprivation 0.0233932 0.0300682
[0.64] [0.69]
past hospitalization 0.0051939 0.0150952
[0.42] [1.00]
constant 0.0187009* -0.1405609 0.0059890 -0.1102563
[1.73] [-1.41] [0.60] [-0.83]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 325 220
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Hospital fixed-effects model
with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.5. Hospital Level Analysis
Dependent variable: emergency readmission rate for elective CABG patients
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (1) (2)
log(waiting times) 0.0057596** 0.0047715* 0.0035729 0.0027745
[2.65] [1.95] [1.55] [1.28]
male patients 0.0216228 0.0054634
[0.73] [0.11]
patients’ age 0.0013353 0.0031211**
[0.99] [2.64]
n of diagnoses 0.0004620 0.0013726
[0.53] [1.42]
income deprivation 0.2286744** 0.2833755**
[2.68] [2.49]
past hospitalization -0.0038196 0.0011034
[-0.21] [0.05]
constant 0.0093507 -0.1202412 0.0204009 -0.2208651**
[0.81] [-1.28] [1.69] [-2.48]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 325 220
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Hospital fixed-effects models
with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
Most waiting time reductions happened between 2000 and 2005 (Figure 3.1). The above
results may be biased towards zero if waiting times varied to a lower extent after 2005. In
Tables 3.6 and 3.7, we replicate the analysis by splitting the sample into two sub-periods,
2000-2005 and 2006-2010. In both sub-periods, we do not find an association of waiting
times with mortality (Table 3.6). On the contrary, we find a positive and significant
association of waiting times on emergency readmissions only during 2006-2010 (Table 3.7).
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Table 3.6. Hospital Level Analysis in two periods (2000-05 and 2006-10)
Dependent variable: in-hospital mortality rate for elective CABG patients
Years 2000-2005 Years 2006-2010
(1) (2) (1) (2)
log(waiting times) -0.0026443 -0.0020068 0.0036239 0.0036015
[-0.78] [-0.68] [1.26] [1.20]
male patients -0.0091950 -0.0173435*
[-0.26] [-1.80]
patients’ age 0.0048528* -0.0003647
[1.95] [-0.28]
n of diagnoses 0.0008613 0.0000929
[0.54] [0.12]
income deprivation 0.0657560 0.0719958
[0.51] [1.13]
past hospitalization 0.0077267 0.0095442
[0.41] [0.85]
constant 0.0285228 -0.2889890 -0.0013992 0.0239590
[1.62] [-1.61] [-0.12] [0.27]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes
year dummies 2001-05 yes yes no no
year dummies 2007-10 no no yes yes
Observations 176 149
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Hospital
fixed-effects model with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Data source: Hospital
Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.7. Hospital Level Analysis in two periods (2000-05 and 2006-10)
Dependent variable: emergency readmission rate for elective CABG patients
Years 2000-2005 Years 2006-2010
(1) (2) (1) (2)
log(waiting times) 0.0046241 0.0042134 0.0120898*** 0.0093411**
[1.61] [1.07] [2.92] [2.34]
male patients 0.0110531 0.0420525
[0.21] [1.36]
patients’ age 0.0013473 0.0037776**
[0.73] [2.19]
n of diagnoses 0.0008766 -0.0003189
[0.70] [-0.27]
income deprivation 0.0202690 0.3420072**
[0.11] [2.37]
past hospitalization -0.0109045 -0.0224399
[-0.46] [-0.76]
constant 0.0153132 -0.0808063 -0.0113722 -0.3206826**
[1.01] [-0.57] [-0.67] [-2.44]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes
year dummies 2001-05 yes yes no no
year dummies 2007-10 no no yes yes
Observations 176 149
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Hospital fixed-effects model
with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
While hospital fixed effect models control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
at the hospital level, some residual endogeneity may still persist if, for example, worse
outcomes lead providers to change (perhaps to reduce) waiting times. We account for this
by employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Table 3.8 provides the IV results.
The first-stage regression suggests that waiting time for PTCA is a good predictor of
waiting time for CABG. The second-stage results confirm that CABG waiting times are
not associated with mortality and emergency readmissions.15
15We also tried as alternative instruments the waiting time for hip replacement and hernia, but these were
not good predictors of waiting times in the first-stage regressions once hospital fixed effects were included.
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Table 3.8. Hospital Level Analysis. FE Instrumental Variable Model
Effect of waiting times on mortality and emergency readmission rate of elective CABG patient
First Stage Second Stage Second Stage
in-hospital mortality emergency readmission
log(waiting times) -0.0037144 [-0.34] -0.0084200 [-0.48]
patients’ age 0.0129814 [0.43] 0.0026375*** [3.29] 0.0016072 [1.25]
n of diagnoses -0.0384465** [-1.99] -0.0001065 [-0.17] 0.0000155 [0.02]
male patients -0.1923644 [-0.32] -0.0109378 [-0.69] 0.0195354 [0.77]
income 6.280076*** [3.26] 0.0409061 [0.51] 0.2865302** [2.23]
past hospitalization -1.462375*** [-3.83] 0.0007613 [0.04] -0.0218942 [-0.71]
log (PTCA waiting times) 0.1711655** [2.37]
hospitals FE yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 315 315 315
Test on instruments and endogenous regressor
F-statistic of excluded instruments (p-value) 5.61 (0.0186) 5.61 (0.0186)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.07 (0.7948) 0.67 (0.4139)
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Model estimated
using a fixed effects instrumental variable approach. The F-statistic is distributed as chi-squared with
one degree of freedom under the null. The endogeneity test provides the Hausman statistic testing the
null hypothesis that the baseline and IV estimates are the same. Under the null, the statistic is distributed
as a chi-square with one degree of freedom. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics 2000/01-2010/11.
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One advantage of the specification in Equation 3.2 is that it allows focusing on the
exogenous variations in waiting times over time within hospitals. On the other hand, it
may be prone to aggregation bias. To address this issue, we employ the specification in
Equation 3.3 running a patient-level regression using the sample spanning over 11 years,
and we instrument patient-level waiting times with hospital-level waiting times for CABG
and PTCA. Table 3.9 provides the results for regressions when we do not account for
the potential endogeneity. We find that longer waiting times are associated with lower
probability of dying after admission. This can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity
(note that in the patient-level analysis most of the coefficients are negative; see Table
3.2). In contrast, we find that waiting times have a positive and, in some specifications
significant, association with emergency readmission. This is consistent with Table 3.3,
where most coefficients are positive.
Table 3.9. Patient Level Analysis using the whole panel
Effect of waiting times on mortality and emergency readmission for elective CABG
patients
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
in-hospital mortality emergency readmission
(1) (2) (1) (2)
log(waiting time) -0.0005946* -0.0007540** 0.0012020** 0.0007792
[-2.02] [-2.52] [2.46] [1.61]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 133,166 133,166 133,166 133,166
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Hospital fixed-effects model
with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Specification (1) includes no control variables,
while specification (2) includes all the set of controls (see Table 3.2). Data source: Hospital
Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
The IV results are reported in Table 3.10. The first-stage estimates show that the mean
CABG waiting time (wjt,CABG). which varies by year and hospital, strongly predicts the
individual waiting time wijt (p-value close to zero), both when it is the only instrument and
also when combined with mean PTCA waiting time. The F-statistic in both specifications
is well above the critical value, suggesting that the instruments are jointly significant. The
second-stage results are consistent with those from Equation 3.2. The coefficient measuring
60
the effect of waiting times on in-hospital mortality is negative and, differently from those
reported in Table 3.9, not significant, indicating that when individual heterogeneity and
unobserved severity are accounted for, waiting times do not affect the probability of death.
On the contrary, the effect of waiting times on emergency readmission is still significant (at
10 per cent level). The size of the coefficient is comparable to the one derived in Table 3.3.
An increase in waiting times by 100 per cent increases readmission rates by 0.35 percentage
points, which translates to an increase in the risk of readmission from 4.07 per cent to 4.42
per cent. Again, the effect appears relatively modest.
Since we have two instruments, we can run the over-identification test and compute the
Hansen J-statistic. The high p-value associated with the statistic demonstrates that the
instruments are valid and correctly included in the model as exclusion restrictions.
Table 3.10. Patient Level Analysis using the whole panel. FE IV Model
Effect of waiting times on mortality and emergency readmission of CABG patients
CABG waiting times CABG and PTCA
as IV waiting times as IV
First stage
log(CABG wt) 1.110832*** [26.07] 1.10578*** [26.56]
log(PTCA wt) 0.0548528* [1.71]
F-statistic 679.68 (0.0001) 360.07 (0.0001)
Second stage - dependent variable: in-hospital mortality
log(wt) 0.0022137 [1.01] 0.002126 [0.97]
Overidentification test 1.019 (0.3128)
Endogeneity test 1.747 (0.1862) 1.263 (0.2611)
Second stage - dependent variable: emergency readmission
log(wt) 0.0034904* [1.74] 0.0033705* [1.69]
Overidentification test 1.932 (0.1646)
Endogeneity test 1.907 (0.1672) 1.328 (0.2492)
Observations 133,166 133,035
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Model estimated using a
fixed effects instrumental variable approach. It includes all control variables and year dummies.
The F-statistic for the significance of the exclusion restriction(s) is distributed as a chi-squared
with one (two, in the last specification) degree of freedom, under the null. The endogeneity test
provides the Hausman statistic testing the null hypothesis that the baseline and IV estimates
are the same. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as a chi squared with one degree of
freedom. The over-identification test provides the Hansen J statistic for the joint validity of
instruments. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11. .
In summary, our key results are robust to alternative specifications. The result that longer
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waiting times weakly affect emergency readmission rates without producing any effect on
mortality seems plausible. Mortality is a more extreme outcome than readmissions. It may
be that longer waiting times deteriorate the health of a patient, but not enough to impair
his or her survival rate.
3.7 Discussion
In this context it is important to identify the mechanisms through which the introduction
of stringent waiting times targets and financial sanctions for hospital managers have lead
to a reduction in the average wait for CABG patients. It can indeed be that this policy
did affect the hospitals more generally, not only through an effective reduction of waiting
times for elective care. Propper et al. (2010) contribute to shed light on this aspect by
providing some evidence on the impact of waiting times targets on hospital managers’
decisions. Their analysis suggests that the introduction of more stringent targets did have
the intended effect on waiting times but did not negatively impact hospital managers
activity. In particular nor the effort on the treatment of patients once admitted to the
hospital, measured in terms of average length of stay in the hospital, or the effort for
less-monitored activities, as the number of emergency readmission, did change after the
introduction of targets.
The large amount of financial resources introduced in the NHS in the same period may
have contributed to the reduction in waiting times as well as it may have had an impact
on patients’ health, for example by increasing per capita health expenditure or allowing
hospitals to hire more medical and non medical staff. Propper et al. (2008) show that more
funding in the health care system did not translate into an increase in per capita health
expenditure. However, in the same study they find that an increase in staff resources did
reduce waiting times. Therefore, under the assumptions that (a) these additional financial
resources were devoted to increase staff resources in hospitals, (b) more hospital staff
reduces the risk of in-hospital mortality or emergency readmission and (c) staff resources
changes across hospitals over the years, our estimates would be biased and in particular
they would represent an upper bound of the true effect of long waiting times on health
outcomes.
Another potential source of bias in our results is selection into treatment due to waiting
times: in response to long waits, some patients may be admitted as emergency or receive
an alternative treatment, such as PTCA. To test whether the choice of elective CABG is
uncorrelated with waiting times, we (a) replicate the analysis measuring the mortality rate
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for all CABG patients, including emergency ones; (b) test directly whether waiting times
are positively associated with the proportion of patients admitted as an emergency; and (c)
test whether waiting times for CABG affect the proportion of patients who receive PTCA
(as a ratio of total number of CABG and PTCA patients). Table 3.11 suggests that the
results are qualitatively similar when we use the mortality rate for all patients (elective
and emergency). We also find no evidence of hospitals admitting more CABG emergency
patients or of substituting CABG with PTCA when waiting times are longer.
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Table 3.11. Hospital Level Analysis. Robustness Checks
In-hospital mortality
rate for elective Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of
and emergency emergency PTCA patients PTCA patients
CABG patients CABG patients
log(waiting times) -0.0023980 -0.0092615 0.0214181 0.0197850
[-1.34] [-1.21] [0.98] [0.90]
male patients -0.0232911 -0.0305265 -0.0732551 -0.0769332
[-1.62] [-0.42] [-0.48] [-0.51]
patients’ age 0.0020795* 0.0104439* 0.0009515 0.0005208
[1.90] [1.89] [0.09] [0.05]
n of diagnoses -0.0004477 0.0055913** 0.0081226* -0.0078424
[-0.72] [2.35] [1.69] [-1.03]
income 0.0631409 0.5628784** -0.8004029 -0.7519688
[1.61] [2.22] [-1.06] [-1.03]
past hospitalization -0.0079545 0.0020330 0.0620515 0.0645974
[-0.72] [0.04] [0.55] [0.56]
log(PTCA waiting time) - - - 0.0133938
[0.34]
constant -0.0883613 -0.5875067 0.3813086 0.355392
[-1.24] [-1.52] [0.50] [0.46]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 325 325 318 318
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Fixed-effects model
with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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Since waiting times have a skewed distribution, we test whether our hospital-level results
change when we substitute the mean hospital waiting time with the hospital median
waiting times (which are shorter than the mean) and the 90th percentile of each hospital
waiting time distribution in each year. Table 3.12 suggests that there is no association
between waiting time and in-hospital mortality. The association between waiting times
and emergency readmission is more statistically significant when waiting time is measured
at the 90th percentile.
If hospitals differ in the volume of CABG patients, our estimates will be less precise. We
already excluded from the sample hospitals performing less than 20 surgeries per year. As
an additional check, we re-estimated the models using the number of CABG surgeries in
each year and hospital as weights. The estimated coefficients are coherent with our baseline
specifications (see Tables 3.E and 3.F in the Appendix).
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Table 3.12. Hospital Level Analysis. Additional Robustness Checks
Average waiting times Median waiting times 90th percentile of
waiting times distribution
In-hospital Emergency In-hospital Emergency In-hospital Emergency
mortality readmission mortality readmission mortality readmission
log(waiting times) -0.0009039 0.0047715* -0.0014211 0.0028205 0.0001417 0.0063349**
[-0.52] [1.95] [-1.31] [1.37] [0.06] [2.60]
male patients -0.0105294 0.0216228 -0.0104922 0.0210998 -0.0103516 0.0227521
[-0.80] [0.73] [-0.82] [0.70] [-0.77] [0.78]
patients’ age 0.0025860* 0.0013353 0.0025914* 0.0013820 0.0025647* 0.0012580
[1.74] [0.99] [1.75] [1.02] [1.75] [0.95]
n of diagnoses -0.0000048 0.0004620 0.0000003 0.0003471 0.0000321 0.0005242
[-0.01] [0.53] [0.00] [0.40] [0.06] [0.60]
income 0.0233932 0.2286744** 0.0289985 0.2337257** 0.0179570 0.2311138***
[0.64] [2.68] [0.80] [2.68] [0.49] [2.80]
past hospitalization 0.0051939 -0.0038196 0.0030620 -0.0040175 0.0066593 -0.005520
[0.42] [-0.21] [0.25] [-0.21] [0.54] [-0.32]
constant -0.1405609 -0.1202412 -0.1387128 -0.1124179 -0.1446598 -0.1291140
[-1.41] [-1.28] [-1.40] [-1.16] [-1.44] [-1.42]
hospitals FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Fixed-effects model
with standard errors clustered at hospital level. The first specification provides baseline estimates. The second
specification uses the (log of) median waiting time for CABG surgeries as aggregated measure of waiting time.
The third one measures waiting time at the 90th percentile of the distribution (in logarithm). Data source:
Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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Next, we discuss some possible limitations. In the analysis, we exploit variation in waiting
times in the period 2000-2010. A number of policies have been implemented during this
period (e.g. more reliance on prospective payment systems, competition and enhanced
choice). Our results may be biased if different hospitals responded differentially to these
policies over time. For example, good hospitals may respond to competition and choice
policies by attracting more severe patients and generally higher demand, therefore increasing
waiting times. However, a bias may arise only if changes in severity are unobserved.
We control for a range of severity measures. Moreover, Gaynor et al. (2013) find that
competition had no effect on waiting time. Such bias is therefore unlikely to be present.
A prospective payment system was introduced in 2003/2004, which links payments to
hospital activity rather than being reliant on historic budgets. This policy makes it lucrative
for hospitals to up-code secondary diagnoses and to have patients labelled as more severe.
However, we use information on the total number of diagnoses and not on the type of
diagnosis, which might instead proxy the severity of concurrent illness. As a check, we run
Equation 3.2, setting the maximum total number of diagnoses to the pre-reform level, and
the results are unchanged. Therefore our results are unlikely to be affected by the change
in the payment system.
In the analysis we treat mortality and emergency readmissions as independent outcomes.
Using data on emergency admissions for hip fracture, Laudicella et al. (2013) show that
measures of emergency readmissions may be biased if they do not take into account that
higher readmissions may be due higher patients’ survival. However, our analysis finds that
waiting times are never associated with mortality and therefore the association between
waiting times and emergency readmissions is unlikely to be biased. Additionally, the
number of patients dying during hospitalization is relative modest with respect to the total
number of patients (about one per cent). We also test for selection due to mortality by
running a Heckman selection model on patient-level data for readmissions conditional on
patient’s survival. The inverse Mills ratios are not significant and the results are similar to
those without accounting for selection (available from the authors). A potential explanation
is that survivorship bias may be more relevant for emergency patients than elective ones.
Finally, if patients are dying while waiting, there may be a potential issue of selectivity
through mortality on the list. Our data does not contain information on mortality while
waiting, but only information on patients who actually receive the treatment. However,
a review of the previous literature on CABG waiting times suggests that the mortality
rate for patients waiting for the surgery is low and ranges between 0.5% to 2.6% (Koomen
et al., 2001; Carrier et al., 1993) and this risk includes also deaths occurred for reasons
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unrelated to cardiac events.
3.8 Conclusions
Waiting times for health services are a major policy issue. Previous work showed that
waiting times act as a rationing mechanism to bring demand for and supply of healthcare
in equilibrium (Martin and Smith, 1999). However, we still do not know whether rationing
by waiting is an efficient and desirable rationing mechanism compared to other ones (such
as co-payments and direct rationing).
A key policy concern with rationing by waiting is that prolonged waiting times may worsen
health outcomes following surgery. This study contributes to the limited empirical evidence
that informs this question. Our results show that for patients in need of coronary bypass,
variations in waiting times may lead to variations in health outcomes as measured by
emergency readmission rates. No association is found with in-hospital mortality.
Our results are important for policy and contribute to the understanding of the role
and relative merits of different forms of rationing within publicly-funded health systems.
In the presence of excess demand, healthcare can be rationed in at least three different
ways. One possibility is to introduce co-payments (rationing by price). Rationing by price
implies that those patients who seek treatment can obtain it without significant waits,
and therefore their health outcomes will not be affected. On the other hand, positive
prices may deter some patients (for example those who are poor and sick) from seeking
treatment, and therefore health outcomes for those patients may be reduced because of
lack of adequate treatment. Rationing by waiting is less likely to deter poor patients
from seeking treatment, but long delays may potentially affect health outcomes. Another
difference is that while higher co-payments raise additional resources for the funder, waiting
times do not (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2008b), although when waiting times are short, an
increase in waiting times may help to reduce cost of provision by reducing idle capacity
(Siciliani et al., 2009). A third possibility is to implement direct rationing where doctors
explicitly refuse treatment to some patients based on low clinical need. This implies the
existence of clear prioritisation rules and protocols, which is only to some extent observed
in practice (and it can be politically unsustainable on a large scale).
Our results are, to some extent, supportive of waiting times as an acceptable rationing
mechanism since waiting times do not appear to be associated with extreme measures of
health outcomes such as in-hospital mortality rates and only to some extent with emergency
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readmissions. This may also be interpreted as a sign that prioritisation works well within
the English NHS. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the quality of life of
patients receiving CABG is reduced when waiting times are long. Mortality and emergency
readmission are extreme negative health outcomes and therefore capture only one end
of the health outcome distribution. For relatively healthier patients who do not die in
the hospital or are not admitted as an emergency, waiting times may still worsen health
outcomes. Testing whether this is the case would require more refined health outcome
measures that are generally not available from large routine administrative databases (such
as the one employed in this study). This could be an interesting issue to explore in future
research. It may also be interesting to test the effect of waiting times on health outcomes
for conditions with different degrees of urgency, including more urgent procedures (e.g.
cancer patients) or less urgent ones (e.g. cataract surgery).
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3.9 Appendix
Table 3.A. Patient Level Analysis. Fixed effects logit model
Dependent variable: in-hospital mortality for elective CABG patients
Year Sample Size Coefficient t-stat Odd Ratios
2000 13,585 0.0093468 [0.17] 1.009391
2001 13,837 -0.0600323 [-1.07] 0.9417342
2002 13,879 -0.1297367** [-2.22] 0.8783267
2003 13,515 -0.1733007** [-2.52] 0.8408848
2004 13,296 -0.0553944 [-0.74] 0.9461119
2005 11,33 -0.0050446 [-0.05] 0.9949681
2006 11,151 -0.0496148 [-0.49] 0.9515959
2007 11,253 0.1523056 [1.09] 1.1645160
2008 11,37 -0.1809042* [-1.83] 0.8345153
2009 8,621 -0.0332263 [-0.28] 0.9673196
2010 7,828 -0.1917367 [-1.56] 0.8255242
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each row shows the effect of (the logarithm of)
waiting times on in-hospital mortality for (elective) CABG patients. All models include the
control variables contained in model (5) of Table 3.2. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.B. Patient Level Analysis. Fixed effects logit model
Dependent variable: emergency readmission for elective CABG patients
Year Sample Size Coefficient t-stat Odd Ratios
2000 13,646 0.0071642 [0.21] 1.0071900
2001 13,837 0.0460237 [1.38] 1.0470990
2002 14,196 -0.0310523 [-0.84] 0.9694249
2003 13,619 0.0717300* [1.65] 10.743.600
2004 13,593 -0.0245261 [-0.58] 0.9757723
2005 11,614 0.0235823 [0.43] 1.023863
2006 11,151 0.0882469 [1.45] 1.092258
2007 11,81 -0.0095488 [-0.17] 0.9904967
2008 11,407 0.0159060 [0.28] 1.0160330
2009 9,655 0.0189666 [0.31] 1.0191480
2010 8,601 -0.0181718 [-0.30] 0.9819923
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each row shows the effect of (the logarithm of)
waiting times on emergency readmission for (elective) CABG patients. All models include the
control variables contained in model (5) of Table 3.3. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.C. Patient Level Analysis
Dependent variable: in-hospital mortality for elective CABG patients
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
log(waiting time) -0.0000842 -0.0006988 -0.0017907* -0.0021645** -0.0006729 -0.0001880 -0.0005610 0.0009006 -0.0022134 -0.0002942 -0.0015461
[-0.10] [-1.08] [-1.88] [-2.74] [-0.63] [-0.17] [-0.38] [0.94] [-1.60] [-0.19] [-0.88]
male 0.0004165 -0.0027522 -0.0039067 -0.0067823** -0.0051515 -0.0066992*** -0.0073853* -0.0038757 -0.0069682*** -0.0017856 -0.0014233
[0.23] [-0.90] [-1.47] [-2.43] [-1.07] [-3.15] [-2.03] [-1.45] [-2.99] [-0.55] [-0.40]
45-54 years old 0.0045328***0.0097048*** 0.0017152 0.0033967** -0.0020266 -0.0023145 -0.0039409 0.0022997 -0.0046270 0.0033378***-0.0032934
[2.98] [4.64] [0.52] [2.08] [-0.47] [-0.34] [-0.61] [1.67] [-0.81] [2.87] [-0.49]
55-64 years old 0.0079519***0.0092808*** 0.0067118** 0.0039636*** 0.0016571 -0.0017240 0.0008586 0.0042064*** -0.0040966 0.0067314***-0.0010198
[4.83] [5.63] [2.19] [2.91] [0.37] [-0.31] [0.12] [3.08] [-0.79] [4.29] [-0.16]
65-74 years old 0.0170111***0.0135625***0.0094031***0.0123745*** 0.0088096** 0.0007350 0.0068489 0.0072408*** 0.0025102 0.0132193*** 0.0027831
[7.49] [6.71] [2.79] [8.16] [2.07] [0.11] [1.04] [4.07] [0.50] [5.50] [0.38]
75-84 years old 0.0337513***0.0322235***0.0248128***0.0224429***0.0181823*** 0.0107688 0.0156038* 0.0196467*** 0.0097425* 0.0220383***0.0152431*
[5.62] [6.41] [4.11] [6.09] [3.20] [1.42] [1.95] [4.69] [1.74] [6.21] [2.01]
85-94 years old 0.1913059 -0.0057591** 0.0782346 0.1306626 0.0400359 0.0170553 0.0360350 0.0188632 0.0087025 0.0721401** 0.0153450
[1.35] [-2.20] [1.30] [1.69] [0.86] [0.83] [1.21] [0.88] [0.45] [2.41] [0.64]
two diagnoses 0.0008796 0.0040683 0.0047885 -0.0083587* -0.0069135 -0.0029668 0.0011676 -0.0029591 -0.0103463 -0.0242601
[0.19] [1.24] [1.30] [-2.03] [-0.85] [-0.69] [0.28] [-0.57] [-1.27] [-1.16]
three diagnoses 0.0001773 0.0074950* 0.0093372** 0.0046778 -0.0034570 -0.0055113 0.0038598 0.0003222 -0.0024231 -0.0042407 -0.0194683
[0.04] [2.03] [2.50] [1.28] [-1.03] [-0.74] [0.74] [0.08] [-0.43] [-0.52] [-1.06]
four diagnoses 0.0022937 0.0053757 0.0130375** 0.0096341** -0.0022716 -0.0050391 0.0051091 -0.0007400 -0.0067918 -0.0118734 -0.0241305
[0.53] [1.14] [2.73] [2.11] [-0.48] [-0.63] [0.98] [-0.23] [-1.15] [-1.51] [-1.15]
five diagnoses 0.0095449 0.0100166 0.0110179** 0.0114814** 0.0024041 -0.0002777 0.0039584 0.0022124 -0.0015446 -0.0088487 -0.0178767
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[1.56] [1.61] [2.33] [2.08] [0.37] [-0.03] [0.71] [0.83] [-0.28] [-1.15] [-0.87]
six diagnoses 0.0130745* 0.0111945* 0.0151248** 0.0147909** 0.0065370 0.0055032 0.0080560 0.0045511 0.0001044 -0.0074897 -0.0181378
[2.02] [1.84] [2.23] [2.73] [1.06] [0.58] [1.48] [1.20] [0.02] [-1.01] [-0.85]
seven diagnoses 0.0371948***0.0437966***0.0165318***0.0202969*** 0.0166182** 0.0103489 0.0189709** 0.0064783* 0.0026121 -0.0056561 -0.0198486
[4.50] [4.20] [2.77] [2.78] [2.15] [1.02] [2.53] [1.77] [0.41] [-0.70] [-0.94]
more than seven -0.0013358 0.0581170***0.0514729*** 0.0279474** 0.0284301** 0.0405992***0.0210751*** 0.0231869*** 0.0116237 -0.0050318
diagnoses [-0.23] [4.67] [5.49] [2.65] [2.24] [4.55] [5.77] [3.75] [1.25] [-0.24]
least income -0.0010501 -0.0008271 -0.0021947 0.0039112 -0.0001196 -0.0010615 -0.0033956 0.0030885 -0.0013869 -0.0010432 -0.0023565
deprived quantile [-0.37] [-0.30] [-0.81] [1.49] [-0.04] [-0.33] [-0.89] [1.08] [-0.26] [-0.24] [-0.82]
second income -0.0043898 -0.0029671 -0.0012793 0.0036963 -0.0034024 0.0006642 -0.0090402** -0.0016910 -0.0058130 0.0003189 -0.0027752
deprived quantile [-1.12] [-1.08] [-0.51] [1.21] [-1.18] [0.18] [-2.28] [-0.71] [-1.41] [0.15] [-0.95]
third income -0.0046827 -0.0032007 -0.0022465 0.0013556 -0.0005870 0.0015994 -0.0039889 0.0035073 -0.0028677 -0.0021471 -0.0007750
deprived quantile [-1.64] [-1.21] [-0.88] [0.58] [-0.20] [0.47] [-0.98] [1.18] [-0.71] [-0.73] [-0.23]
forth income -0.0022968 0.0000649 -0.0001661 0.0023834 0.0021655 0.0030477 -0.0013339 -0.0018866 0.0010147 -0.0009913 -0.0018469
deprived quantile [-0.66] [0.02] [-0.05] [0.92] [0.76] [1.04] [-0.34] [-0.74] [0.31] [-0.28] [-0.59]
emergency 0.0047617***0.0061318*** 0.0004503 0.0005121 0.0026176 0.0001658 0.0018053 0.0013025 0.0006130 0.0013225 0.0028592
hospitalizations [3.09] [3.06] [0.27] [0.29] [1.14] [0.08] [0.92] [0.75] [0.37] [0.79] [1.20]
constant -0.0063381 -0.0064683 0.0017141 -0.0000749 0.0074176 0.0101546 0.0046776 -0.0081832 0.0195140* 0.0029755 0.0257779
[-1.05] [-1.28] [0.23] [-0.01] [0.89] [1.07] [0.41] [-1.61] [1.83] [0.31] [1.38]
Observations 13,646 13,837 14,196 13,654 13,593 11,614 11,151 11,844 11,429 9,655 8,639
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Linear probability models with clustered robust standard errors at hospital level. All specifications
include hospital fixed effects. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.D. Patient Level Analysis
Dependent variable: emergency readmission for elective CABG patients
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
log(waiting time) 0.0002793 0.0017976 -0.0010683 0.0024484 -0.0009810 0.0009158 0.0032491* -0.0004096 0.0005642 0.0009717 -0.0008229
[0.21] [1.12] [-0.78] [1.55] [-0.60] [0.46] [1.92] [-0.17] [0.27] [0.37] [-0.28]
male -0.0114681* -0.0059294 -0.0083280* -0.0059820 -0.0017538 0.0012526 0.0024097 0.0009648 -0.0083478 -0.0029131 -0.0142834**
[-1.95] [-1.29] [-1.85] [-1.24] [-0.35] [0.26] [0.51] [0.23] [-1.67] [-0.54] [-2.19]
45-54 years old -0.0089233 0.0056352 -0.0223762 -0.0016275 -0.0168853 0.0030679 -0.0034246 0.0104949 -0.0179585 -0.0096608 0.0025513
[-0.94] [0.54] [-1.37] [-0.13] [-1.31] [0.24] [-0.26] [0.86] [-1.17] [-0.55] [0.14]
55-64 years old -0.0113090 0.0049675 -0.0192389 -0.0085524 -0.0152860 -0.0011458 -0.0039596 0.0177956 -0.0205557 -0.0102592 0.0100731
[-1.11] [0.52] [-1.31] [-0.84] [-1.25] [-0.10] [-0.25] [1.45] [-1.45] [-0.60] [0.55]
65-74 years old -0.0056298 0.0138442 -0.0256205 0.0002815 -0.0177485 0.0024428 -0.0042426 0.0202264 -0.0143106 -0.0044084 0.0182483
[-0.57] [1.56] [-1.67] [0.03] [-1.60] [0.21] [-0.26] [1.63] [-1.13] [-0.27] [0.97]
75-84 years old -0.0004388 0.0090702 -0.0225766 0.0056957 -0.0112957 0.0117410 -0.0019949 0.0156625 -0.0130754 -0.0017612 0.0195661
[-0.04] [0.83] [-1.51] [0.47] [-0.93] [0.92] [-0.11] [1.33] [-0.91] [-0.10] [1.14]
85-94 years old -0.0583641***-0.0266904** -0.0154909 -0.0356865***-0.0558881*** 0.0188040 -0.0468100***-0.0073058 -0.0206113 -0.0198999 -0.0122215
[-4.78] [-2.72] [-0.33] [-3.21] [-4.15] [0.65] [-2.85] [-0.27] [-0.82] [-0.56] [-0.45]
two diagnoses 0.0099131 -0.0045893 -0.0055184 -0.0029904 -0.0014497 0.0083951 -0.0026671-0.0175387*** 0.0011810 -0.0650271
[1.40] [-0.74] [-0.85] [-0.70] [-0.16] [0.59] [-0.18] [-2.99] [0.06] [-1.42]
three diagnoses 0.0085559* 0.0008017 -0.0050694 -0.0023132 -0.0007487 -0.0013059 -0.0002014 0.0081655 0.0036394 -0.0031383 -0.0361144
[1.91] [0.15] [-0.65] [-0.41] [-0.12] [-0.18] [-0.02] [0.53] [0.39] [-0.24] [-0.79]
four diagnoses 0.0101041* 0.0028576 -0.0030904 0.0027303 0.0001319 0.0007579 0.0014551 0.0030580 0.0080815 -0.0053091 -0.0400376
[2.00] [0.48] [-0.54] [0.37] [0.02] [0.08] [0.11] [0.25] [0.96] [-0.36] [-0.89]
five diagnoses 0.0036645 0.0049864 -0.0052600 0.0130322 -0.0023773 0.0003474 0.0081064 0.0036386 0.0110788 0.0023483 -0.0305629
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[0.64] [0.82] [-0.95] [1.44] [-0.29] [0.04] [0.68] [0.28] [1.34] [0.14] [-0.65]
six diagnoses 0.0249337*** 0.0100844 0.0017397 0.0083069 0.0109534 0.0168755* 0.0086224 0.0063573 0.0080808 0.0093725 -0.0189764
[2.93] [1.25] [0.29] [1.04] [1.43] [1.99] [0.67] [0.48] [0.91] [0.57] [-0.40]
seven diagnoses 0.0266380*** 0.0193218** -0.0092145 0.0055964 0.0199260** 0.0062547 0.0127119 0.0091427 0.0206011** 0.0091403 -0.0244306
[3.14] [2.08] [-1.37] [0.57] [2.13] [0.71] [0.98] [0.72] [2.45] [0.63] [-0.53]
more than seven 0.0525630 0.0045181 0.0257203** 0.0108140 0.0006560 0.0168647 0.0167324 0.0131364 0.0219154 -0.0216010
[1.24] [0.64] [2.65] [1.35] [0.08] [1.24] [1.22] [1.56] [1.44] [-0.47]
least income 0.0000887 -0.0052896 -0.0031850 -0.0040619 -0.0024418 -0.0090261 -0.0164181***-0.0035624 -0.0031366 -0.0097168 -0.0022754
deprived quantile [0.02] [-0.97] [-0.53] [-0.73] [-0.42] [-1.37] [-2.93] [-0.49] [-0.46] [-1.62] [-0.31]
second income 0.0054784 0.0001305 0.0015204 -0.0055615 -0.0018216 -0.0117297 -0.0033325 -0.0006654 -0.0102432 -0.0174210***-0.0195383**
deprived quantile [0.86] [0.02] [0.22] [-0.99] [-0.29] [-1.51] [-0.46] [-0.12] [-1.59] [-3.10] [-2.68]
third income 0.0042499 0.0034015 -0.0015714 0.0001075 -0.0079528 -0.0026619 -0.0083156 -0.0032379 0.0003579 -0.0096398** -0.0113339
deprived quantile [0.75] [0.52] [-0.31] [0.02] [-1.26] [-0.34] [-1.26] [-0.62] [0.07] [-2.05] [-1.26]
forth income 0.0002706 -0.0042431 -0.0011998 -0.0096254** -0.0070482 -0.0021430 -0.0138460** -0.0020739 0.0010043 -0.0011795 -0.0134304
deprived quantile [0.06] [-0.87] [-0.22] [-2.32] [-1.16] [-0.26] [-2.28] [-0.35] [0.17] [-0.20] [-1.34]
emergency -0.0032819 -0.0003359 -0.0071187*** -0.0019811 0.0005915 0.0003338 -0.0044372 -0.0002524 0.0014503 -0.0067233** -0.0018409
hospitalizations [-1.21] [-0.15] [-3.38] [-0.73] [0.23] [0.14] [-1.67] [-0.09] [0.44] [-2.42] [-0.56]
constant 0.0436181*** 0.0243985 0.0771729*** 0.0332404** 0.0616973*** 0.0378682** 0.0309234 0.0214103 0.0540282*** 0.0452407 0.0802663
[4.29] [1.41] [5.11] [2.44] [4.27] [2.38] [1.22] [0.98] [2.76] [1.56] [1.66]
Observations 13,646 13,837 14,196 13,654 13,593 11,614 11,151 11,844 11,429 9,655 8,639
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Linear probability models with clustered robust standard errors at hospital level. All specifications
include hospital fixed effects. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics, 2000/01-2010/11.
75
Table 3.E. Hospital Level Analysis. Weighted model
Dependent variable: in-hospital mortality rate for elective CABG patients
Baseline model Model with weights
log(waiting times) -0.0009039 [-0.52] 0.0005126 [0.35]
male patients -0.0105294 [-0.80] -0.0119602 [-1.02]
patients’ age 0.0025860* [1.74] 0.0016287 [1.43]
n of diagnoses -0.0000048 [-0.01] 0.0000345 [0.07]
income deprivation 0.0233932 [0.64] 0.0260553 [0.66]
past hospitalization 0.0051939 [0.42] 0.0063746 [0.63]
constant -0.1405609 [-1.41] -0.0879657 [-1.18]
hospitals FE yes yes
year dummies yes yes
Observations 325 325
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Fixed-
effects model with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Weights: number of CABG
surgeries performed by the hospital in each year. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
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Table 3.F. Hospital Level Analysis. Weighted model
Dependent variable: emergency readmission rate for elective CABG patients
Baseline model Model with weights
log(waiting times) 0.0047715* [1.95] 0.0035317 [1.26]
male patients 0.0216228 [0.73] 0.0254568 [0.87]
patients’ age 0.0013353 [0.99] 0.0014884 [1.03]
n of diagnoses 0.0004620 [0.53] 0.0009098 [1.11]
income deprivation 0.2286744** [2.68] 0.1732340* [1.94]
past hospitalization -0.0038196 [-0.21] 0.0063625 [0.34]
constant -0.1202412 [-1.28] -0.1244334 [-1.232]
hospitals FE yes yes
year dummies yes yes
Observations 325 325
Notes. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Fixed-
effects model with standard errors clustered at hospital level. Weights: number of CABG
surgeries performed by the hospital in each year. Data source: Hospital Episodes Statistics,
2000/01-2010/11.
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Chapter 4
The response of parental time
investments to the child’s abilities
and health
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4.1 Introduction
The behavioural response of parental investments to child endowments has attracted a lot
of researchers’ attention, but there is not yet consensus on whether parents compensate or
reinforce for differences in child’s human capital (Currie and Almond, 2011; Almond and
Mazumder, 2013). Most of the empirical literature has focused on the reaction of parental
investments to siblings’ or twins’ differences in endowments at birth or in early childhood1
or to exogenous health shocks caused, for example, by flu epidemics.2
On the contrary, in our paper we focus on the response of parental time investments
to their child’s human capital by observing their time investment in two points in time,
when children are 6-7 and 8-9 years old. Furthermore, while previous studies on parental
investments have generally ignored the multi-dimensionality of the child’s human capital
(two exceptions are given by Yi et al., 2016 and Attanasio et al., 2015), we consider the
response of parental time investments to three different dimensions of child’s human capital,
namely health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills.
Using the first three waves of the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC), we
take advantage of the availability of time-use diaries to measure the time parents spend
with their child doing activities that foster the child’s development. Unlike proxy measures
of time investment, such as parents’ employment status and number of working hours,
time-use diaries allow to distinguish between formative and non-formative activities that
children do together with their parents and to derive a more accurate measure of time
investment.3 Parental time investment differs from most of the measures of parental
investment considered in the empirical literature (e.g. household income and parental
employment status) by being more reactive and therefore allowing to better capture the
potential response of parents to changes in their child’s health, cognitive and socio-emotional
skills.
We estimate a parental investment model by regressing the time parents spend with
their child at 6-7 (8-9) years old on the child’s cognitive and socio-emotional skills and
health measured when the child is 4-5 (6-7) years old and controlling for other types of
investments in children, in particular for childcare, school inputs and household income. To
1See Behrman et al. (1994); Royer (2009); Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009); Datar et al. (2010); Currie
and Almond (2011); Hsin (2012); Aizer and Cunha (2012); Del Bono et al. (2012); Restrepo (2012);
Rosales-Rueda (2014); Yi et al. (2016).
2See Kelly (2011), Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2012); Venkataramani (2012); Parman (2012).
3Similar definitions of parental investments based on time-use diaries have been used by Stafford and
Yeung (2004), Price (2008), Hsin (2007), Hsin (2009), Carneiro and Rodrigues (2009), Del Boca et al.
(2012), Fiorini and Keane (2014) and Del Boca et al. (2014).
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take into account unobserved heterogeneity and, more specifically, unobserved family and
environment characteristics that are time invariant and potentially relevant to explain both
child’s human capital and parental investments, we use a panel data approach and express
our model in first-differences, therefore controlling for child (family) fixed effects. We
estimate this first-differences model by using an instrumental variable approach to correct
for potential biases caused by (i) the presence of time varying unobservables that may
affect both the child’s human capital and parental investments and (ii) the reverse causality
issue, i.e. the fact that the time parents spend with their child may improve their child’s
human capital. Specifically, we instrument the first differences in child’s skills and health
with past measures of skills and health. This fixed effect estimation with instrumental
variables is equivalent to the one proposed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) who identify
the effect of maternal prenatal investments on the child’s human capital at birth. Instead,
we apply it to estimate the reverse causal effect later in life, namely the impact of the
child’s human capital on parental time investment.
We follow the existing literature on child development by focusing mainly on mothers’
time investment behaviours. Mothers are usually the main childcare givers and therefore
they are expected to spend more time with their child than fathers, to be more able to
detect child’s needs and to change their investment accordingly. However, since fathers
also play an important role in their child’s development, we analyse the difference between
mothers’ and fathers’ behaviours as well as variations in their time investments in sons
and daughters.
To assess whether the time investment strategy differs by socio-economic status, we allow
the effects of the child’s physical health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills on the mother’s
time investment to vary between mothers with and without a university degree. We expect
mothers with a degree to be more involved in their child’s education, to better perceive
child’s developmental needs and therefore to react to such needs by increasing the time
spent with their child. Additionally, highly-educated mothers may also have stronger
preferences for child quality, which may lead to larger time investments (Hill and Stafford,
1974, Guryan et al., 2008) and potentially to a stronger compensating strategy. On the
other hand, the economic theory suggests that the cost opportunity of spending time
with the child is higher for highly-educated mothers because of their expected higher
productivity in the labour market and their forgone earnings (Becker, 1965). As a result,
whether they adopt a stronger or weaker compensating behaviour than mothers without a
university qualification is an empirical question.
Another important factor that can affect the mother’s time investment response is the
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actual availability of time to invest in her child. Even if the amount of working hours is
generally lower than one third of the total amount of hours available in a day, working
mothers can face time constraints. This is especially the case for mothers with jobs that do
not allow for flexible working time and non-standard working practices, such as working
occasionally from home. We check whether mothers who work are actually facing time
constraints that limit their time investment response by estimating a model that allows
the investment response to change between working and non-working mothers.
Because we consider an investment model with child fixed effects, we implicitly control for
the number of children in the household. Even if recent studies on the trade-off between
quality and quantity of children (see Becker and Lewis, 1973, and Becker and Tomes,
1976) seem to suggest that the child’s human capital does not depend on exogenous shocks
to family size (see Black et al., 2005, Angrist et al., 2010), we are still concerned that
the investment response to changes in child’s human capital might be attenuated in the
presence of more children and related time constraints. For this reason we check whether
fertility decisions, namely the number of children in the household, affect the parental
behavioural response by comparing parental investments in only-child and multiple-child
households.
Finally, we carry out a set of sensitivity analyses to (i) test if shocks experienced by the
household (such as severe health conditions or death of family members, relatives and
close friends) change the parental investment, biasing our results; (ii) assess the effect of
measurement errors on time investments by restricting the sample to the cases where the
information on time investments has been collected in ordinary days; (iii) check the validity
of the instruments by using a larger number of instrumental variables and computing a
test of over-identifying restrictions; (iv) investigate whether results change when adopting
a semi-log model rather than a linear model.
Results show differences in the response of parental time investments to changes in the three
dimensions of the child’s human capital. Both mothers and fathers adopt a compensating
strategy for socio-emotional skills and are seldom reactive to cognitive skills and physical
health. In particular, for one standard deviation decrease in the child’s socio-emotional
skills mothers (fathers) increase the time spent with their child by about one hour and a
half (one hour) per week. Fathers seem to adopt a stronger compensating strategy for sons,
whereas mothers’ investment strategy does not differ between sons and daughters. Finally,
our findings suggest that highly-educated mothers compensate for deficits in cognitive
skills, while mothers without a degree compensate for low socio-emotional skills. We find
also differences between working and non-working mothers, with working mothers adopting
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a weaker compensating strategy, which seems to suggest mothers who work face more time
constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related
literature and our contribution. Section 4.3 presents the conceptual framework and the
identification strategy used to produce the empirical evidence on parental time investment.
We describe the sample and variables in Section 4.4 and we report our main results and
robustness checks in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
There is a widening literature on the response of parental investments to child endowment
at birth. Almond and Mazumder (2013) present a useful review of this literature and
discuss the related econometric challenges. In this section, we summarise such literature
and extend it by considering the response of parental investments to child’s human capital,
measured during childhood rather than at birth. Furthermore, we review those studies
that have assessed the effect of parental time investment on children outcomes by using
time diaries. Finally, we report the main differences and contribution of our paper with
respect to previous literature.
4.2.1 Investment response to endowments at birth: Sibling fixed effect
estimation
Most of the empirical evidence on the response of parental investments has been provided
using samples of siblings (or twins) and evaluating how sibling differences in parental
investments respond to sibling differences in birth weight, but no consensus has been
reached yet on whether investments strategies are compensating, reinforcing or neutral.
Royer (2009) finds no effect of differences in birth weight between twins on mothers’
breastfeeding decision and on neonatal medical care, while Datar et al. (2010) show that
postnatal investments (e.g. breastfeeding initiation and immunization) are higher for the
sibling with a higher birth weight. Hsin (2012) looks at sibling differences in the mother’s
time investments4 and provides evidence of a compensating behaviour for highly-educated
mothers and a reinforcing one (but not statistically significant) for lowly-educated mothers.
Restrepo (2012) considers sibling differences in parental investment measured by the Home
Observation for Measurement of the Environment (HOME) score and finds a reinforcing
4Time investment is measured in two ways: considering the total time mothers spend with their child
and the time that they spend in human capital enhancing activities.
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investment strategy for lowly-educated parents and a compensating one for highly-educated
parents. Finally, Currie and Almond (2011) suggest that there is generally no difference
in parental investments between twins except for a higher concern about kindergarten
readiness for the twin with lower birth weight.
4.2.2 Investment response to endowments at birth: Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1988 and 1995) method
Evaluating the effect of endowments at birth on postnatal parental investments by consid-
ering a family fixed effect estimation may lead to biased results because of non-random
differences in birth endowments between siblings. Differences in endowments at birth can
depend on unobserved differences in inputs during pregnancy that may be correlated with
differences in postnatal parental investments. An approach to correct for the endogeneity
of the endowment at birth, which was first proposed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988),
is to estimate the effect of the child’s endowment at birth net of the effect of prenatal
investments and of sibling-invariant endowment and family characteristics, which they call
child-specific endowment (see also Pitt et al., 1990; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1995; Del Bono
et al., 2012; Aizer and Cunha, 2012). This approach consists of two stages: in the first stage
a human capital production model is estimated by regressing the child’s endowment at
birth on prenatal parental investments using family fixed effects and instrumental variables
to correct for the endogeneity, while in the second stage a family fixed effect estimation
is applied to the regression of postnatal parental investment on child-specific endowment
(which is estimated using the child idiosyncratic error in the first stage) and a set of control
variables.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988) show that children with higher health endowment are
more likely to be breastfed than their less healthy siblings, providing evidence of parents’
reinforcing investments. Del Bono et al. (2012) find that breastfeeding initiation and dura-
tion are negatively related to child-specific endowment, therefore suggesting that mothers
compensate for differences between siblings. On the contrary, Aizer and Cunha (2012),
who extend the approach of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988) to correct for measurement
errors in the estimated child-specific endowment and in the mother’s investment,5 find that
the mother’s investment tends to reinforce for differences in endowments between siblings.
5By exploiting the availability of multiple measures of birth endowments (birth weight, gestation, head
circumference and body length) they use a factor analysis to extract the latent common endowment.
Similarly they measure mother’s investment by extracting the common latent factor from 7 different
measures of mother’s parenting behaviour.
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4.2.3 Investment response to endowments at birth: Indirect evidence
Some studies provide ‘indirect evidence’ (as called by Almond and Mazumder, 2013) of
parental investments responsiveness by comparing estimations of the impact of the child’s
endowments on outcomes measured later in life using and without using family (sibling)
fixed effect. Loughran et al. (2008) explain the logic behind this indirect evidence and
suggest that a larger (smaller) effect of the child’s endowments when using family fixed effect
would be indicative of a reinforcing (compensating) behaviour. By looking at birth weight
effect on the child’s cognitive outcomes later in life, they find that parents compensate for
low birth weight, at least when looking at long-term outcomes. Using this type of evidence
Almond et al. (2009) find that parental investments are reinforcing when evaluating the
damage caused by exposure to Chernobyl radioactive fallout on educational achievements.
4.2.4 Investment response to endowments during childhood: Extensions
of the sibling fixed effect estimation
The assumptions imposed by the estimation procedure proposed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1988) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) are generally less credible when the focus is on
the response of parental investments to the child’s endowment measured during childhood
or later in life rather than at birth. Alternative methods have been used to correct for
the endogeneity of the child’s endowments measured later in life. They usually consider
family fixed effects and correct for the residual endogeneity of the child’s endowment by
either controlling thoroughly for prenatal investments and the child’s characteristics (e.g.
Rosales-Rueda, 2014) or by exploiting exogenous variation in the child’s endowment using
instrumental variables (e.g. Frijters et al., 2013) or natural exogenous shocks (e.g. Yi et al.,
2016).
Rosales-Rueda (2014) analyses how parental investment, proxied by the HOME score,
responds to health conditions during childhood. She corrects for the bias caused by the
potential endogeneity of health conditions by using family fixed effect and controlling for
the child’s characteristics and prenatal parental investments. Her results show a reinforcing
parental behaviour in the case of mental illness, but no statistically significant response
of parental investment to physical health conditions is observed. Frijters et al. (2013)
examine the responsiveness of the HOME score to cognitive test scores and correct for the
potential endogeneity bias by adopting a family fixed effect estimation and instrumenting
the cognitive test scores using the child handedness. They find that parents reinforce for
differences in cognitive skills between siblings. Yi et al. (2016) study the effect of twin
85
differences in health shocks in early childhood on twin differences in parental investments in
China. Health shocks are measured by serious diseases (e.g. diarrhoea, calcium deficiency,
asthma and fracture) when children are between 0 and 3 years old and they seem to be
exogenous, at least after controlling for unobserved family effects. They find a compensating
behaviour when parental investments are measured in terms of medical expenditure and a
reinforcing one in the case of educational expenditure.
4.2.5 Investment response to endowments during childhood: Dynamic
latent factor models
While the papers mentioned above have as a main goal to explore the response of parental
investments to the child’s human capital, in this section we review some recent papers
that estimate the production process of the child’s skills and health focusing on the role of
different inputs.These studies do not provide a direct estimation of the response of parental
inputs to the child’s human capital, but they account for the endogeneity of parental inputs
caused by the feedback effect from child’s human capital to parental inputs. In doing this,
they provide some suggestive evidence on whether parental investments are compensating
or reinforcing for the child’s low human capital. These studies usually adopt dynamic
latent factor models to estimate the production process of the child’s human capital at
different stages of the child’s life as a function of past skills, parental human capital and
a variety of inputs including parents’ investments (see Cunha and Heckman, 2008). The
models make use of multiple measures available for each of the inputs and skills, which are
assumed to be related to the true common latent skills and inputs, in order to recover the
relationships between the unobserved latent skills and inputs. Furthermore, these papers
take into account the endogeneity of inputs and, in particular, of parental time investments
by using instrumental variables.
Cunha and Heckman (2008) find no significant changes in their results when correcting for
the endogeneity of the parental inputs, while Cunha et al. (2010), considering a non-linear
(rather than linear) dynamic factor model, find evidence of a compensating investment
strategy. Attanasio et al. (2015) and Attanasio et al. (2015) also use dynamic factor models
and correct for the bias caused by the endogeneity of the parental investments by adopting
a control function approach (i.e. using the estimated residuals of the investment models
as additional explanatory variables in the production models). Both these papers show
that parents adopt a compensating behaviour as indicated by the underestimation bias of
the effect of investments on the child’s human capital when ignoring the endogeneity of
86
parents’ investments. In particular, Attanasio et al. (2015) find that parents compensate
for low socio-emotional skills by increasing the time spent with their child, whereas they
compensate for low cognitive skills by increasing their material investments.
4.2.6 The effect of parental time investment on the child’s human capital
There exists only a handful of studies using time-use diaries to assess the relationship
between parental investments and child endowments and they generally evaluate the effect
of time investments on child’s endowments, rather than the response of parental investment
(except for Hsin, 2012). Overall they show a positive effect of parental time investments on
child development.
Using information from time-use diaries of children available in the Child Development
Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Hsin (2007) finds that maternal time
spent with the child during pre-school years has a positive effect on child’s cognitive skills
measured five years later, but only for verbally-skilled mothers. Additional evidence of the
effect of time investment using the same survey is provided by Del Boca et al. (2014), who
show that maternal time increases the child’s cognitive skills, although the effect attenuates
as the child gets older (see also Carneiro and Rodrigues, 2009). In particular they focus on
the effect of time children spend in formative activities on their own and together with
their mothers on their cognitive abilities during adolescence and find that the mother’s
time investment matters less than the child’s own time investment. Fiorini and Keane
(2014) use time-use diaries collected in the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children to
show that time parents spend on educational activities with their child has a positive effect
on the child’s cognitive skills.
Evidence of the importance of parental time investments for child development is also
found using surveys that approximate time investments with information on the type and
frequency of parental activities (e.g. Del Bono et al., 2014 and Attanasio et al., 2015)
and the length of maternity leave (e.g. Carneiro et al., 2015). Del Bono et al. (2014) find
that mothers’ time spent in educational and recreational activities have positive effects
on cognitive and socio-emotional skills of their children. This effect decreases with the
child’s age for cognitive skills but not for socio-emotional skills. Results from the study by
Attanasio et al. (2015) show time investments being more relevant for socio-emotional skills,
while material investment being more important for cognitive skills. Finally, Carneiro et al.
(2015) use exogenous variation in the time mothers spend with their newborns caused by a
maternity leave reform and find that mothers’ time investments in infants have a significant
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effect even on long-term outcomes, such as wages and high school completion.
4.2.7 Differences between our paper and previous studies
The review of previous studies has highlighted a large variability in the parental investment
strategy when considering different types of parental investments that range from breast-
feeding practices and immunization to expenditure in the child’s education and health.
Nevertheless, when focusing on parental time investments, there seems to be a consensus
that time investments benefit child development and that parents compensate for the
child’s low endowments by increasing their time with the child, at least in the case of
highly-educated mothers (see Hsin, 2012, Attanasio et al., 2015, Del Boca et al., 2014).
Our paper adds to this literature by providing for the first time a comprehensive analysis of
the response of parental time investments to changes in the child’s cognitive, socio-emotional
and physical health. Furthermore, while most of the previous literature has focused
exclusively on parents with at least two children to use sibling fixed effect estimation, we
consider parents with any number of children so that we are able to evaluate the investment
strategy even in absence of other children in the family. Contrary to those papers that use
sibling fixed effect estimation, we control for unobserved inputs and family characteristics
by using a panel data approach and adopting a child fixed effect estimation. Therefore, we
are able to account for all unobserved inputs that do not vary across time, or at least in
the period considered when children are 6-7 and 8-9 years old.
4.3 The parental time investment model
4.3.1 The conceptual framework
In the economics literature it is usually assumed that parents maximize a utility function
that depends on parental consumption and on their child’s human capital or future wages,
income or wealth (see Becker and Tomes, 1986; Behrman et al., 1982). We assume that
parents make decisions in each child’s life stage of development, denoted with the subscript
t, and that there are S sequential stages between birth and adulthood, t = 1, ..., T (see
Del Boca et al., 2012). Following this approach, we assume that parents care about their
consumption and their child’s human capital and we consider the following parents’ utility
function in stage t:
Ut(Ci,t,θi,t,θPi ) (4.1)
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where i denotes the child (household), Ci,t is the parental consumption, θi,t = [θHit , θCit , θSit]
is a column vector with three measures of the child’s human capital which are health,
cognitive and socio-emotional skills respectively, and θPi is a vector of measures of parents’
human capital that do not change across stages. We allow parental human capital, θPi ,
to enter the utility function because of potential heterogeneity of investment preferences
across parents with different endowments and because parents’ utility can depend on the
difference between their own human capital and the one of their child. For example, parents
might have an aversion to intergenerational inequity and prefer to transmit to their child a
level of human capital similar to theirs.
In each stage t of the development process, parents are assumed to maximize the expected
discounted sum of their utilities under the child’s human capital production and budget
constraints. Following Cunha et al. (2010) and Almlund et al. (2011) we allow the human
capital to be multi-dimensional and we assume the production of human capital of type k
for child i in stage t to be given by:
θki,t = hk,t(θi,t−1, IT imei,t , ICarei,t , ISchooli,t ,θPi , υki , ηki,t), (4.2)
where θkit is the child’s human capital of type k; with k = H,C and S denoting health,
cognitive and socio-emotional skills respectively. IT imei,t is the parental time investment,
ICarei,t represents childcare inputs while ISchooli,t indicates school inputs.6 υki represents
time invariant child’s and parents’ characteristics that might affect the production of
human capital of type k, and ηki,t is an idiosyncratic shock in stage t, which can affect
the production of human capital of type k. We assume that what parents observe when
deciding the investment level in t is θi,t−1, θPi , υki and the idiosyncratic shocks, ηki,t for
k = H,C and S.
Finally, we assume that the budget constraint is given by
Yi,t = Ci,t + pTt IT imei,t + pCaret ICarei,t + pSchoolt ISchooli,t , (4.3)
where Yi,t is parental income; pT imet , pCaret and pSchoolt are the prices of parental time,
childcare and school inputs.
We do not impose any additional assumption on the utility function (4.1) and on the
human capital production model (4.2) except regularity conditions (in particular, the strict
concavity and twice continuously differentiability) to ensure the problem is well-behaved
6For the time being we consider these investments as univariate variables, but in the empirical application
we will measure school and childcare inputs using multiple variables.
89
and to allow for the existence of a unique solution for the parental time investment model.
We approximate the optimal parental time investment in child i in stage t by the following
function:
IT imei,t = ft(θi,t−1,θPi , Yi,t, ICarei,t , ISchooli,t , pT imet , pCaret , pSchoolt , υHi , υCi , υSi , µIi , ηHi,t, ηCi,t, ηSi,t, ui,t),
(4.4)
where ui,t is an idiosyncratic shock affecting parental time investment, which we assume
to be independent of the production shocks ηHi,t, ηCi,t and ηSi,t, whereas µIi represents time
invariant child’s and parents’ characteristics that might affect the time investment beside
υHi , υCi and υSi .
4.3.2 Econometric strategy
In this section we present the econometric approach we apply to identify the effect of the
child’s human capital on parental time investment.
In the empirical analysis, we follow a cohort of Australian children from stage 0 (age 4-5,
year 2004). We observe parental time investment in stages 1 (age 6-7, year 2006) and 2
(age 8-9, year 2008) and the child’s human capital in stages 0 and 1. By assuming that the
investment model (4.4) is linear and additive in its inputs and it does not change between
stages 1 and 2, we can rewrite it as
IT imei,t = α0 + α1di,t + θ′i,t−1γ + θPi β + Yi,tρ+ ICarei,t λ+ ISchooli,t ψ + µi + i,t, (4.5)
where t = 1 or 2, di,t is a dummy taking value 1 for stage 2 (year 2006) and 0 for stage 1 (year
2008) capturing any potential macro change between stages (e.g. changes in the price of
investments pT imet , pCaret and pSchoolt between 2006 and 2008), θ′i,t−1 = [θHi,t−1, θCi,t−1, θSi,t−1]
is the transpose of the column vector of the three child’s human capital measures, µi is
an unobserved individual effect capturing the child’s and parental characteristics that
are time-invariant between age 6-7 and 8-9 and is a linear combination of µIi and υki for
k = H,C, S. i,t is an idiosyncratic error independent of the explanatory variables which
can be defined as a linear combination of ui,t, ηHi,t, ηCi,t and ηSi,t in model 4.4. α0 is the
intercept for stage 1, α1 is the differential intercept for stage 2, and β, ρ, λ and ψ are
the effects of parental human capital, income, childcare and school inputs. γ is a column
vector containing the parameters of interest γH , γC and γS , which measure the response
of parental investments to child’s physical health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills.
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As Yi et al. (2016) explain, a positive (negative) value of γk would imply that parental
investments are reinforcing (compensating) in ability of type k. Without introducing
additional assumptions on the utility and production functions 4.1 and 4.2, the sign of
the effect of the child’s human capital on parental time investment is ambiguous because
parents generally face an inequity-efficiency trade-off when deciding to choose between
a compensating or a reinforcing investment strategy. If the human capital production
model (Equation 4.2) is such that ∂hk,t(.)/∂θsi,t−1∂Ii,t > 0 for any k and s (i.e. if there
is complementarity between the parental investment in stage t and endowment in stage
(t−1)), then a high human capital endowment at stage (t−1) may increase the productivity
of parental investment at stage t.7 Therefore, in the case of complementarity, parents
may decide to adopt a reinforcing strategy and increase their time investment in stage
t when the child’s human capital at stage (t − 1) is higher. However, the response of
parental investments may also depend on specific parents’ preferences captured by the
utility function (4.1). For example, if parents are averse to intergenerational inequity (i.e.
to inequalities between their own endowments and the ones of their child), then their utility
may increase if adopting a compensating investment strategy, namely investing more when
their child is performing below their standards and less when he or she is performing above
their standards.
In Section 4.5, we report empirically the size and the sign of the response of parental time
investment to the child’s endowments by estimating model 4.5 using a child fixed effect
estimation with instrumental variables as described below.
To control for the unobserved individual effect µi, we adopt a first difference approach
(child-fixed effect estimation) which is equivalent to estimating model 4.5 transformed using
first differences
∆IT imei,2 = α1 + ∆θ′i,1γ + ∆Yi,2ρ+ ∆ICarei,2 λ+ ∆ISchooli,2 ψ + ∆i,2, (4.6)
where ∆IT imei,t denotes the difference in the time investment between stage t and (t− 1),
(ITimei,t − IT imei,t−1 ), and similarly for the other variables.
There are two endogeneity issues in the investment model (4.6). The first is caused by the
presence of unobservables in stage 1 that affect parental time investments as well as human
capital production in stage 1. In our framework, these unobservables are captured by the
idiosyncratic shocks ηHi,1, ηCi,1 and ηSi,1, which are correlated with both i,1, the error term in
the investment model, and the child’s health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills in stage
7For a definition of complementarity see Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha and Heckman (2008);
Cunha et al. (2006);Cunha et al. (2010); Aizer and Cunha (2012).
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1, θki,1 for k = H, C and S. This implies that there is a potential correlation between ∆θi,1
and ∆i,2 in Equation 4.6. The second endogeneity issue is caused by a reverse causality
problem which depends on the fact that the parental time investment in stage 1 has an
effect on the child’s health and skills in stage 1. This translates to a potential correlation
between θki,1 and i,1 and, as a result, on a potential correlation between ∆θi,1 and ∆i,2 in
Equation 4.6.
To correct for the consequent biases caused by these two sources of endogeneity we instru-
ment ∆θi,1 with θi,0. This approach is equivalent to the estimation used by Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1988) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) to solve the issue of endogeneity in
a model for childbirth outcomes. The instruments θ′i,0 = [θHi,0, θCi,0, θSi,0] are uncorrelated
with ∆i,2 = i,2 − i,1 because the child’s human capital in stage 0 depends neither on
future shocks nor on future parental investments in stages 1 and 2.
We implement this instrumental variable approach by adopting a two-stage least squares
estimation whose first stage consists in the estimation of three regressions, one for each of
the three measures of human capital, which are specified as follows
∆θki,1 = δk0 + θHi,0δkH + θCi,0δkC + θSi,0δkS + ∆X′i,2δkX + ∆vki,1, (4.7)
where k = H,C and S; X is a column vector containing all remaining control variables in
(4.6), and vi,1 is an idiosyncratic error. If there are self-productivity effects in the child’s
skills and health as assumed by the production model (4.2) then the child’s skill (or health)
θki,1 depends on its lagged value θki,0 and potentially also on the lagged values of the other
two measures of the child’s human capital θhi,0 for h 6= k, implying that our instrumental
variables are relevant.
A final remark is needed to explain the consequences of potential zeros observed for the
parental time investment measure on our econometric strategy. This is a common issue
when measuring time spent in specific activities over a short period as in this case, where
parental time investment in children is observed only in two specific days. In theory we
would like to measure the time parents spend with their child over a much longer time
period, which is the two-year gap between stage 1 and stage 2 (between ages 6-7 and 8-9).
Because of this mismatch between the period of interest and the reference period in our
sample, we observe some zeros for the time investments.
This issue is very similar to the problem of zeros observed when measuring the demand
for items that are infrequently purchased (see Keen, 1986). Stewart (2013) adapts the
infrequent purchase model considered by Keen (1986) and shows that the Ordinary Least
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Squares estimation of a regression model for the time spent in specific activities provides
an unbiased estimation of the effects of the explanatory variables on the time, even in
presence of zeros. More in general this consistency result applies also to the case where
the linear regression model is estimated controlling for fixed effect and using instrumental
variables, as in our case. Therefore the major consequence of the presence of zeros for our
estimation is simply a reduction of its precision.
4.4 Data
Our analysis relies on the first three waves of the Longitudinal Study of Australian
Children (LSAC), an ongoing biannual survey that collects information on two nationally
representative samples of Australian children since 2004.8 The two samples of children
are called cohort B (baby), which follows 5,107 children from age 0-1, and cohort K
(kindergarten), which follows 4,983 children from age 4-5.
The LSAC collects information on the time children spend in different activities using time-
use diaries. Furthermore, it provides detailed information on children’s health, cognitive
and socio-emotional skills, family characteristics and socio-economic background. These
details are obtained through interviews with parents who live with the child, teachers,
carers as well as using tests administered to children.
In our analysis we only use the sample of children belonging to cohort K because for
these children we can observe measures of parental time investment and the child’s human
capital, which are comparable across time.
4.4.1 Sample selection
Our sample includes only children living in intact families, i.e. children living with both
biological parents (93 per cent of the sample). Because our empirical results are based on
child fixed effect methods that require at least three observations for each child, we restrict
the sample to children who have been observed in all the first three waves i.e. when they
are 4-5, 6-7 and 8-9 years old. Finally, we drop children with missing observations in any
of the variables used in our analysis, which are: parental time investments in waves 2 and
3 (see Table 4.1),9 the child’s cognitive and socio-emotional skills and health measured
8The two samples have been drawn from the full population of children included in the Medicare
Australia enrolment database. More details on the sample design can be found in Gray and Smart (2009)
and Soloff et al. (2005).
9The time investment measure is derived by using details on two diaries collected for each child in a
weekend and in a working day. We exclude those cases where only weekend or working day diaries were
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in waves 1 to 3 (see Table 4.3), and the set of additional control variables described in
Table 4.4, which are measured in waves 2 and 3. This leaves us with a main sample of 910
children.
In addition to the main sample, we also consider the ordinary-day sample that includes
158 children for whom the time-use diaries were completed in ordinary days, i.e. excluding
unusual days such as holidays, days when the child or other family members were sick and
so on.
4.4.2 Time-use diaries and parental investments
One of the main advantages of using the LSAC is the availability of time-use diaries (TUDs)
that can be used to measure the amount of time fathers and mothers spend with their
children doing formative activities.10 For each of the first three waves the LSAC collects
details on the activities done by the child in two randomly assigned days, a working and a
weekend day, by asking the main respondent (usually the mother) to complete two 24-hour
time-use diaries. More precisely, the main respondent is asked to report the main activity
done by the child (by choosing from a list of 26 pre-coded activities), where the activity
took place and who was together with the child for each 15-minute interval in a 24-hour
day (for a total of 96 consecutive intervals).
In the following, we provide details on our definition of mother’s time investment using
variables collected through the TUDs. A similar definition is applied to father’s time
investment as well.
Mother’s time investment is defined as the time she spends actively engaged with her child
in formative activities, i.e. activities that can benefit child development (see Del Boca
et al., 2014). A mother is defined to be actively engaged only if she is present while
the activity takes place and if either the child is the primary focus of the activity or the
activity is presumably involving a reasonable amount of interactions between the mother
and the child (see Stafford and Yeung, 2004 and Price, 2008). We include both home and
out-of-home activities, but we exclude time spent in school. Examples of activities that we
exclude because either the activity is not formative enough or does not require an active
engagement of the mother include sleeping, watching television, listening to radio, playing
video-games and travelling.
filled.
10Previous papers that have measured parental investments using time diaries include Stafford and Yeung
(2004), Price (2008), Hsin (2007), Hsin (2009), Carneiro and Rodrigues (2009), Del Boca et al. (2012),
Fiorini and Keane (2014), Del Boca et al. (2014).
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We classify the formative activities into five categories: eating together, personal care,
leisure activities, psychological support and educational activities.11 We compute the sum
of the total number of minutes the child spends in each of these formative activities in
presence of the mother in the randomly assigned working day (working day time) and in
the randomly assigned weekend day (weekend day time) and we define the weekly mother’s
time investment as the working day time multiplied by five plus the weekend day time
multiplied by two.
Table 4.1 shows how much time children spend with their mother in each of the above five
types of activity and how it changes between waves 2 and 3 when children are 6-7 and
8-9 years old. Mothers invest on average more than 14 hours in a week (848 minutes) in
formative activities with their 6-7 year-old child, and the investment remains quite stable
over time (749 minutes when children are 8-9 years old). Time invested in leisure activities
represents about 50 per cent of the overall time investment, while the least time demanding
activities seem to be those related to psychological support (about 30 minutes in a week).
All mothers spend at least 15 minutes in formative activities with their child except for 6
per cent (9 per cent in wave 3) for whom the time investment is zero.
In Table 4.2, we compare the time investment of mothers and fathers. We find that fathers
spend only 230 minutes doing formative activities with their children, while mothers spend
798 minutes.12 This evidence is also found in other studies, such as Butcher and Case
(1994); Thomas (1990); Thomas (1994); Case and Deaton (1999); Dahl and Moretti (2008),
and it suggests that mothers are usually the main care givers, investing almost triple the
time of fathers.
The literature has also identified a gender bias in parental investment, with fathers investing
more time and financial resources in sons than in daughters (Lundberg, 2005b; Lundberg,
2005a; Lundberg et al., 2007). For example, Yeung et al. (2001) report that fathers spend
more time in companionship activities and playing with their sons than with their daughters.
Baker and Milligan (2010) find that boys receive more parental time than girls because of a
larger time input from their fathers when they are four years old. Our data confirms these
results by showing that fathers spend 279 minutes with sons and only 181 with daughters
and the difference is statistically significant. On the contrary, mothers are found to invest
equally between sons and daughters (772 and 824 minutes respectively).
11Appendix A provides a more detailed list of formative activities we consider.
12Average time investments computed using wave 2 and 3.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics. Weekly mother’s time investment
Main and ordinary-day sample
Weekly mother’s time investment - main sample
Children aged 6-7 years Children aged 8-9 years
Mean SD Mean SD
Educational activities 100.154 138.306 78.165 128.355
Psychological support 31.500 73.636 23.258 69.537
Leisure activities 426.264 444.900 407.440 494.652
Eating 181.582 164.148 160.731 162.836
Personal care 108.478 111.996 78.989 97.353
Total time 847.978 626.343 748.582 642.938
Children 910 910
Weekly mother’s time investment: ordinary-day sample
Children aged 6-7 years Children aged 8-9 years
Mean SD Mean SD
Educational activities 90.570 111.570 83.259 145.041
Psychological support 21.646 52.360 17.278 55.822
Leisure activities 363.228 341.530 258.418 274.406
Eating 180.570 141.138 162.911 171.440
Personal care 105.570 96.885 86.108 104.996
Total time 761.582 486.268 607.975 496.651
Children 158 158
Notes. Mothers’ time investment measured when children are 6-7 and 8-9 years old (minutes).
Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
4.4.3 Child’s skills and health
In our analysis, we follow the approach of Borghans et al. (2008), Cunha et al. (2010), and
Almlund et al. (2011) and we allow for multiple dimensions of human capital. In particular,
we focus on the child’s cognitive and socio-emotional skills and physical health measured
in each of the first three waves of the LSAC.
We measure the child’s cognitive skills using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT
- III), which has been administered to the LSAC children in a version adapted for Australia
and based on work done in the United States for the Head Start Impact Study. This test
is specifically designed to assess the child’s verbal ability and scholastic aptitude and to
capture real changes in the child’s functioning rather than just changes in position relative
96
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics. Mothers’ and fathers’ weekly time
investment by child’s gender
Sons Daughters Total
Fathers 279.296 (350.945) 181.716 (264.152) 230.077 (313.948)
Mothers 772.300 (652.249) 823.807 (619.860) 798.280 (798.280)
Notes. Mothers’ and fathers’ time investment measured when children are 6-7 and 8-9 years
old. Time investment in minutes. Standard errors in parentheses. Data source: Longitudinal
Study of Australian Children, waves 2-3.
to peers (Dunn and Dunn, 1997; Rothman, 2005).13 The PPVT is age specific and includes
different, although overlapping, sets of items for children of different ages. Higher scores
indicate higher levels of children’s cognitive skills.
We use the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) composite difficulty score
to measure the child’s social and emotional skills (Goodman, 1997). The SDQ consists
of 25 questions, which the main respondent answers, organized around five major sub-
scales: hyperactivity, emotional symptoms, conduct problems, peer problems and pro-social
behaviour. Each sub-scale is measured using five items. Following the literature (e.g.
Del Bono and Ermisch, 2009; Morefield et al., 2011; Conti and Heckman, 2014), we use
responses to 20 questions from the first four components, which are aggregated to form a
single “difficulty” score. To ease the interpretation of our findings, we re-code this score so
that a higher value represents better socio-emotional skills.
The child’s health is measured by the physical health sub-scale of the Paediatric Quality
of Life Inventory (PEDS QL), which is composed of eight items (see Varni et al., 1999)
measuring motor coordination and general health. The composite score we use is scaled to
range from 0 (poor) to 100 (good).14
We standardize each of the three above scores, separately by child’s stage, to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1.
13In Appendix B we provide additional details on this measure of cognitive ability.
14See Appendix B for more details on these measures.
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Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics. Child’s human capital measures by child’s age
Standardized Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Cognitive skills
4-5 years old 0.035 0.973 -2.402 3.454
6-7 years old 0.045 0.975 -4.794 3.377
8-9 years old 0.083 0.990 -4.643 3.703
Socio-emotional skills
4-5 years old 0.079 0.961 -3.476 1.732
6-7 years old 0.085 0.909 -3.716 1.516
8-9 years old 0.101 0.909 -4.038 1.384
Physical health
4-5 years old 0.084 0.908 -3.657 1.558
6-7 years old 0.042 0.977 -4.678 1.220
8-9 years old 0.063 0.969 -4.393 1.167
Raw Variables
Mean SD Min Max
Cognitive skills
4-5 years old 65.632 5.450 51.978 84.782
6-7 years old 74.829 4.901 50.503 91.575
8-9 years old 79.557 4.766 56.804 96.983
Socio-emotional skills
4-5 years old 8.253 4.795 0 26.000
6-7 years old 6.835 4.345 0 25.000
8-9 years old 6.392 4.524 0 27.000
Physical health
4-5 years old 83.854 9.951 42.857 100.000
6-7 years old 83.773 13.459 18.750 100.000
8-9 years old 85.104 13.066 25.000 100.000
Notes. The raw socio-emotional variable measures child’s behavioural problems, therefore
a higher score implies more socio-emotional problems. On the contrary, higher values of
the standardized socio-emotional variable imply better socio-emotional skills. Data source:
Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
Table 4.3 summarizes descriptive statistics for the child’s skills and health, reporting both
the standardized and raw values of these measures (see top and bottom panel, respectively).
Because the standardization of the scores is carried out using the full sample of children
responding at each stage while the descriptive are reported for our sample of 910 children,
the standardized scores have a mean very close but not exactly equal to 0 and a standard
deviation of about 1. We also measure the correlation between the different dimensions
of the child’s human capital (using standardized scores) and we find that generally it is
low and not always significant. In particular, while emotional skills are positively and
significantly correlated with both cognitive skills and physical health (Pearson coefficients
are 0.10 and 0.27 respectively), physical health does not appear to be significantly correlated
with cognitive skills. These findings confirm the importance of including in the model
separate measures of the child’s skills that account for the multidimensionality of human
capital.
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The econometric specification we employ (see Section 4.3) requires a sufficient degree of
variability in the child human capital measures between stage 0 and stage 1, i.e. when
children are 4-5 and 6-7 years old. For the interpretation of our results, it is also important
to establish who are those children who experience more variation in their level of human
capital over time. Comparing the variance of the first difference of the three measures
of human capital described above, we find on average more variability among children of
non-working and low educated mothers as well as among those with no siblings and lower
level of endowment at birth (approximated by child birth weight and intensive care at
birth).
4.4.4 Additional variables
In the top panel of Table 4.4 we report descriptive statistics for the time variant covariates,
obtained by averaging them across the child’s life stages 1 and 2 (age 6-7 and 8-9). The
covariates include measures of school quality, family exogenous shocks, income and childcare.
School quality variables are constructed using data collected from the teacher questionnaire
on composition of their classes and the teacher’s characteristics. The average pupil-teacher
ratio is just over 20 and on average teachers have 16 years of experience.
The yearly household income, equivalised to account for the household composition by
using the OECD modified scale15, is on average equal to 46,743 AUD.
Family shocks are defined using four dummies that report whether in the year before the
interview the child has experienced a serious illness, injury or assault directly affecting (i)
one of the parents or another household member, (ii) a close relative or a family friend;
or the death of (iii) a grandparent, a parent or a sibling, (iv) a close family friend or a
relative. 5.8 per cent and 10 per cent of children in the sample have experienced a serious
illness of one of the household members or of a close relative (or family friend). About
3.7 per cent of children have experienced the death of a grandparent or of another family
member; while 18 per cent had a close family friend or relative that died.
Finally, we measure childcare inputs using a set of four variables. We consider whether the
main childcare arrangement is formal care, informal care or parental care only by defining
two dummy variables, taking value one in case of formal and informal childcare respectively
(parental care only is the left out reference category). We also add information on the
15The OECD modified scale is equal to (1 + 0.5 ∗ nadults+ 0.3 ∗ nchildren) with nadults and nchildren
measuring the numbers of adults and children in the household.
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number of hours spent in formal (informal) care for those children whose main arrangement
is formal (informal) care. The number of hours is measured as deviation from the average
hours computed considering all children for whom formal (informal) childcare is the main
arrangement in a specific child’s stage. The main childcare arrangement is informal care
for almost one in five children, formal care for 15.3 per cent, and parental childcare for the
remaining 66 per of children.
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Table 4.4. Descriptive Statistics. Control variables
Variable Mean SD
Time varying variables
Pupil-teacher ratio 20.848 6.849
Teacher’s years of experience 16.264 11.045
Equivalised household income 40,785.100 26,605.940
Family shocks
Sickness of a close relative (dummy) 0.058 0.233
Sickness of a close friend (dummy) 0.100 0.300
Death of a close relative (dummy) 0.037 0.190
Death of a close friend (dummy) 0.184 0.387
Hours of informal care (deviation from the mean) -0.152 2.788
Hours of formal care (deviation from the mean) -0.164 2.562
Mainly using informal care (dummy) 0.187 0.390
Mainly using formal care (dummy) 0.153 0.360
Time invariant variables
Intensive care at birth (dummy) 0.138 0.345
Male (dummy) 0.496 0.500
No. of children in the household 2.485 0.877
Mother with degree (dummy) 0.416 0.493
Unemployed or inactive mother (dummy) 0.198 0.398
Notes. Statistics of time invariant variables are computed using information in wave 1, when
children are 4-5 years old, except for mother’s variables which are measured in wave 2. Statistics
of time variant variables are obtained pooling observations when children are 6-7 and 8-9 years
old. Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
The bottom part of Table 4.4 shows the mean and standard deviations for selected time-
invariant child’s and mother’s variables.16 In our sample, about 50 per cent of children
are male, they live in households with an average of 2.5 children, and 14 per cent of them
have been admitted to neonatal intensive care unit at birth. Mothers’ socio-economic
status is proxied by education level, while employment status is included as a measure of
time constraint that affects the amount of time mothers can spend with their children.
42 per cent of mothers have at least a university degree, and 20 per cent are inactive or
unemployed.
We explore the relationship between maternal time investment, her working status and
educational level in Table 4.5.
16For the purpose of our analysis, we consider mother’s education and employment status as time invariant
and we measure these variables in child’s stage 2, when children are 8-9 years old.
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Table 4.5. Average mother’s time investment by education and working status
Mothers without Mothers with Total
university degree university degree
Working mothers 729.370 (681.482) 740.862 (572.685) 734.486 (634.956)
Non-working mothers 755.476 (682.885) 923.056 (640.702) 805.750 (673.146)
Total 735.565 (681.261) 766.821 (585.439) 748.582 (642.938)
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Employment status, educational level and time
spent with the child measured when children are 8-9 years old. Time investment in minutes.
Standard errors in parentheses. Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, wave
3.
We find that, in general, non-working mothers spend more time (806 minutes) with their
children compared to working mothers (734 minutes), although such differences are not
statistically significant. Evidence from the previous literature is quite mixed, with some
studies showing that mothers tend to reduce time spent on housework and leisure when
they experience time constraint, but leave the time devoted to childcare almost unchanged
(e.g. Gauthier et al., 2004, Monna and Gauthier, 2008, Guryan et al., 2008), and others
indicating a reduction in the time spent with children in the case of working mothers (Baker
and Milligan, 2010; Cawley and Liu, 2007). When distinguishing between mothers with
a university degree and those without such qualification, we observe that the difference
between working and non-working mothers is driven by highly-educated mothers. Among
this group, non-working mothers spend in a week 923 minutes with their child, while
employed mothers spend only 740 minutes. Instead, for lowly-educated mothers we find a
time investment of 729 and 755, respectively. This might depend on the different type of
occupation, with more educated mothers being more likely to be employed in jobs which
require spending more time working and more flexibility in the working schedule, which, in
turn, limits the time they can spend with their children.
Comparing the time investment of mothers with different levels of education, we observe
a small difference between the two groups, with more educated mothers investing more
time (767 minutes compared to 736 minutes).17 As suggested by Villena-Roldán and
Ríos-Aguilar (2012), this evidence can be confounded by observable characteristics of the
two groups of mothers. Indeed, we find a clear gradient among non-working mothers
(i.e. mothers who do not face time constraints): those with a university degree invest 923
minutes compared to the 755 minutes that mothers without a degree spend with their
children. Differences in the amount of time spent with their children by educational level
are also found in Datcher-Loury (1988), Bryant and Zick (1996), Kimmel and Connelly
17The difference is not statistically significant at 5 per cent level.
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(2007), Sandberg and Hofferth (2001) and Craig (2006).
4.5 Estimation results
In this section we assess empirically what type of investment strategy parents adopt. We
measure parents’ time investments as the weekly amount of minutes mothers (fathers)
spend with their child in formative activities and we examine whether parents tend to
adopt an investment strategy that is reinforcing, compensating or neutral to changes in
the child’s human capital, measured by physical health, cognitive and socio-emotional
skills. Section 4.5.1 presents our benchmark results for model 4.5, focusing on the mother’s
time investment using child fixed effect estimation with instrumental variables. We then
extend this model to allow the mother’s time investment to vary by her level of education
and working status (Section 4.5.2). Finally, in Section 4.5.3, we analyse the father’s time
investment and we estimate potential differences between mothers and fathers in their
investment behaviours for daughters and sons.
4.5.1 Main results
Table 4.6 shows the estimates of the investment model 4.5 where the dependent variable
measures the mother’s weekly time investment in minutes and the set of explanatory
variables includes (i) three measures of the child’s human capital (physical health, cognitive
skills and socio-emotional skills) standardized to have a mean of zero and a variance of one,
(ii) school investments, proxied by pupil-teacher ratio and the teacher’s years of experience,
(iii) equivalised household income, (iv) childcare inputs (two dummies indicating whether
formal or informal childcare is the main childcare arrangement, and the amount of hours
the child spends in the main type of childcare, expressed as deviation from the mean).
Notice that we do not include measures of the parents’ human capital, θPi . However, this
does not bias our results because we consider a child fixed effect model computed using
the first difference between stages and parents’ human capital is likely to be constant in
the two-year gap between the two stages.
In the first column, we report results obtained using child fixed effect without instrumental
variables (child FE), while in the second column we report child fixed effect estimation
obtained instrumenting the first differences of the three types of the child’s human capital
with the twice-lagged measures of human capital (child FE with IVs). Results from former
specifications are potentially biased by (i) a reverse causality issue, i.e. the fact that the
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mother’s investment in a stage can affect the child’s human capital in the same stage; (ii)
an endogeneity issue caused by unobserved time-variant variables that affect both the
mother’s investments and the child’s human capital in the same stage. On the contrary,
the FE estimation with instrumental variables is theoretically free of biases.
Both estimations suggest that mothers adopt a compensating behaviour for changes in the
child’s socio-emotional skills, but are indifferent to changes in the child’s physical health or
cognitive skills. A standard deviation decrease in the child’s socio-emotional skills leads to
an 89-minute increase in the weekly time investment when considering the FE without IVs,
and a 117-minute increase when adopting the instrumental variable approach. Based on
these results, the endogeneity biases do not seem to be a big concern for the FE estimation
without IVs.
Looking at the effect of the remaining covariates, we find the mothers’ time investment does
not seem to react to school inputs. In particular, changes in the pupil-teacher ratio and in
the teacher’s years of experience do not lead to any statistically significant effect on the
mother’s time investment. Differently from school inputs, we do find that the use of formal
childcare has a negative impact on the mother’s time investment, but only if the amount of
hours is above the average observed for children for whom formal care is the main type of
childcare arrangement. In particular, one hour of additional formal childcare (with respect
to the average) leads to a reduction of weekly mother’s time by about 30 minutes. On
the contrary, we find no effect of informal childcare as main childcare arrangement on the
mother’s time investments. This seems to suggest that formal childcare might be used as a
substitute for mother’s time investment.
In the bottom panel of Table 4.6, we provide evidence of the relevance of our instruments.
We report the F-tests for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stages, i.e. in
the regression of each of the three measures of human capital on the instruments, child fixed
effects and covariates (see Table 4.7 for the full set of first stage results). Given the large
F-statistics, we strongly reject the assumption of a zero effect of the instruments in each of
the first stage equations and we confirm the strong relevance of our instruments. We also
test the endogeneity of the child’s skills and health using a robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. The robust Hausman statistic and p-value suggest that there is no clear evidence of
endogeneity issues (p-value equal to 0.11).
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Table 4.6. Mother’s time investment model. Main results
Child fixed effects models
without IV with IV
Cognitive skill -17.049 52.778
(25.317) (47.122)
Socio-emotional skill -88.510*** -116.647*
(31.426) (61.443)
Physical health -0.923 -70.884
(27.284) (57.382)
Pupil-teacher ratio 20.866 10.704
(15.861) (16.239)
Pupil-teacher ratio (squared) -0.672 -0.392
(0.424) (0.436)
Teacher experience (years) 0.227 1.025
(1.902) (1.925)
Household income -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Hours of informal care -0.562 -10.827
(15.126) (15.477)
Hours of formal care -32.179** -29.227*
(15.688) (15.671)
Mainly using informal care -5.910 58.238
(84.763) (87.070)
Mainly using formal care 103.140 72.805
(104.004) (104.333)
Constant 767.527*** -92.522***
(158.065) (28.309)
Observations 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 122.51 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 102.02 [0.000]
Physical health - 85.72 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 5.96 [0.1136]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
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Table 4.7. Mother’s time investment model. First stage regressions
Dependent variable: first difference of
cognitive socio-emotional physical
skill skill health
∆ Pupil-teacher ratio -0.028 -0.000 0.014
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
∆ Pupil-teacher ratio (squared) 0.001* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Teacher experience (years) -0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Household income 1.03e-06 0.000 -0.000
(1.62e-06) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Hours of informal care 0.010 -0.010 0.012
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
∆ Hours of formal care 0.017 0.004 -0.008
(0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
∆ Mainly using informal care 0.081 -0.003 -0.083
(0.097) (0.081) (0.095)
∆ Mainly using formal care -0.011 0.072 0.012
(0.116) (0.097) (0.114)
Double lagged cognitive skill -0.584*** 0.042* 0.052*
(0.031) (0.026) (0.030)
Double lagged socio-emotional skill 0.038 -0.460*** 0.075**
(0.032) (0.027) (0.031)
Double lagged physical health -0.035 0.052* -0.518***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.033)
Constant 0.009 0.036 0.009
(0.032) (0.026) (0.031)
Observations 1,820 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910 910
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. ∆
corresponds to first difference. Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves
1-3.
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4.5.2 The heterogeneity of the mothers’ investment behaviour
In this section, we explore whether the response of the mothers’ time investment varies
across mothers with different levels of education and working status. We start by allowing
the effects of the child’s physical health, cognitive and socio-emotional skills to differ
between mothers with and without a university degree by simply considering an investment
model with interactions between the three measures of the child’s human capital and a
dummy for mothers with a degree. We then consider another model where we allow the
effects of the child’s human capital measures to differ between working and non-working
mothers.
Table 4.8 shows the results for mothers with different levels of education. Because we do
not reject the exogeneity of the child’s human capital (the endogeneity test is reported
in the last row of Table 4.8), we focus our discussion on the estimation without IVs (first
column in the top panel of Table 4.8). We find that while mothers with low education show
compensating behaviour for socio-emotional skills, highly-educated mothers compensate
for a lack of the child’s cognitive skills. Evidence of differences in the mother’s investment
behaviour by educational level are found also in Hsin (2012) and Restrepo (2012), who study
the mother’s investment response to differences between siblings in birth weight. Using a
sibling fixed effect estimation and without controlling for the endogeneity of the investments,
Hsin (2012) finds that highly-educated mothers tend to compensate by spending more time,
and especially more educational time, with their lower-birth-weight child. However, she also
finds that lowly-educated mothers reinforce for birth weight differences between siblings.
Similarly, Restrepo (2012) adopts a sibling fixed effect estimation, but he also controls for
prenatal investments (e.g. smoking and drinking during pregnancy) to reduce the potential
bias caused by the endogeneity of postnatal investments. He finds that parents with higher
(lower) education increase (decrease) cognitive stimulation and emotional support for the
child with lower birth weight.
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Table 4.8. Mother’s time investment model by mother’s educational level
Child fixed effects models
without IV with IVs
Mothers without a degree
Cognitive skill 52.890 61.218
(32.198) (58.249)
Socio-emotional skill -93.007** -148.554*
(39.298) (75.889)
Physical health 13.266 -89.991
(34.057) (72.546)
Mothers with a degree
Cognitive skill -127.220*** 37.442
(40.527) (79.935)
Socio-emotional skill -74.999 -54.088
(51.972) (106.390)
Physical health -19.544 -40.213
(45.410) (94.761)
Constant 802.786*** -90.452***
(158.645) (28.818)
Observations 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 61.52 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 50.94 [0.000]
Physical health - 42.97 [0.000]
Cognitive skill (interaction) - 52.20 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill (interaction) - 44.97 [0.000]
Physical health (interaction) - 42.72 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 9.192 [0.1631]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). All models include the full set of covariates: pupil-teacher ratio, teacher’s
years of experience, household income and childcare measures. Data source: Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
Mothers who work are likely to face time constraints when deciding how much time to
invest in their children. Consequently, there might be differences in the time investment
behaviour between working and non-working mothers. We have already discussed above
(see Section 4.4) the potential mechanisms leading to differences in the amount of time
that working and non-working mothers spend with their child. In Table 4.9, we show
whether these time constraints also change the response of the mother’s time investment to
variation in their child’s human capital. As in the previous estimation results, there is no
evidence of an endogeneity bias and therefore we focus on the estimation results without
IVs reported in column 1 of Table 4.9. All mothers seem to compensate for negative
changes in the child’s socio-emotional skills regardless of their working status. However,
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while non-working mothers compensate by spending an additional 165 minutes with their
child for a decrease in the child’s socio-emotional skills of one standard deviation, working
mothers spend only an additional 65 minutes.
Table 4.9. Mother’s time investment model by mother’s working status
Child fixed effects models
without IV with IVs
Mothers with a job
Cognitive skill -7.641 60.047
(28.942) (53.722)
Socio-emotional skill -64.907* -72.483
(35.981) (71.428)
Physical health 7.694 -73.183
(30.915) (64.950)
Mothers without a job
Cognitive skill -42.037 19.866
(52.451) (102.305)
Socio-emotional skill -165.180** -250.884**
(64.630) (119.808)
Physical health -31.821 -75.376
(58.251) (122.394)
Constant 757.416*** -89.150***
(158.222) (28.529)
No. observations 1,820 1,820
No. children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 61.42 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 51.35 [0.000]
Physical health - 42.75 [0.000]
Cognitive skill (interaction) - 54.70 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill (interaction) - 61.57 [0.000]
Physical health (interaction) - 43.06 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 7.10 [0.3120]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). All models include the full set of covariates: pupil-teacher ratio, teacher’s
years of experience, household income and childcare measures. Data source: Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
4.5.3 Differences in parents’ investments in daughters and sons
As discussed above, there exists evidence of differences in parents’ preferences over the
gender of their children. These preferences may lead to differences in parental investments
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between mothers and fathers as well as between sons and daughters. In this section, we
assess the presence and size of such differences in the response of parental time investments
to changes in the child’s human capital.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.10, we report for comparison our benchmark results for the
mother’s time investment model using child FE estimation with and without IVs, while in
columns 3 and 4 we show the corresponding estimation results when allowing the effects
of the three measures of the child’s human capital to differ for sons and daughters. Since
the endogeneity bias does not seem to be an issue, we focus on the results reported in
column 3 which show that mothers’ investments do not depend on child’s gender. Their
investment strategy is neutral to changes in either daughter or son’s cognitive skills and
health, while it is compensating for negative changes in socio-emotional skills, with no
statistically significant differences between daughters and sons. For one standard deviation
decrease in socio-emotional skills, mothers increase their time investment by about one
hour and a half for both daughters and sons.
Table 4.11 reports the same estimation results when considering fathers’ rather than
mothers’ time investments. The endogeneity tests reported at the bottom of Table 4.11
suggest that we can reject at the 5 per cent level of significance the assumption of no
endogeneity. Consequently, the child FE estimations with IVs are preferable and we focus
our discussion on the results of such estimations.
Similarly to mothers, fathers do not react to changes in their child’s health and cognitive
skills, whereas they compensate for decreases in socio-emotional skills (compare column 1
in Table 4.10 for mothers to column 2 in Table 4.11 for fathers). Nevertheless, there are
also some evident differences in the investment behaviour of mothers and fathers. First, on
average, fathers compensate less for negative shocks in their child’s socio-emotional skills.
For one standard deviation decrease in the child’s socio-emotional skills, fathers increase
their time investment by about one hour, which is about half of the corresponding effect
found for mothers. Second, while there are no differences in this compensating strategy by
child’s gender for mothers, we find father’s compensating effect being statistically significant
at the 5 per cent level only for sons (85 minutes). This seems to suggest that while fathers
strongly compensate for their sons, they do not react to changes in their daughters’ skills.
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Table 4.10. Mother’s time investment model by child’s gender
Child fixed effects
without IVs with IVs without IVs with IVs
(baseline) (baseline) (interactions) (interactions)
Baseline / Sons
Cognitive skill -17.049 52.778 -48.121 54.202
(25.317) (47.122) (36.000) (71.976)
Socio-emotional skill -88.510*** -116.647* -91.868** -134.602*
(31.426) (61.443) (41.836) (81.364)
Physical health -0.923 -70.884 21.235 -15.731
(27.284) (57.382) (40.537) (83.885)
Daughters
Cognitive skill - - 15.507 51.626
(35.804) (66.949)
Socio-emotional skill - - -80.760* -103.913
(48.104) (98.414)
Physical health - - -21.311 -121.682
(36.849) (76.953)
Constant 767.527*** -92.522*** 761.643*** -94.409***
(158.065) (28.309) (158.504) (29.442)
Observations 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 122.51 [0.000] - 62.20 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 102.02 [0.000] - 52.60 [0.000]
Physical health - 85.72 [0.000] - 43.25 [0.000]
Cognitive skill (interaction) - - - 69.96 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill (interaction) - - - 52.17 [0.000]
Physical health (interaction) - - - 44.55 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 5.96 [0.1136] - 6.23 [0.398]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). All models include the full set of covariates: pupil-teacher ratio, teacher’s
years of experience, household income and childcare measures. Data source: Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
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Table 4.11. Father’s time investment model by child’s gender
Child fixed effects
without IVs with IVs without IVs with IVs
(baseline) (baseline) (interactions) (interactions)
Baseline / Sons
Cognitive skill -6.946 0.592 -9.967 -27.860
(12.977) (24.405) (18.471) (37.421)
Socio-emotional skill 12.381 -66.310** 7.563 -84.560**
(16.108) (31.822) (21.466) (42.303)
Physical health -9.882 9.488 -16.672 32.402
(13.985) (29.719) (20.799) (43.613)
Daughters
Cognitive skill - - -3.669 29.696
(18.371) (34.808)
Socio-emotional skill - - 20.316 -36.258
(24.682) (51.167)
Physical health - - -4.323 -14.698
(18.907) ( 40.009)
Constant 239.712*** 1.147 238.113*** 4.849
(81.021) (14.661) (81.328) (15.307)
Observations 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 122.51 [0.000] - 62.20 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 102.02 [0.000] - 52.60 [0.000]
Physical health - 85.72 [0.000] - 43.25 [0.000]
Cognitive skill (interaction) - - - 69.96 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill (interaction) - - - 52.17 [0.000]
Physical health (interaction) - - - 44.55 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 9.54 [0.023] - 15.35 [0.018]
Notes.*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). All models include the full set of covariates: pupil-teacher ratio, teacher’s
years of experience, household income and childcare measures. Data source: Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
4.6 Robustness checks
4.6.1 Omission of time variant variables
Our benchmark models allow us to estimate the causal effect of the child’s human capital
on parental time investment accounting for: (i) other types of investments (school, childcare
and household income), (ii) observed and unobserved time invariant characteristics (e.g.
parental human capital), (iii) the reverse causality issue (i.e. the fact that parental time
investment can have a causal effect on the child’s human capital), (iv) the endogeneity issue
caused by unobserved idiosyncratic shocks in stage t that can affect both time investment
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and child’s human capital in stage t. However, the response of mother’s time investment to
changes in the child’s human capital could still be biased if there are omitted time-variant
variables that are correlated with the child’s human capital in stage (t− 1) and that are
relevant to explain the mother’s investment in stage t.
Previous research has identified health shocks occurring to parents or other family members
as important predictors of child development (Westermaier et al., 2013, Adda et al., 2012
and Morefield et al., 2011). These shocks might also limit the time mothers can spend with
their children. We account for these exogenous shocks by adding to the investment model a
set of four dummy variables indicating the death of a family member, the death of a close
relative or family friend, serious illness of a family member, and serious illness of a relative
or a close family friend. Table 4.12 shows results with these additional covariates for the
two estimations described above, the child FE estimation without and with instruments.
We find that the coefficients associated with these variables are not statistically significant
at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that the mother’s investment is not affected by exogenous
family health shocks, at least as defined in our sample.
4.6.2 Only-child and multiple-child households
So far our analysis has ignored the presence of siblings in the household and their impact
on parental time investments. Because the time available to parents is limited, the presence
of other children can lead to a reduction of the parental time invested in each specific
child. For multiple-child households our model of parental time investment in a child (see
Equation 4.5) is misspecified because of the omission of his/her sibling’s health, cognitive
and socio-emotional skills, which parents are likely to take into account when deciding how
much time to spend with each of their children.
If we assume that parents who compensate for changes in their child’s human capital across
time are also compensating for differences in human capital between siblings, and that
human capital measures are positively correlated between siblings, then the omission of
the siblings’ measures of human capital leads to an attenuation bias of the effect of the
child’s health, cognitive skills and socio-emotional skills on the parental investment in the
child. This is because under the assumption of compensating investments between children
and the presence of parental time constraints, a decrease in a sibling’s human capital leads
parents to invest more in the sibling and less in the child in question.18
18A similar attenuation bias would exist if parents adopt an investment strategy that reinforces for
differences in human capital between siblings as well as for changes in human capital of the same child
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Table 4.12. Mother’s time investment model. Additional family shocks
covariates
Child fixed effects models
without IV with IV
Cognitive skill -16.766 54.533
(25.376) (47.085)
Socio-emotional skill -87.616*** -118.196*
(31.559) (61.618)
Physical health -0.109 -70.861
(27.380) (57.533)
Pupil-teacher ratio 20.777 10.841
(15.902) (16.272)
Pupil-teacher ratio (squared) -0.671 -0.398
(0.425) (0.437)
Teacher experience (years) 0.179 1.010
(1.908) (1.932)
Household income -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Hours of informal care -0.108 -10.156
(15.183) (15.521)
Hours of formal care -31.133** -28.457*
(15.750) (15.706)
Mainly using informal care -2.830 58.003
(85.077) (87.270)
Mainly using formal care 102.972 72.958
(104.178) (104.358)
Family shocks
Sickness of a close relative 7.583 -2.553
(89.414) (90.295)
Sickness of a close friend 84.043 59.031
(66.849) (67.025)
Death of a close relative 47.357 23.325
(100.051) (99.821)
Death of a close friend 9.503 15.915
(48.959) (49.190)
Constant 756.055*** -89.834***
(158.608) (28.546)
Observations 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 122.88 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 101.74 [0.000]
Physical health - 85.50 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 6.275 [0.099]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
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Table 4.13. Mother’s time investment model by number of children in the
household
Child fixed effects models
without IV with IVs
Only-child households
Cognitive skill 62.621 123.842
(83.563) (131.034)
Socio-emotional skill -190.790** -307.263**
(96.564) (145.157)
Physical health 119.486 75.803
(88.360) (150.863)
Multiple-child households
Cognitive skill -21.494 43.549
(26.416) (49.396)
Socio-emotional skill -80.195** -88.537
( 32.873) (65.191)
Physical health -11.786 -87.095
(28.242) (58.910)
Constant 957.341*** -90.430***
(268.122) (28.481)
Observations 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 61.17 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 52.21 [0.000]
Physical health - 43.03 [0.000]
Cognitive skill (interaction) - 59.94 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill (interaction) - 49.20 [0.000]
Physical health (interaction) - 44.77 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 7.09 [0.3131]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). All models include the full set of covariates: pupil-teacher ratio, teacher’s
years of experience, household income and childcare measures. Data source: Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
Because we do not observe information on siblings’ human capital, we cannot solve this
omission variable issue. However, we are able to estimate model 4.5, allowing for different
parental behaviour according to the number of children present in the household. We
find that for one standard deviation decrease in the child’s socio-emotional skills mothers
compensate by spending 191 minutes more per week with their child when there are no other
children and 81 minutes more per week if there are other children (see Table 4.13). This
result seems to confirm that mothers compensate for changes in the child’s socio-emotional
skills across time and for differences in socio-emotional skills between siblings.
across time.
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4.6.3 Ordinary days
One of the limitations of using time use diaries consists of the fact that days in which
the information is collected may be not representative of the parent-child typical time
interaction. This can happen, for example, because diaries are filled during a holiday or
when the child or the parent is sick. If this is the case, our estimates would be affected by
measurement error and potentially biased if the error is correlated with the explanatory
variables or the true time investment.
As a robustness check, we estimate the main models using the ordinary-day sample, which
includes only information on parental time investments in ordinary days (see Section 4.4 for
more details). As shown in Table 4.14, results are qualitatively similar to those obtained
using the full sample. In particular, mothers appear to increase their time by 139 minutes
for a one standard deviation decrease in the child’s socio-emotional skills. We find also a
reaction of the mother’s time investment to changes in the child’s physical health, although
this reaction is statistically significant only at the 10 per cent level.
4.6.4 Alternative distributional assumptions
In Table 4.15, we introduce some non-linearities in the effect of child human capital on
mother’s investment by estimating a model where mothers’ time investments are expressed
in logarithms.19 In this specification, the estimated coefficients for health, cognitive
and socio-emotional skills are interpretable as the relative change in the mother’s time
investment for one standard deviation increase in the corresponding human capital measure.
The estimation results are in line with our benchmark results. In particular, looking at the
child fixed effect estimation results (column 1 in Table 4.15), we find that for a decrease
of one standard deviation in the child’s socio-emotional skills the mother increases her
time investment by approximately 20 per cent, while her response to changes in the child’s
health or cognitive skills is not statistically significantly different from zero.
19To overcome the problem of zero values for the time investment, we add one minute.
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Table 4.14. Mother’s time investment model. Ordinary days sample
Child fixed effects models
without IV with IVs
Cognitive skill 20.434 -57.212
(52.100) (94.793)
Socio-emotional skill -139.193** -113.450
(61.642) (104.553)
Physical health -97.659* -103.827
(56.288) (92.869)
Constant 517.279* -168.810***
(302.918) (55.301)
Observations 316 316
Children 158 158
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 24.74 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 24.84 [0.000]
Physical health - 30.34 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 1.05 [0.7899]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). All models include the full set of covariates: pupil-teacher ratio, teacher’s
years of experience, household income and childcare measures. Data source: Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
4.6.5 Overidentified model
We also provide evidence of the validity of our instrumental variables by increasing the
number of instruments and computing an over-identifying test (Sargan test). Besides the
twice-lagged measures of the child’s human capital, we also use their interaction with a
dummy for child’s neonatal intensive care. These additional instruments are justified by
the fact that a negative health shock at birth might affect the child development process.
The estimated coefficients using the additional instruments are reported in column 2 of
Table 4.16 and do not seem to differ from our benchmark results, which we report, for
convenience, in column 1. The Sargan test has a p-value of 0.6486, which suggests that we
cannot reject the validity of the instruments used in the analysis.
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Table 4.15. Mother’s time investment model. Logarithm of time investment
Child fixed effects models with
without IVs with IVs
Cognitive skill -0.066 0.075
(0.077) (0.143)
Socio-emotional skill -0.224** -0.210
(0.096) (0.186)
Physical health 0.105 -0.033
(0.083) (0.174)
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.042 -0.000
(0.048) (0.049)
Pupil-teacher ratio (squared) -0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Teacher experience (years) 0.000 0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Household income -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Hours of informal care -0.006 -0.046
(0.046) (0.047)
Hours of formal care -0.003 0.007
(0.048) (0.047)
Mainly using informal care -0.187 0.068
(0.259) (0.264)
Mainly using formal care -0.457 -0.573*
(0.318) (0.316)
Constant 6.180*** -0.360***
(0.483) (0.086)
Observations 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill - 122.51 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill - 102.02 [0.000]
Physical health - 85.72 [0.000]
Endogeneity test - 2.38 [0.497]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. In the estimation with IV twice-lagged skills and health are used
as instruments (IV). Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
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Table 4.16. Mother’s time investment model. Additional instruments
Child fixed effects models
with IVs with IVs
(1) (2)
exactly identified over-identified
Cognitive skill 52.778 54.251
(47.122) (47.029)
Socio-emotional skill -116.647* -119.846*
(61.443) (61.161)
Physical health -70.884 -62.717
(57.382) (56.995)
Pupil-teacher ratio 10.704 10.601
(16.239) (16.230)
Pupil-teacher ratio (squared) -0.392 -0.389
(0.436) (0.436)
Teacher experience (years) 1.025 0.995
(1.925) (1.924)
Household income -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Hours of informal care -10.827 -11.068
(15.477) (15.467)
Hours of formal care -29.227* -29.347*
(15.671) (15.662)
Mainly using informal care 58.238 58.943
(87.070) (87.022)
Mainly using formal care 72.805 74.106
(104.333) (104.270)
Constant -92.522*** -92.272***
(28.309) (28.293)
Observations 1,820 1,820
Children 910 910
F tests (first stages)
Cognitive skill 122.51 [0.000] 61.27 [0.000]
Socio-emotional skill 102.02 [0.000] 51.42 [0.000]
Physical health 85.72 [0.000] 43.40 [0.000]
Endogeneity test 5.96 [0.1136] 5.71 [0.1267]
Sargan test - 1.65 [0.6476]
Notes. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors reported in parentheses. P-values
reported in square brackets. Column 1 shows results from the exactly identified model, where
twice-lagged skills and health are used as instruments. Column 2 provides results from the over-
identified model, where twice-lagged skills and health as well as their interactions with a dummy
for child’s neonatal intensive care are used as instruments (IV). Data source: Longitudinal
Study of Australian Children.
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4.7 Conclusions
This paper assesses for the first time in the literature whether parental time investments
respond to changes across time in three different dimensions of their child’s human capital,
which are physical health, cognitive skills and socio-emotional skills. Unlike previous studies
that use proxies for parental time investments, we employ information from time-use diaries
collected in the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children to derive a direct measure of
the weekly amount of time that mothers and fathers spend with their children in formative
activities. From a methodological point of view, estimating parental response to the child’s
skills is challenging because of potential unobservables that may affect both the child’s
human capital and parental investments and because of the reverse causality. We tackle
these issues using child fixed effects estimation with instrumental variables in a way similar
to the approach proposed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995).
Our estimates of the parental time investment model reveal some interesting and important
findings. Both mothers and fathers compensate for low socio-emotional skills by increasing
the time they spend with their child doing formative activities. However, when we compare
fathers’ and mothers’ investment behaviours, we find that this effect is larger for mothers
than for fathers. In addition, while mothers respond similarly for changes in socio-emotional
skills of sons and daughters, fathers adopt a compensating strategy for sons and a neutral
strategy for daughters. Overall these findings show that parents are adverse to inequity
and adopt investment strategies that compensate for reductions in the human capital of
their children, at least in the case of low socio-emotional skills. This evidence, combined
with previous research that finds a positive effect of parental investments on children’s
human capital, suggests that public policies targeted at parents could represent an effective
way to improve child development.
We also observe differences in the parental time investment response across mothers with
different socio-economic status. In particular, working mothers seem to compensate less
for low socio-emotional skills than non-working mothers and this might suggest that time
constraints working mothers face affect their ability to take care of their children. If
this is the case, the implementation of policies that promote family-friendly practices in
the workplace, such as working occasionally from home or flexi-time, may allow working
mothers to better balance work time and time spent with their child and therefore improve
child development. However, from our analysis we cannot infer the ’intensity’ of mother’s
time investment. In other words, it may be that the quality of the time investment of
mothers with different working conditions differ. For example working mothers may put
120
more effort to compensate for a reduction in their child human capital because of the
time constraint they face. This would imply that there is not necessarily a welfare loss
for children of working mothers compared to children of unemployed mothers. Further
analysis with more refined measures of the quality of parental time investment is required
to support effective policy interventions.
Additionally, our results show that mothers with a university degree compensate for low
cognitive skills and do not react to changes in socio-emotional skills, while mothers without
a degree are sensitive to changes in child’s socio-emotional skills. Because lowly-educated
mothers do not seem to compensate for a decrease in their child’s cognitive abilities,
inequalities in cognitive skills across children are expected to be reduced by implementing
policies that raise parental awareness of their child’s cognitive performance and of the
importance of parental inputs. Schools can play a key role in this context by organizing
workshops and events aimed at developing parental skills to support their children’s
cognitive development and involving parents more directly in their children’s education
and school activities (see Mayer et al., 2015).
A major question that arise from these findings concerns the identification of the mechanisms
explaining such differences in the investment response by mother’s education and more in
general by socio-economic status. A potential reason could be that lowly-educated mothers
are less able to perceive the cognitive needs of their child and consequently compensate
less. Another explanation could relate to differences in their expectations and preferences
for child quality, with highly-educated parents having higher preferences for the child’s
quality in terms of cognitive abilities. We leave the investigation of these questions for
future research.
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4.8 Appendix A
Table 4.A. List of developmental activities included in the parental time
investment measure
Category List of Activities
Eating eating, drinking
Personal Care bathing, dressing, hair care, health care
Educational Activities read a story, talked/sung to, sing/talk, helping with chores, job
Leisure Activities
organised sport or physical activity (e.g.swim/dance), other
organised lesson or activity (e.g.music, drama), active free play
(e.g. running, climbing, ball game), quiet free play (e.g. craft,
dress-ups), taken places with adult (e.g.shopping), visiting people
or special event, walking (for travel or fun), ride bicycle or trike
(for travel or fun)
Psychological Support held, cuddled, hugged, comforted, soothed
Notes. Data source: Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, waves 1-3.
In the LSAC, time-use diaries allow to record contemporaneous activities in each time
interval, implying that the sum of child’s time could exceed 24 hours in a day. Differently
than other datasets that comprise time use diaries (as the Child Development Supplement
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), the LSAC does not distinguish among primary
and secondary activities. Therefore we have defined an algorithm in order to define the
main (or primary) activity when two or more activities are recorded:
1. Educational Activities
2. Psychological Support
3. Leisure Activities
4. Eating
5. Personal Care
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4.9 Appendix B
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) provides a measure of listening
comprehension for spoken words in standard English and a screening test for verbal ability.
The main part of the test involves items presented in picture plates, arranged in a multiple-
choice format. Children are asked to ”select the picture that best illustrates the meaning
of the stimulus word presented orally by the examiner” (Dunn and Dunn 1997).
The Strength and Difficulty Questionnaire (SDQ) is a behavioural screening ques-
tionnaire composed by 25 items divided in 5 subscales (peer problems, emotional symptoms,
hyperactivity, conduct problems and prosocial behaviour) . The parent, who was the main
carer, reports whether the description was ”certainly true”, ”somewhat true” or ”not true”.
Each item scores from 0 (non true) to 2 (certainly true). Higher scores indicate more
negative symptoms, except for the scores indicating prosocial behaviour. Here below we
report the questions asked in the SDQ.
• SDQ Peer problems subscale: mean of 5 parent-rated items assessing problems in the
child’s ability to form positive relationships with other children
– rather solitary, tends to play alone
– does not have at least a good friend
– generally not liked by other children
– picked on or bullied y other children
– gets on better with adults than with other children
• SDQ Emotional symptoms subscale : mean of 5 parent-rated assessing a child’s
frequency of display of negative emotional states :
– often complains of headaches, stomach aches or sickness
– many worries, often seems worried
– often unhappy, down-hearted or tearful
– nervous or clingy in new situations, easily loses confidence
– many fears, easily scared
• SDQ Hyperactivity subscale: mean of 5 parent-rated items assessing child’s fidgetiness,
concentration span and impulsiveness:
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– restless, overactive, cannot stay still for long
– constantly fidgeting or squirming
– easily distracted, concentration wanders
– does not stop and thinks things out before acting
– does not sees tasks through to the end, poor attention span
• SDQ Conduct subscale: mean of 5 parent-rated items assessing child’s tendency to
display problem behaviours when interacting with others:
– often has temper tantrums or hot tempers
– not generally obedient, usually does not what adult requests
– often fights with other children or bullies them
– often argumentative with adults
– can be spiteful with others
• SDQ Prosocial subscale: mean of 5 parent-rated items assessing the child’s propensity
to behave in a way that is considerate helpful to others:
– considerate of other people’s feelings
– shares readily with other children
– helpful if someone is hurt, upset or feeling ill
– kind to younger children
– often volunteers to help others
The PEDS Physical health subscale is part of the Paediatric Quality of Life Inventory
that measures health-related quality of life in children and adolescents. It integrates a
variety of scales that capture different aspects of child’s health: physical functioning,
emotional functioning, social functioning and school functioning.
We focus on the physical health subscale composed by the following 8 items:
• Problems with walking
• Problems with running
• Problems with sports and exercise
124
• Problems with heavy lifting
• Problems in bathing
• Problems helping to pick up toys
• Problems with hurts or aches
• Problems with low energy levels
For each item the parent is asked to choose among 5 alternatives to describe the frequency
of these problems in the last month: (1) never, (2) almost never, (3) sometimes, (4) often,
(5) almost always.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis presents empirical evidence on a variety of aspects of human capital, focusing
on different groups of individuals (mothers, patients in need of a coronary bypass and
children) and exploiting alternative data sources (longitudinal surveys on children and
their families and administrative longitudinal data on hospital inpatient admissions) with
the aim of informing policy interventions.
Chapter 2 shows that emergency caesarean deliveries have a detrimental impact on mothers’
mental health by increasing their risk of developing postnatal depression in the first nine
months after childbirth by 12 per cent, compared to natural deliveries. Because depressed
mothers generally show less attentiveness and responsiveness to their children’s needs (for
example, fewer mother-child interactions), this effect might also negatively impact child
development.
The results presented in Chapter 2 shed light on the health and economic costs of emergency
caesarean deliveries and have important policy implications. First, they support the World
Health Organization’s recommendation to reduce the utilization of this procedure when
alternative methods are available (e.g stimulated labor or assisted births) in order to limit
the negative impact of caesareans on women’s psychological and social well-being. Secondly,
governments should consider policies that offer psychological support services to mothers
in the first months after childbirth to further limit the occurrence of postnatal depression
among new mothers. Thirdly, reducing the utilisation of this procedure is expected to not
only contribute to improving mothers’ mental health, but also to bring further benefits for
their families (and for children’s human capital in particular). Finally, this study suggests
the importance of also taking into account intangible health costs when evaluating the
cost-effectiveness of caesarean deliveries.
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The limitations of the UK Millennium Cohort Study employed in the empirical analysis open
the door to further research in this area. A longitudinal dataset with detailed information
on mother’s health measured before and after the delivery would confirm these results
using alternative econometric approaches and fewer assumptions. In addition, it would be
useful to explore whether similar results are found when considering objective measures
of the mother’s health and socio-economic status, as opposed to self-reported measures
typically characterising survey data. This can be achieved by combining hospital records on
childbirths (such as the maternity data available as part of the Hospital Episode Statistics
for England) and information on mothers’ primary care visits, as depression is usually
diagnosed by general practitioners during routine visits. Additionally, it would be important
to link such information with administrative or census data providing details on income,
education, working experience and other socio-economic characteristics. Unfortunately, the
linkage of different data sources necessary to further explore this research question is not
yet possible, at least in England. This highlights a more general need in economics and
social sciences for making the linkage of administrative and survey data available in order
to allow for policy-relevant research, which could in turn benefit individuals and their lives.
Chapter 3 informs policy on the relative merit of waiting times, a rationing mechanism
often adopted in countries that offer universal health insurance coverage combined with
constraints on capacity. Long waiting times for coronary bypass in the English NHS
hospitals are found to not increase the risk of in-hospital mortality and to have only a weak
(statistically significant at the 10 per cent level) and a small magnitude effect (doubling
the waiting time increases the risk of emergency readmission from 4.07 per cent to 4.48
per cent) on the risk of emergency readmission for any cause in the 28 days following the
discharge for the surgery.
These results, robust to different model specifications, seem to support the utilization
of waiting times as a form of rationing to limit the excess demand for healthcare. In
addition they suggest that the current prioritisation system, where higher severity patients
wait shorter and lower severity patients wait longer, works well, avoiding waiting times
to negatively affect patients’ health. However, while this study contributes to the public
debate on the utilization of waiting times for elective healthcare services, further research
is required to compare waiting times over other forms of rationing, such as co-payments
and direct rationing. In particular, it is important to provide additional evidence on the
waiting times effect by focusing on conditions with different degrees of urgency and on
alternative health outcome measures.
Indeed, while this study finds very little evidence of long waiting times affecting the
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probability of dying or being readmitted after the surgery, it might still be that patients
derive disutility from the delay (for example, due to the uncertainty and pain or disability
caused by the health condition). Alternative and less extreme health outcome measures,
which can be used to capture other negative effects of long waiting times, include patients’
self-reported measures of pain, discomfort and mobility. These outcomes have been only
recently introduced in the Hospital Episode Statistics and are currently available for a
limited set of procedures (hip replacement, knee replacement, varicose vein and groin
hernia surgery). To extend our analysis, we would require similar information with details
on patients’ health-related quality of life measured before and after the surgery, and also
for patients waiting for other treatments (such as coronary bypass surgery).
An aspect left for future research is the investigation of whether findings shown in Chapter
3 can be generalised to patients suffering from conditions with different degrees of urgency
(such as cancer, in-grown nail and hernia). Indeed, we may expect that for patients with
more severe conditions long waits have a larger negative impact on their health with respect
to patients with less severe conditions.
Chapter 4 adds to the knowledge on the determinants of parental time investments in
children and demonstrates how mothers compensate for negative changes in their children’s
behaviours by increasing the amount of time they spend on formative activities with them.
On the contrary, mothers do not seem to react when children experience a reduction
in their cognitive skills or in their physical health, suggesting the importance of setting
policy interventions that help mothers improve their parenting behaviour and to guarantee
children full support in all the dimensions of their human capital.
The empirical evidence of different compensating strategies between highly- and lowly-
educated mothers, with the former compensating for cognitive shocks and the latter for
reductions in children’s behaviours, further demonstrates the necessity to raise mothers’
awareness of their offspring’s needs and of their responsibility in fostering child development.
This purpose can be achieved with the contribution of schools and teachers who can
set initiatives aimed at directly promoting parents participation in child education and
development. A natural question that arises from this heterogeneous result and opens
the door to future research concerns the potential mechanisms that explain differences in
investment behaviours between mothers with different levels of education. Future studies
are expected to investigate whether such variations are driven by differences in the quality
of the interventions (i.e. the type of activities mothers with different levels of education
are more like to be engaged in), in the perception of children’s needs or in their preferences
and expectations for the child’s quality.
128
Furthermore Chapter 4 contributes to the debate on the role of the mother’s employment
status on child development. The larger compensating effect in case of an increase in
child’s behavioural problems observed for non-working mothers with respect to employed
mothers seems to suggest that mothers face a time constraint that limits their ability to
take care of their children. Therefore, more flexible work arrangements that allow mothers
to spend more time with their children are expected to be associated with an improvement
in their ability to respond to children’s needs, and as a result, to improvements in child
development.
While this study follows the existing literature by focusing mainly on mothers’ time
investments, it also explores differences in investment behaviours between mothers and
fathers. Previous research has shown that parental investments (both in terms of financial
resources and time allocation) differ with the gender of the parent and of the child as well.
This study confirms such results and finds that fathers adopt a compensating investment
strategy for sons and a neutral strategy for daughters. On the contrary, mothers’ investment
does not differ by child’s gender. These results leave space for future research to identify
the drivers of fathers’ investment behaviour and, in particular, to distinguish between the
effects of fathers’ preferences and time constraints.
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